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Introduction 
 
Relational Selves  
  
 
The texts in this dissertation are all engaged in the project of articulating a particularized 
literary self.  And yet, I argue, they are also deeply invested in dissolving the boundaries 
that would separate that particularized self from its various others: from the resplendent 
bodies of nature, from the frigid interests of the family, from the transitory affections of 
lovers, and from the fleeting pleasures of the orgy.  The radically relational literary selves 
that I foreground here find definition and autonomy, paradoxically, through their widely 
dispersed investments of affect.  Through the practice of sentimental mediation, they 
develop self-knowledge by seeking contingent but powerful connections to others.  We 
imagine the eighteenth century to be a time when modern individuals constituted 
themselves against the forces of communal obligation, when marriage emerged as a 
union based on singular affection, and when sex became a definitive, if troubling, 
category of personal identity.  But I claim that a libertine logic of communal attraction, 
spontaneous affiliation, and transitory affection remains central to the literary production 
of modern selfhood in the eighteenth century. 
The term “libertine logic” emerges from my dissertation’s focus on sexual 
relationships as particularly formative for the literary self in the eighteenth century.  The 
figure of the libertine, a character at once demonstrably anti-social and yet excessively 
available, fiercely independent and yet undeniably the product of his conquests, embodies 
the dialectic between feeling self and eroticized community that my dissertation asserts is 
vital to the eighteenth-century understanding of subjectivity.1  Thus I argue that libertine 
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affections remain wildly indiscriminate in British literature beyond the Restoration, that 
they persist in the “Augustan” poetry of the early eighteenth century, and that they are 
central to the domestic sensibilities of mid-century fiction.  I not only revise literary-
historical lineages of the early English novel that see domestic writing as a departure 
from the more amatory sensibilities of the Restoration, but also reassess the tendency in 
sexuality studies to assume that libertine desire is truncated, made polite, and 
“reformulated” into “the privileged site of an emerging heterosexual hierarchy defining 
‘male’ as that which corresponds to ‘female’ as a limit” by the middle of the eighteenth 
century, as Todd Parker suggests.2  By understanding libertine sensibilities as more 
continuous throughout eighteenth-century literature, I also draw an important connection 
to the French roman libertin, which -- rising to prominence during the Enlightenment -- 
is usually demarcated from the eighteenth-century British novel.3  Concluding my 
dissertation with a discussion of the influence of Richardson’s work on D.A.F. Sade, I 
emphasize the fertile influence of the British imagination on how French Enlightenment 
texts conceived of their own modern, fluid, literary selves. 
 In the past two decades, the question of whether or not the eighteenth-century 
self can in fact be called a modern self has ignited important philosophical debates about 
the nature of modernity and the limits of the human.4  Eighteenth-century literary 
criticism has generally embraced the label of modernity, identifying the rise of the novel 
as evidence of literary innovation, the rise of the reading public as symptomatic of a 
nascent capitalism, and the rise of the autonomous individual as evidence of the declining 
influence of communal bodies -- historically, church, state, and family.5  In taking issue 
with the last assertion, my project argues that eighteenth-century literature continued to 
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imagine an individual inextricably enmeshed in his or her communities.  Selfhood was 
conceived in these texts as a highly particularized phenomenon at the intersection of 
complex social, political, aesthetic, and emotive networks.  My approach thus takes 
impetus from the poststructuralist assumption that individuals are not separable from the 
ideological networks that produce and enfold them.  I follow theorists like Michel 
Foucault and Bruno Latour in seeing the relationship between self and community as 
inherently complex and slippery, where social “assemblies” -- to borrow a term favored 
by Latour -- posit individuals as discrete beings only within deeply enmeshed social, 
political, and ecological contexts replete with other beings and things.6 
Trying to make sense of how subjects come to internalize the expectations of 
broader political and social collectives, Foucault theorizes that power is a relational 
phenomenon, one both separate from and bound up in individual subjectivities.  In an 
attempt to account for how power is “omnipresen[t]” in The History of Sexuality, Volume 
I, Foucault explains: “[it is] not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything 
under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at 
every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.”7  This is an important 
distinction that Foucault makes and it necessitates some emphasis.  The first formulation 
is quite clear: power is not visible, is not a discrete, material “unity” that can be identified 
or isolated, thus it must be fleeting, evasive, temporal, “produced from one moment to the 
next.”  By describing power in temporal terms, as occurring in successive “moments,” 
“one…to the next,” Foucault summons the image of a localized network of individual 
nodes that invite and embody power consecutively and systematically, if still in fleeting, 
transient forms.  Foucault is thus demonstrably tempted by the rules and mechanisms that 
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govern material bodies; he reiterates again that power is “produced…at every point,” 
suggesting that it is -- again, however fleetingly -- tangibly manifested and thus, at least 
in theory, identifiable in a microcosmic and highly particularized way in the individual 
body.   
 Then he corrects himself.  “[O]r rather,” he surmises, power is relational.  It 
exists not in “every point,” or even in any “point,” but “in every relation from one point 
to another.”  There is, of course, a quite significant difference between the two claims.  In 
one instance, power can be traced to the individual body that produces and replicates it, 
and in the other, power is, rather importantly, immaterial, located only in the nebulous, 
communal “relation” that joins “one point to another,” and ultimately, all points together.  
This is an ambiguity that recurs frequently in Foucault’s political thought.  In Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, he describes the relations between bodies and 
political institutions as a “micro-physics of power,” “whose field of validity is situated in 
a sense between these great functionings and the bodies themselves with their materiality 
and their forces.”8  Again, power emerges both “in…between,” and through “diffuse” 
technologies, the “bits and pieces” of discourse that flow through and around political 
subjects, but also, rather emphatically, in “the bodies themselves, with their materiality 
and their forces” -- in their individualized capacity for resistance and for regulation, in 
how they manifest discipline or docility. 
At the heart of Foucault’s notion of power, then, is a relational model of 
subjectivity, one that recognizes the ways in which individuals can particularize 
themselves through local expressions of and resistance to power.  Foucault is not alone in 
oscillating between the “micro-level of interactions” and the “macro-level” in his efforts 
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to define and give shape to social collectives; Latour, in Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, calls the possibility of a defined “group” the “first 
source of uncertainty” in understanding and defining broader social and political 
collectives.  In emphasizing instead “group formation” -- the act of assembling a group, 
the process of collecting and organizing human and nonhuman subjects rather than its 
product -- Latour thus describes social relations as associative and collective.9  Latour’s 
formulation is important because, like Foucault’s characterization of power, it 
emphasizes the idea of both a subjectivity in process and the ways in which such 
subjective processes characterize collective or relational behavior as well as individual 
behavior.  Latour calls for a sense of the overlaps between the individual and the 
communities of which she or he is part.  Indeed, the processes by which both are formed, 
understood, and named are analogous.  This is the understanding of selfhood that my 
dissertation identifies as integral to the portrayal of eighteenth-century literary selves.  
My project describes how, for example, characters as diverse as Eliza Haywood’s Betsy 
Thoughtless and D.A.F. Sade’s Dolmancé both strive to define themselves through the 
communities -- of would-be lovers and of the orgy, respectively – in which they are 
inextricably enmeshed.  
Feminist literary historians have turned to poststructuralist theory as a way of 
conceiving female subjectivity in a more resistant relationship to the dominant 
ideological discourses of the eighteenth century -- giving particular attention, as this 
dissertation does, to domestic fiction.  Nancy Armstrong, in a compelling Foucauldian 
approach to the rise of the novel, has shown that the gendered discourse of domestic 
novels in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries necessitated “a whole new 
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vocabulary for social relations, terms that attached precise moral value to certain qualities 
of mind” rather than to specific gender roles or even to sex.10  Novels written by and 
about women, Armstrong notes, dramatized the modern self as relational and as a product 
of complex emotional networks for the first time.  This composite self defined a 
paradigm of feminine “qualities of mind” that came to determine the behavior of both 
female and male characters in the domestic fiction of the nineteenth century.  As in my 
own project, Armstrong recognizes the importance of a relational model of subjectivity in 
defining female (and other marginalized) identity in the eighteenth century, and links this 
conditional and discursive identity to the capacity for desire and pleasure.  But I diverge 
from Armstrong in her positing of this female subject as a corrective to the traditional 
notion of a political male subject, in her displacing of one abstract individual for another: 
 
[t]his struggle to represent sexuality took the form of a struggle to 
individuate wherever there was a collective body, to attach psychological 
motives to what had been the openly political behavior of contending 
groups, and to evaluate these according to a set of moral norms that 
exalted the domestic woman over and above her aristocratic 
counterpart…the female was the figure, above all else, on whom depended 
the outcome of the struggle among competing ideologies.11  
 
Indeed, it is Armstrong’s claim -- and not mine -- that “the modern individual was first 
and foremost a woman.”12 
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 I instead aim to recover the very contingency of that, or any, “modern individual” 
self in the first instance, and to preserve the ambiguous relationship that the literature 
persists in maintaining between the individual and the political and social institutions of 
which she is part.  While Armstrong is also somewhat attentive to the fluidity of literary 
selves, I question whether such a self could ever be called anything as determinate as an 
“outcome,” acknowledging the ways in which these selves are both subordinated to 
extensive networks of power and simultaneously striving to extricate themselves from 
such networks.  By emphasizing collective relations as formative for subjects, I dismantle 
the strictly oppositional or hierarchical relationships that pit women against men, or 
humans against things.  What my readings privilege instead is how individuals participate 
in broader and more dispersed affective relations in eighteenth-century literature. I find in 
such accounts a more positive and active kind of female subjectivity than has been 
hitherto recognized: one that abandons any fixed political position and becomes 
considerably more supple, more reactive, and more flexible as an element of the text.  My 
project thus allows for the ways in which both female and male subjects understood 
themselves as mobile and polymorphous individuals within and through fictional 
networks of power and feeling.  I thus share the concerns of critics like William Warner, 
who contend that Armstrong’s account is, in many ways, too oriented towards power and 
not enough towards play, pleasure, and movement.13  My project asserts pleasure, 
mobility, and feeling as foundational to how eighteenth century texts rendered their 
subjects, and to how those subjects envisioned their relationship to broader social and 
political collectives within these texts. 
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 My project thus revises a number of enduring assumptions in eighteenth-century 
studies.  I question, for example, the critical commonplace that the British eighteenth-
century novel defines the individual in opposition to his or her affective relations.  This 
view has been promulgated, in particular, by Ian Watt’s influential argument for the new 
prominence of individualism in The Rise of the Novel.14  Watt claims that “the rise of 
individualism” in the eighteenth century “weaken[ed] communal and traditional 
relationships,” placing new emphasis on “the kind of private and egocentric mental life” 
that characterize Defoe’s early characters, but also, crucially, “the later stress on the 
importance of personal relationships which is so characteristic of modern society.” For 
Watt, intriguingly, it is the burgeoning self-conscious interest in the individual that 
prompts the domestic novel’s characteristically “modern” interest in “relationships,” 
which “offer the individual a more conscious and selective pattern of social life to replace 
the more diffuse, and as it were involuntary, social cohesions which individualism had 
undermined.”15  While I actually agree with Watt that relationships are fundamental to 
the assertion of individuality in the literary texts of the eighteenth century, my project 
obviously privileges the second, more undefined, kind of “social cohesions” that Watt 
asserts lose value in the transition to modernity.  I instead follow Latour in identifying the 
emergence of publics, interconnected social “assemblies” that are engaged in a kind of 
“constant commerce,” “ceaseless swapping,” and “endless crisscrossing of apparatuses, 
procedures, instruments, and customs.”  From such dynamic and teeming roots rise the 
sprawling, multiplicitous social and political identities that my dissertation describes in 
eighteenth century literature.16  Latour goes further still; his articulation of the public 
sphere is so highly particularized as to include both its subjects and its objects in “endless 
 9 
crisscrossing[s].”  My own work seeks to live up to this inclusion.  A chapter on the 
eroticized plenitude that shapes the poet-speaker in Thomson’s Spring anticipates the 
piecemeal subjectivity of Clarissa’s letters, with both confirming the relevance of things 
in the constitution of selfhood. How these collectives of persons and things motivate a 
specific individual to distinctive and exceptional action is thus a central concern of my 
project.  
We also tend to assume that psychological interiority is cultivated in the absence 
of social interactions, and that the experience of feeling is thus deeply individualized.  
Yet recent scholarship has recognized the eighteenth century as a historical moment in 
which feelings are also experienced in an externalized and communal way.  Adela Pinch 
argues that, in this period, feelings are actually represented as themselves autonomous, as 
derived -- but not inextricable -- from their human origins.17  She cites as an example of 
this move David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), where the philosopher 
theorizes the possibility of a community of passions.  The “social ‘force’” that Hume 
assigns feelings articulates the intersection between self and community at the 
profoundest levels of human experience. Indeed, Pinch sees that Hume tells two 
contradictory stories about feeling but that these stories are not mutually exclusive.  
Hume describes self-knowledge as arising from both the “individual authenticity of our 
emotional responsiveness” and the communicable and transsubjective nature of feelings 
within communities of other feeling beings.  Hume thus supplies a powerful image of 
composite individualism, as the actual subjective experience of feeling occurs on a 
simultaneously individual and communal level, calling attention to the centrality of social 
interactions in the construction of selfhood. The emotion of pride, sketched by Hume, 
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nicely demonstrates this dialectic: it is a feeling brought on by our “sympathetic versions 
of other people’s feelings about us,” a clear “communication of sentiments,” neither 
wholly individual nor wholly communal.18  It is precisely this kind of relational sense of 
self that I will emphasize in my own readings of eighteenth century literature. 
So far, I have described how my dissertation recasts notions of interiority and 
subjectivity within communal contexts.  Yet I also contend that social “forces,” to borrow 
Hume’s term, appear to serve localizing, particularizing, and individualizing functions in 
eighteenth-century literature.  The interest in exteriority has recently preoccupied and 
galvanized the study of subjectivity in our field.  Insightful works published in 2010 by 
Jonathan Kramnick and Julie Park strive to connect phenomenological concerns in the 
period with the agency of the mind and the construction of identity, respectively.19  Both 
Kramnick and Park assert a real lack of distinction between the self and its objects or 
things, claims that I find compelling in my own work.20  Yet, these narratives tend to 
replace the historical understanding of selfhood as fully intimate or private with equally 
comprehensive claims for its externality -- as Kramnick puts it, for the ways in which a 
subject’s “[a]ctions extend mind into the world.”21  My dissertation approaches this issue 
rather differently, in that I purposefully resist the substitution of one kind of subjectivity 
for another.  Instead, I claim that representations of selfhood in the works I study are 
firmly ambiguous on this point: selfhood is a highly private state of being paradoxically 
because of one’s immersion in exterior relations of all kinds, hence the term “relational 
self,” which seeks to preserve and embody this dialectic.22  Many of the works I study 
grapple precisely with the question of how one can become autonomous or exceptional if 
so much of who one is is determined by our relationship with others.  Tensions, 
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problems, and contradictions tumble from these works as they try to preserve their in-
between-ness, their image of a self hovering on the borders of autonomy and community 
but never finding rest in the possibilities and limitations of either.  Thus, in both its 
terminology and its methodology, my project has tried to preserve these contradictions as 
contradictions, and to allow for the same deep sense of ambiguity that the literature itself 
exhibits. 
My dissertation studies four individuals -- the proto-Romantic poet of The 
Seasons, Richardson’s Clarissa, Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless, and Sade’s Dolmancé -- 
within the networks that enfold and produce them.  These characters, I claim, can only 
become exceptional by immersing themselves in the diverse communities that surround 
them.  My first chapter, “Spring: James Thomson’s Anxious Affinities,” argues that 
Thomson’s poem infuses its culminating vision of companionate love with the dynamic, 
collective eroticism of nature.  The poem compulsively traces its own circular narrative, 
in which the poet-speaker evinces a sense of anxiety about the possibilities of 
representing and “courting” a nominally feminine profusion of nature.  Thomson aims to 
reconcile his displacement by imagining poetry as a productive form of creative 
confluence, the poet working with the natural world.  I relate this to Thomson’s own 
sexual experience, aligning the uncontrolled and powerful elements of spring with his 
self-professed “Muse” and financial patron, the Countess of Hertford, and the more 
defined and polite impulses with his “happy vision” of a marriage to Elizabeth Young.  I 
thus contend that Spring is a work of erotic literature because it so energetically renders 
the tensions between companionate and polymorphous desire, and further, frames this 
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tension as a question of cultural and social progress -- a “modernizing” move not 
typically associated with georgic poetry. 
 In my second chapter, I bring the study of affective dispersal to one of the key 
documents for the “rise” of a new liberal individualism.  In “Clarissa: Collective 
Relations and the Problem of Sexual Autonomy,” I argue that the era’s quintessential 
individual -- Clarissa Harlowe -- becomes exceptional only through her reliance upon 
transitory sentimental affinities.  Even more self-consciously than Thomson, Richardson 
plays out the clash of Restoration erotic sensibilities and companionate courtship.  I 
recover typically overlooked energies in the novel: Lovelace is a polyamorous rake who 
finds himself defined by one monogamous intrigue, and Clarissa is a sexually virtuous 
woman who engages in a steady stream of erotic intimacies with her friends, family, and 
even foes.  I contend that Clarissa’s fleeting affinities actually align her more with 
amatory heroines and other libertine tropes of intrigue and seduction, a conclusion that 
allows me to reassess the literary-historical lineage that separates authors like Eliza 
Haywood from moralizing domestic writers like Richardson. 
 My third chapter continues this line of thought, opening with a comparison of 
Haywood’s Fantomina and Richardson’s Clarissa to highlight the shared liberties and the 
limits of erotic affiliation on women’s desire.  “The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless: 
Eliza Haywood’s Promiscuous Machines” then stages a related argument about the 
unnaturalness of companionate marriage, given the power and pleasure inherent in 
polyamorous affections.  Even as she is writing what many scholars see as her most 
didactic novel, Haywood subverts the expectations of this genre by privileging 
promiscuous affections in a world plagued by incompatibility: suitors and lovers are 
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mismatched and manipulative, narrators and friends are deceptive and unreliable, men 
and women share indistinguishable physical and emotional qualities, and sexual double-
standards arise at every turn.  Companionship becomes wholly impossible in such a 
world, as does true self-knowledge.  The alternative -- a “hurry of promiscuous 
diversions” -- promises pleasure and, at least, the possibility for genuine, spontaneous 
feeling.  Betsy’s “thoughtlessness” prevents her attachment to any one companion for the 
majority of the novel, and -- like Clarissa’s “powers of moving,” her sentimental 
affinities -- offers an alternative to the dangers of being defined solely by a companionate 
marriage.   
 My fourth and final chapter, “La Philosophie dans le Boudoir: Communal 
Sexuality and Mutual Pleasure,” takes seriously the fact that Sade admired Richardson’s 
fictions, and asserts that orgiastic desire is simultaneously limiting and enabling for male 
libertines, who must abandon apathy and critical distance for mutually-reinforcing 
pleasure in order to achieve communal orgasm.  In this text, real pleasure can only be 
achieved through collective desire.  Sade thus enacts the professed goal of sexual 
complementarity -- mutual and perfect physical unity between wholly disparate beings --
and expands it, dismantling its couplings and spectacularly dissolving its bonds. La 
Philosophie persuasively demonstrates a crucial aspect of my larger argument: that 
libertine desire is not synonymous with phallic desire -- as is usually presumed -- but, in 
fact, often organizes itself around the collective and mutual desires of others.  Building 
from my discussion of the sensibilities of orgy, a conclusion considers the implications of 
a radically relational subjectivity for reassessing the critical emphasis on historical and 
literary individualism as one of the eighteenth century’s defining outcomes.  
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My dissertation invites poetry and prose, English and French authors, polite and 
pornographic texts into a lively discussion of the persistent crossings of self and 
community in eighteenth-century literature.  Because the relational self inhabits forms as 
critically divergent as georgic poetry, the domestic novel, and the roman libertin, my 
project charts thematic resonances across generically and formally diverse texts, 
sanctioned by comparative approaches that encourage such inclusivity while still 
demanding close attention to historical and cultural context.23  The spontaneous affinities 
of Thomson’s Spring, the dissembling media of Richardson’s Clarissa, the overlapping 
social strata of Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless, and the contingent vulnerabilities of the 
Sadeian libertine each present versions of an exceptional self subordinated to collectives, 
with each text formalizing these relationships in different, yet profoundly resonant ways.  
Accordingly, my methodology strives to remain equally flexible: Chapter One combines 
Jean-Joseph Goux’s materialist retelling of sexual history with feminist critiques of the 
gaze, both of which offer suggestive considerations for reassessing Ralph Cohen’s 
formalist, “process-based” analysis of Thomson.  The second and third chapters 
collaborate in reconsidering the established story of the early British novel, particularly 
its tendency to separate domestic from amatory fiction.  I see Richardson’s Clarissa and 
Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless as participating in a shared project of representing an 
exemplary feminine self as the product of her familial, social, and sexual relations.  
Finally, in its analysis of the textual and spectatorial mechanics of the orgy, Chapter Four 
aims to situate Sade within the tradition of British sensibility -- an overlooked influence 
in most readings of the Marquis, which tend toward the theoretical, often at the expense 
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of the textual.   Each chapter remains attentive to the text, while still aiming to situate the 
relational self within the broader theoretical and critical context of the dissertation. 
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Chapter One 
 
Spring: James Thomson’s Anxious Affinities 
 
Augustan poetry is not usually assumed to engage with questions of modernity, and 
particularly not with the emerging technologies for representing subjectivity in the early 
eighteenth century.  Such literary innovation and progressive work has been historically 
reserved for the novel.1  But in this chapter I argue that the poet James Thomson draws 
upon the affective networks of a sentimentalized Nature to carve out a particularized, 
eroticized identity in Spring (1728), a project that has important resonances for the 
radically relational and eroticized selves of sentimental novels like Richardson’s Clarissa 
(1748-9) and libertine fiction like Sade’s La Philosophie dans le boudoir (1795).  In this 
poem, one of the four Seasons (1730), Thomson self-consciously portrays the 
tenuousness of human identity, particularly when the self is placed dynamically in 
contact with sentimentalized objects that elicit its wildest passions and its most fervent 
enthusiasm.  However, I contend, these frenzied passions often bring into greater relief 
the particularized, feeling perspective of the poet-speaker.  By bringing the insights of 
recent posthumanist work on natural collectives to bear on early formalist approaches to 
Thomson, this chapter begins to develop this dissertation’s understanding of how desire 
acts as a simultaneously individual and collective mechanism in forming and shaping the 
modern literary self. 
It is surprising that a work unabashedly dedicated to the celebration of 
“NATURE’S great Command” is rarely read as an erotic poem, but this paradox speaks 
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rather precisely to the unusual representation Thomson offers us of sex and sexuality in 
his poem Spring.  While few would argue that this poem is explicitly about sex, the kind 
of sex it depicts and, more importantly, the way in which sex is represented -- in 
sweeping, populous vernal landscapes -- must register as foreign, and maybe even 
somewhat chaste, to contemporary readers accustomed to understanding sex in more 
graphic, intimate, and non-collective terms.2  That Thomson’s work did excite its readers, 
however, is well-documented.3  John Aikin, a prominent physician and literary critic 
reflected in 1781 that “no poem was ever composed which addressed itself to the feelings 
of a greater number of readers,” and Sir Harris Nicolas, editor of the 1830 edition of The 
Poetical Works of James Thomson, writes that “when he breaks upon us in some 
spontaneous burst of passion…we sympathise with the man, and are excited to kindred 
enthusiasm.”4 And Thomson himself thought Spring compelling enough to woo a lover; 
he sent drafts of later versions to the reluctant Elizabeth Young, as a means of convincing 
her to one day share this “happy picture” with him.5  But late twentieth-century critics of 
The Seasons -- while sifting through the complexities of its portrayal of human 
subjectivity, the nuances of its form, and even its physiological and emotional enthusiasm 
-- have all failed to register the significance of Spring’s erotic content.6  Part of the 
project of this chapter is to attend purposefully and seriously to the erotic content of 
Thomson’s poem.  My chapter contends that Thomson’s Spring understands sexual 
relations as a powerful form of creative confluence, joining subject with object in the 
project of poetry, but also evinces deep anxieties about how this process destabilizes the 
role of poet-speaker, both as imagined suitor and as “creator.”   
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What Thomson paints in Spring, I argue, is a world in which one cannot visually 
or emotionally distinguish between self and other, and further, where aesthetic and erotic 
pleasure results from precisely such a confluence.  In this cooperative envisioning of the 
natural world, Thomson’s poetry anticipates many of the important insights of 
Enlightenment vitalism, though of a historical moment immediately prior to its 
efflorescence.  As Peter Reill has observed, the vitalist movement in the eighteenth 
century was particularly invested in restructuring how the natural world looks to its 
observers, and in collapsing the relationship between viewing subject and natural object.  
Vitalistic epistemology actively sought to “dissolve the strict distinction between 
observer and observed,” effectively contracting the ontological gap between subject and 
object, as “both were related within a much larger conjunction of living matter.”7  In 
Thomson, the collapse between subject and object occurs even on the level of form: 
Heather Keenleyside has read personification and periphrasis as tropological signals of 
instability in Thomson’s poetry, signs of a profound uncertainty in the relationship 
between persons and nature in The Seasons.  Thomson blurs precisely those categories -- 
person/thing, whole/part, human/animal -- that earlier critics believed fundamentally 
separate in the “Augustan” world-view.8  For Keenleyside, then, a perceived “unity” 
between the human and natural world actually masks a deeply troubling ontological 
confusion, where “the basic unit of Thomson’s ontology” is no longer the “unique 
individual.”9  Thomson’s poetry thus narrates selfhood from the intersections of the local 
and the global, the miniscule and the macrocosmic, and interprets the subject’s 
relationship to nature within a proto-vitalistic lens, as “a teeming interaction of active 
forces vitalizing matter, revolving around each other in a developmental dance,” much 
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like the Latourian “assemblies” that emphasize “group formation” instead of fully-formed 
groups.10 
 Thomson’s ability to capture these “teeming…active forces” through figurative 
language delighted but also challenged his contemporaries’ understanding of what 
constituted good descriptive poetry. In a formal study of Thomson, The Unfolding of the 
Seasons, Ralph Cohen responds to the commonplace charge by eighteenth-century 
readers that Thomson’s poetry is “too loose” by arguing the opposite: that the Seasons are 
aesthetically and epistemologically unified.  In Spring, according to Cohen, erotic love is 
the mechanism that aligns (hu)man with nature, and, by extension, situates and positions 
the particular image within Thomson’s broader poetic vision.  For Cohen, then, a high 
value is placed on synthesis and on unity of design as characteristic Augustan virtues.11  
More recent studies -- in particular, Kevis Goodman’s excellent work on the georgics -- 
have considered dissonance, not unity, as a defining feature of early eighteenth-century 
poetry, with Thomson a key figure in her study.12  The present chapter combines both 
insights in arguing that Thomson’s Spring hovers between the equally-restrictive 
categories of unity and dissonance; the poet-speaker oscillates between the focused and 
local perspective of attentive observer and the swarming global perspective of a subject 
subsumed by generative Nature.  The poet-speaker’s ambiguous relationship to the 
natural world thus betrays Thomson’s rather profound ambivalence about sex: it is both a 
natural and meaningful mechanism of joyful connection and of reproduction, but one that 
carries unpredictable risks and rejections.  While the rituals and imagery of sex certainly 
offer Thomson an attractive analogy to describe the complexities of the natural world, the 
poem’s erotic landscapes also betray Thomson’s own anxieties about the social and 
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political implications of a world in which categories of maleness, of the individual, and 
indeed, of humanity more broadly, are by necessity not dominant.  Thomson is, then, 
both enthralled by the capacity of Nature to seduce and consume him, but also 
instinctively seeks to preserve his own autonomy as poet-creator, his sense of self that 
threatens to collapse at every turn.  In Spring, this tension is embodied, most palpably, in 
Thomson’s representations of his real-life lovers: his patron and “Muse,” the Countess of 
Hertford, and Spring’s Amanda, Elizabeth Young, whose financial, social, and sexual 
powers over the poet repeatedly surface, almost obsessively, in his work. 
 In short, Thomson negotiates the unpredictable and enigmatic behavior of his 
lovers by analogizing his own pursuit of love to the way a poet might successfully 
capture the wilds of Nature: through spontaneous affinities, through careful negotiations, 
and through transient -- yet meaningful -- contact.  But these are often demonstrably 
unsatisfying compromises for an ardent lover who wants to possess his mistress fully -- 
or for a poet who wants to capture his subject perfectly -- and so, in some moments, an 
increasingly anxious Thomson emerges, a Thomson who is eager to establish humanity’s 
authoritative hold over an ordered and controllable Nature, as Marjorie Hope Nicolson, 
Patricia Meyer Spacks and others have recognized.13  But while critics have tended to 
focus on how such alternating currents of diffusion and contraction have signified 
politically or aesthetically in the period, I consider how this dialectic complicates our 
assumption that sexual subjectivity, in particular, is a deeply intimate and thus highly 
particularized state of being.  In this chapter, I argue that Thomson’s portrayal of the 
sexed body as a landscape -- and, of the aroused observer as part of that landscape, rather 
than as separate from it -- necessitates a more nuanced conception of sexuality and its 
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ontological categories, one that can account for the teeming multiplicity inherent in both 
Thomson’s “lover,” and his characterization of the poet-speaker as both the source and 
the subject of its powerful representations.   
Though it was widely read and celebrated, Spring’s erotic landscape is strange 
and even perverse enough to continue to raise questions about the sexual proclivities of 
its author.14  While I am not the first critic to express some interest in Thomson’s 
sexuality, most are brief, at best, on the subject.  In a cursory biographical note in their 
acclaimed anthology of eighteenth-century poetry, David Fairer and Christine Gerrard 
speculate that Thomson might have been gay, as he never married and spent most of his 
time drinking and cavorting with groups of male friends.15  In another instance, James 
Sambrook, Thomson’s conscientious biographer, reports a number of bizarre stories 
circulated by Thomson’s friends and associates about his strange sexual behaviors, each 
seeming more preposterous than the last: the notoriously shy and gentle Thomson lewdly 
groping and cursing female companions on a alcohol-fueled bender; Thomson spying on 
his female neighbors undressing through a peep-hole in his floor (and having his nose 
burned by their candle when he fell asleep “on the watch”); Thomson loitering on street 
corners in Edinburgh hoping to catch a glimpse of women lifting their hoop skirts as they 
crossed the street.  (He did actually write some poetry about this, of course -- an 
adolescent and rather titillated poem called “On the Hoop,” where the “hoop and tartan 
both combine / To make a virgin like a goddess shine.”)16  Still, Thomson was 
demonstrably unsuccessful in love: the two most influential women in his life were 
Hertford and Young, and neither openly returned his affections.  Yet both women figure 
rather prominently in this particular Season, with Hertford its “Muse” and Young the 
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purported impetus for extensive revisions to the 1744 version of The Seasons, particularly 
the introduction of the lover “Amanda” into the poem. 
There are, then, two stories that I want to tell about James Thomson, and they are 
related.  One is of a writer who tried to find emotional solace and poetic purpose by 
losing himself in the mysterious flux of a divinely-ordered natural world.  The other is of 
a man who wanted to believe himself truly exceptional: as a poet, as a lover, and as a 
human being made “LORD,” “but not…Tyrant” of God’s creation.  I will argue in this 
chapter that Thomson achieved neither to his satisfaction, but that Spring can instead be 
read as a testament to what I’ll later describe as the “Toil”: Thomson’s articulation of 
creation and seduction as process in which consummation is never complete or fully 
achieved, but in which the pursuit is, indeed, often all there is.  In what follows, I will 
begin by examining Spring’s vexed portrayal of female sexuality through the lens of 
Thomson’s influential relationship with Hertford.  I argue that Hertford -- or, more 
particularly, the landscape that Thomson paints to embody her -- becomes the locus for a 
sexualized struggle between author and patron for figurative and poetic control, the 
control of the “I”/eye that serves as the aesthetic and ontological center of the poem.  
Hertford’s doubly-influential status -- as both Thomson’s patron and object of affection -- 
makes her a formidable and often impenetrable presence in Spring even as she is depicted 
as its benevolent Muse.  Thus, while the natural world in Spring attracts the poet-speaker, 
it also challenges his phallocentric sense of unity and meaning, and threatens to subsume 
the “I”/eye into its indeterminate collective.  In a struggle to maintain his creation as 
independent from the prolific and abundant gifts of his Muse, Thomson rather 
uncharacteristically persists in strict oppositions between poet and Creation, between 
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lover and landscape.  These oppositions, however, frequently leave him in despair, 
signaling his isolation from the feminized landscape he desperately wants to possess. 
  
The Countess of Hertford and the Matter of (m)Othering 
Written sometime in Thomson’s early career, an ode to an unresponsive lover -- called, 
simply, “Song” -- rather compactly prefigures tendencies that dominate the landscape of 
Spring, and does so in compelling ways.  The two poems are formally quite contrastive: 
while Spring is an expansive explosion of love, the verses of this “Song” are 
comparatively stifled, cramped, claustrophobic, and uninspired.  I reproduce it in its 
entirety here: 
 
Unless with my Amanda blest 
In vain I twine the woodbine bower; 
Unless to deck her sweeter breast, 
In vain I rear the breathing flower: 
 
Awaken’d by the genial year, 
In vain the birds around me sing; 
In vain the fresh’ning fields appear: 
Without my love there is no spring.17 
 
The poet’s emotional shackles are echoed in the unimaginative and unyielding adherence 
to iambic tetrameter, and again in the anaphoric openings that pronounce the 
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heartbreaking refrains “unless” and “in vain.”  Further, and perhaps most noticeable to a 
reader comparing this poem to Spring, there is a pronounced lack of enjambment.  By 
contrast, the lines of Spring -- indeed, of all of the Seasons -- are extremely flexible, 
heavily-enjambed blank verse.  They house innovative, imagistic, periphrastic diction: no 
line resembles its neighbor.  In comparison, the “Song” is obvious, awkward, clumsy.  
And yet, despite the deflating subject, despite the uninspired language, despite the 
constricting form, this poem, like Spring, is erotically charged.  Why? 
 The poem eroticizes a struggle for control: Thomson’s wavering faith in his poetic 
productions is intensified by his sexual defeat.  The imagery here is surprisingly rich, 
juxtaposing two complementary registers of production: the poet, who insistently creates 
despite the futility of doing so, and the lover, who, through a refusal to “bles[s]” the poet, 
negates but cannot fully diffuse his desire.  Even as the poet is in the process of creating  
-- noting the present tense, “I twine,” “I deck,” “I rear” -- such powerful acts of 
generation are always “in vain.”  Thus, despite the poet’s urgent exertions, the theme is 
impotence, underscored by Amanda’s refusal to supply her body and her “sweeter breast” 
as a landscape for him to adorn and preen.  Without the context of this amorous and 
receptive landscape, his poetic flourishes have no real significance, and though the poet is 
ultimately still aroused (“awaken’d by the genial year”), he cannot consummate his love.  
The second verse confirms his loss of control.  The season rushes in upon him: 
“fresh’ning fields appear” and “birds…sing,” seemingly independent of and external to 
the poet, who no longer “rears” the imagery.  In fact, the “I” of the poem finds himself 
wholly excised from his own poetic creations, the “woodbine bower” and “breathing 
flower” fruitlessly generated in the opening stanza.  The final line proves his defeat: there 
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is no spring if there will be no Amanda.  And yet, despite this seeming finality, the poem 
resonates with traces of the poet’s desire, prevailing despite the certainty of his lover’s 
perpetual refusals.  
 In its dense depiction of poetic creation as a form of failed sexual courtship, the 
“Song” anticipates some of Spring’s dominant erotic motifs.  Particularly, it introduces 
the female-body-as-landscape, and, further, the characteristics of this landscape -- its 
“Negligence…wide, and wild”-- that allow it simultaneously to register and resist the 
philosophical, aesthetic, and emotional gaze of the poet-speaker.18  Further, the “Song” 
also testifies to Thomson’s ambivalence when his own powerfully mutable depictions of 
female fertility and sexuality press upon -- indeed, even threaten to supplant -- the 
unifying, governing image of the Seasons’ poet-as-creator.  So, as Spring unfolds in a 
blooming garden, for example, the “I”/eye is passively “Snatch’d thro’ the verdant 
Maze,” “hurried” and “Distracted” by a “mingled Wilderness of Flowers” that 
overwhelms the spectator visually and defuses his gaze.19 And, shortly after, his visual 
displacement spirals into a loss of poetic control: the poet’s “varied Verse” is no longer 
his own, but the result of a “Theme rising” independently from the “vegetable World” 
and also “len[t]” by the “Nightingales,” who “pour / The mazy-running Soul of Melody” 
-- the vital energy -- into his poetry.20  Indeed, throughout Spring, the sensual intensity of 
Nature infuses -- rather, inundates -- Thomson’s descriptions.  In particular, this 
displacement serves to challenge the notion of the poet both as a solitary, omnipotent 
spectator (whose eye can be violently “snatch’d” into Nature’s serpentine “Maze”) and, 
by extension, as the solitary, omnipotent author (whose verse ultimately only siphons the 
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dynamic tide of avifaunal “Melody”).  As the poetry dissolves into the landscape, then, 
curiously, so does the poet. 
 Thomson uses another suggestive metaphor for this dissolution and diffusion: the 
female breast, which often characterizes the landscape of Spring.  However -- unlike the 
“Song” of the nightingales and the “Theme” of the vegetables, both moments in which 
the poet shares his vision with Nature -- the breast registers both the poet’s resistance to 
the landscape as well as his attraction, and thus signals Thomson’s growing ambivalence 
about being seduced by a specifically feminized Nature.  While the breast is sentimental 
and eroticized under the penetrating eye of a lover, it is also independently, and rather 
formidably, prolific and effusive.21  It threatens to obscure, rather than to sharpen, what 
Thomson posits as otherwise productive, and seemingly self-contained, oppositions: the 
distinction between male and female physiology, or between the expectations of a 
nominally feminine Nature as maternal or as sexual.  Thus the landscape, and 
particularly, the landscape-figured-as-breast, is at once sexually ambiguous, powerfully 
seductive, and comfortingly maternal.   
 At least some of this paradox has been argued to characterize the early modern 
imagination of the natural world more generally, although research has tended to focus 
more on the early American landscape and its response to colonial invasion than on the 
British countryside.22  Annette Kolodny, in her pioneering work of feminist eco-criticism 
The Lay of the Land: Metaphor As Experience and History in American Life and Letters 
(1984), uncovers a troubling problematic when she writes that “[i]mplicit in the metaphor 
of land-as-woman was both the regressive pull of maternal containment and the seductive 
invitation to sexual assertion.”23  Tracing the “threatening, alien, and potentially 
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emasculating terror of the unknown” expressed by the white European colonizers of the 
Americas, Kolodny helpfully recognizes a primal “need to experience the land as a 
nurturing, giving maternal breast,” a means of neutralizing and diffusing its inherent and 
invisible threats.24  For Kolodny, the feminization of the landscape allows the male 
colonizer to repress his fear through a powerful and comforting fiction: the landscape 
becomes familiar as the ultimate expression of nourishment, inviting his occupation and 
succumbing to his needs in the same way a mother brings her child to breast.  But for 
Thomson, intriguingly, the feminization of the landscape does not always signal comfort 
and provision.  Indeed, the act of feminizing can be precisely what makes the landscape 
seem strange, foreign, and Other to the poet-speaker.  The breast -- and, indeed, 
Thomson’s representations of female sexuality more generally -- is not transparently or 
straightforwardly receptive.  The female-body-as-landscape is instead a site where the 
typical expectations for sexed bodies and beings are confused, where the female body is 
not familiar or inviting territory, but a lush, dangerous, overpowering, and threatening 
landscape. 
 Returning to the “Song,” we can see that the breast initially appears as a rather 
straightforward metaphor for what the poet cannot have: Amanda’s love.  And yet, the 
couplet in which the breast appears is anything but straightforward: Thomson writes, 
“Unless to deck her sweeter breast / In vain I rear the breathing flower.”  The common 
association between the breast and “rear[ing]” (as the expected occupation of a breast) 
gives the couplet a strong feminine subject, and yet it is the male poet -- not the female 
lover -- who must “rear” in this case.  Thomson creates a double significance for the act 
of “rearing” as one of nurturing but also of generation: the poet brings the flower into 
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existence, and then must also sustain it because the “sweeter breast” has rejected it.  The 
breast refuses to become a backdrop, a landscape that the flower might only “deck” or 
“adorn.”  Thus despite the poet’s best efforts to sentimentalize the “sweeter” breast, and 
thereby, to incorporate it into his romantic vision of spring as a potent expression of 
complementary coupling, the breast -- cold, evasive -- remains problematically external 
to the unfolding tableau.  The poet, then, occupies a sexually ambiguous position in the 
poem: his lover’s perpetual refusal means that he must generate and nourish the flower 
alone, without her “bles[sing.]” 
 This is not, then, a breast that nurtures the poet-speaker, as in Kolodny’s 
formulation, but one that rejects and further alienates the poet (and, importantly, his 
creative offspring).  It remains persistently foreign and impenetrable, refusing to yield 
even to the poet’s pleading supplications.  And yet, this resisting and unyielding body is 
still a source of pleasure for the poet, perhaps made even more so by the ways in which 
the poet must compensate with his own desires for Amanda’s continuous refusal.  Gillian 
Rose, in her compelling discussion of the visual/sexual politics of “looking at landscape,” 
registers this kind of sexual ambivalence in the complex “pleasures that geographers 
feel,” pleasures that are “not innocent…nor…simple.”25  Rose’s book -- a thoughtful 
response to the masculinist orientation of the discipline of geography in the 1990s -- 
explores the problematically empirical, knowing gaze that always installs itself as a 
“master subject” over the landscape it seeks to know and to probe.  To characterize this 
complex visual relationship, Rose combines the approaches of psychoanalysis and 
feminist aesthetics to conclude that the male gaze is not infallibly dominant, but in fact 
“inherently unstable, subverted by its own desire for the pleasure that it fears.”26  The 
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landscape, then, is perceived as simultaneously alluring and terrifying, and it is precisely 
this dialectical, “unstable” component of the male gaze that Thomson explodes in “Song” 
when he promiscuously mixes the imagery of active generation with the language of 
impotent passivity.  Unable to fully resist or to consummate his desire, the poet is left 
suspended between the role of the passive, feminized lover and the virile, masculinized 
creator.  Borrowing from Rose’s paraphrasing of Laura Mulvey’s dialectic of the gaze, 
here, the poet can be understood as “always torn between two conflicting impulses: on 
one hand, a narcissistic identification with what [he] sees and through which [he] 
constitutes [his] identity; and on the other, a voyeuristic distance from what is seen as 
Other to [him].”27  
 This dialectic offers one rich way of conceiving Thomson’s relationship to a 
resisting nature/lover in both “Song” and, I will show, in Spring: by installing himself in 
the landscape, he turns unrequited love into a productive, prolific and powerful source of 
sexual fantasy.  In his poetry, Thomson meditates anxiously on the pervasive influence 
exerted by a lover who alone can “bles[s]” the poet and his creation, and without whom 
“there is no” text at all.  Such an aesthetic model, I argue, springs from the close, and yet 
demonstrably unsatisfying, relationship that Thomson enjoyed with the Countess of 
Hertford.28  Indeed, because Hertford is both Thomson’s patron and the indifferent object 
of his affections, she is doubly constitutive of the erotic dynamic I have been sketching: 
she is both powerful and passive, both alluring and distant.  As Hertford is Thomson’s 
patron and he her beneficiary, their relationship is structured by a strict power dynamic 
and a very specific, established set of expectations, and yet she is also the fantasized 
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lover embedded into the “blooming and benevolent” landscape of Spring, a lover 
Thomson desperately wants to conquer and adore.  
 Indeed, the relationship between Thomson and Hertford is one of the most 
extensively glossed aspects of Spring, and -- at one time -- sparked quite a bit of curiosity 
from Thomson’s critics, though it seems to attract significantly less attention now.29  
Beginning with Helen Sard Hughes’ essay “Thomson and the Countess of Hertford,” 
published in Modern Philology in May 1928, and ending with a series of responses in the 
1970s and 1990s, there are a number of critical works that investigate Hertford’s 
formidable influence as Thomson was composing Spring at her estate in Marlborough.  
Hughes cites Thomson’s affection in his dedication to the first edition of Spring in 1728, 
and I will gloss this more extensively below: 
 
Happy! if I have hit any of those Images, and corresponding Sentiments, 
your calm Evening Walks, in the most delightful retirement, have oft 
inspired.  I could add, too, that as this Poem grew up under your 
Encouragement, it has therefore a natural Claim to your Patronage.30 
 
Thomson’s poised but intimate praise, here, imagines his “Poem” as a child “gr[o]w[ing] 
up under” Hertford’s nurturing “Encouragement,” able to lay a “natural Claim” to her as 
its mother/patron.  Indeed, while Thomson conventionally adopts the supplicating pose of 
the poet channeling his muse, he -- perhaps less conventionally -- casts the material 
product within a familial and complementary fantasy, where the poem becomes the 
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offspring of two lovers, a child that he and Hertford have, presumably, raised and 
“Encourage[d]” -- indeed, reared -- together. 
  Hughes also exhaustively traces Thomson’s intimate references to Hertford -- 
and, even, Hertford’s blushing, if polite, marginal responses, in her hand-copied versions 
surviving at Alnwick Castle -- in Thomson’s early poetry: particularly, in the initial, 
unpublished drafts of “A Hymn on Solitude.”31  For example, Hughes identifies the 
appearance of “gentle-looking Hertford’s Bloom” in a draft of the “Hymn” that she dates 
to 1727 or 1728: a version that likely would have been composed and reworked alongside 
Spring.32  She also notes an important edit to the final lines, but does not really speculate 
as to its meaning: 
 
Oh let me peirce [sic] thy Secret hill 
And in Thy deep Recesses dwell 
Forever from the World retir’d 
Forever with thy Raptures fir’d  
Nor by a mortal seen save He 
A Lycidas, or Lycon be.33 
 
Hughes underscores the significance of the phrase “Secret hill” in this particular version, 
which replaces the “Secret cell” of the first published version in 1729.  It is probably, 
Hughes intimates, a reference to Marlborough Mount, and thus to Hertford’s own 
cherished haunts and landscapes, where Thomson himself wandered and meditated as he 
composed his poetry.  The association, then, of the “Secret hill” with Hertford makes the 
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poem’s final lines highly suggestive: Thomson imagines himself phallically “peirc[ing]” 
the “Secret” mount, “dwell[ing]” in its “deep Recesses,” “Forever” fired with her 
“Raptures.”  In this very particular and deeply personal draft -- which is not the version 
Thomson eventually made public -- he explicitly imagines Hertford as an erotic, 
feminized landscape that can be penetrated and occupied.34  Her “Secret hill” is 
simultaneously also a space of blissful solitude, of what Kolodny calls “maternal 
containment”: a hermitage where the poet is protected, nurtured, and sustained, “Forever 
from the World retir’d.”   
 I cite this evidence to show that Thomson was, quite clearly, in the habit of 
fantasizing about his “most valuable woman patron” as a sexualized landscape that he, as 
beneficiary, was uniquely permitted to explore, probe, and penetrate.35  But he is not 
always so bold, and, indeed, Hertford’s body-as-landscape is not always so receptive.  In 
another of his “Songs,” Thomson imagines “sympathetic groves” and “dying lilies” 
communicating the love he dare not express:  
 
Oh! tell her what she cannot blame, 
Tho’ fear my tongue must ever bind; 
Oh tell her that my virtuous flame 
Is as her spotless soul refin’d…36 
 
Though “sympathetic,” the wasting Nature surrounding the poet becomes his mouthpiece, 
wooing Hertford for him by “tell[ing] her” what he cannot: that he loves her, supposedly 
“virtuous[ly].”  In lamenting the futility of his affection for the Countess, Thomson tries 
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to console himself with a solitary hope: his conclusion that “[t]rue love and friendship are 
the same.”37  Thomson thus optimistically conflates the acceptable, polite relationship he 
currently enjoys with Hertford with the sexual relationship he ultimately desires, for what 
the poem’s final stanza reveals, in fact, is that his intentions are anything but “spotless”: 
 
But if at first her virgin fear 
Should start at love’s suspected flame 
With that of friendship soothe her ear— 
True love and friendship are the same.38   
 
Thomson is quite obviously aware that true love and friendship are not the same to 
Hertford, because a (motivated) promise of friendship will “soothe her ear” while a 
confession of love will make “her virgin fear / …start.”  A tongue-tied, and yet also quite 
artful Thomson appears sympathetic and innocuous while plotting to seduce his patron.   
These “Songs” both depict Thomson as divorced from Hertford and yet despairingly 
trying to connect with her by invoking social mechanisms: through moral cultivation and 
friendship, respectively.  The same kind of distance characterizes Hertford as Spring’s 
Muse, even as she becomes associated with more expansive vernal qualities.  Indeed, 
Hertford remains enigmatic and elusive even as she embodies the blushing and 
blossoming erotic qualities of spring. 
Hertford emerges into the Season immediately after its opening invocation.  I will 
examine these initial lines with some attention, as they reveal a subtly estranged Hertford 
couched within Thomson’s seemingly conventional praise: 
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COME, gentle Spring, ethereal Mildness, come. 
And from the bosom of yon dropping cloud, 
While music wakes around, veil’d in a shower 
Of shadowing roses, on our plains descend.39  
 
The invocation prepares the reader for the vitalistic universe of Spring, where nature is 
not only “complex” but in “continuous movement.”40  The imagistic opening lines move 
“From the bosom of yon dropping cloud” to spring “wak[ing]” as music and 
simultaneously “shower[ing]” the “plains” with “shadowing roses.”  This complex image 
depends on the seemingly endless versatility of moisture as a metaphor for the coming of 
Spring: the music, perhaps, a soft rain, a multitude of droplets like rose petals pelting the 
ground.  The “dropping cloud” is figured as a maternal “Bosom” that generates this 
synesthetic “music”: if literally, transforming airy gas into material, into liquid rain, and 
if figuratively, composing the vernal song completely independently of the poet.  Indeed, 
the poet, despite his booming invocation “COME,” is rather irrelevant; Spring 
“descends,” suggestively from a curvy bosom, a scantily-clad lover “veil’d” in her 
“shower / Of shadowing roses.”  
As Cohen has also observed, Thomson uses the metaphor of the “Bosom” rather 
awkwardly, or at least inconsistently, here.41  The fertilizing rain, dropping onto “our 
plains” from the “Bosom” cloud, seems almost seminal (particularly so when read in the 
context of the “penetrating” sunbeams, also descending from the sky, only a few lines 
ahead).  Further, the scene that follows immediately also features a “Bosom,” this time a 
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more conventional maternal Earth, which passively receives the seed from the 
husbandman and encloses it in its womb.  But even this “bosom” is characterized by its 
processes of generation.  In a typically didactic georgic scene, Thomson describes the 
introduction of seed into a “nursing Mold,” the matrix of the earth, “mixing” this fertile 
soil with the nourishing “Current[s]” and “Rain” that have been rather sumptuously 
“flung” about by Nature’s “liberal hand.”42  Here the mixing of seed with land is both 
generative and ubiquitous, both the origin and the product of the extensive variety present 
in the natural world.  Mixture, then, is the cooperative mechanism that enables the 
dazzlingly various and prolific world to spring forth.  
Thus, the “Bosom,” for Thomson, is both generative and receptive, active and 
passive: it characterizes both the independent creation of substance (the transformation of 
air into rain) and the cooperative act of insemination.  Thomson seems transfixed by the 
possibility of a “Bosom” that can independently generate, and also with the breast that 
can independently sustain and nourish its offspring.  For Thomson, milk is both maternal 
and seminal, as evidenced by its metaphorical role as nourishing “sap.”  He initially 
describes sap as “milky Nutriment” that feeds all “vegetable Life.”43  Yet elsewhere in 
the poem, the explosion of sap is figured as a male sexual orgasm; addressing the 
“SOURCE OF BEINGS!,” the “UNIVERSAL SOUL,” Thomson writes: 
 
At THY Command the vernal Sun awakes 
The torpid Sap, detruded to the Root 
By wintry Winds, that now in fluent Dance, 
And lively Fermentation, mounting, spreads 
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All this innumerous-colour’d Scene of things.”44  
 
The now-virile sap “mount[s…]” and “spread[s…],” it explodes into a “fluent Dance,” a 
“lively Fermentation” that generates “All this innumerous-colour’d Scene of things.”   
The cycles of generation, of copulation, of procreation, and of gestation are all 
collapsed, in Spring, into the doubly-gendered metaphor of the “Bosom” that is capable 
of both generation and sustenance. And while indeed the bosom is a powerfully feminine 
image, the constant confluence between the breast and semen seems to suggest that both 
male and female bodies are extraordinarily, scandalously mutable: semen is milky, and 
milk is seed.  Thomson returns to this particular conflation again and again, as when he 
later suggests that both “the Drops of Rain” and the penetrating sunbeams “gave…birth” 
to the “ten thousand Delicacies, Herbs / And Fruits” that pour, unrestricted, from 
Nature’s ample “lap.”45  In a poem where both the sun and rainclouds have been firmly 
and repeatedly sexed as male and female, respectively, the suggestion that such bodies 
are variable and fluid enough to be complicit in both the processes of birth and gestation 
is significant, as it troubles an otherwise oppositional view of gendered bodies.  It is 
precisely this subversive, self-generating potential of matter that Jean-Joseph Goux 
describes in his work on sexual generation and the “stuff” of history.  In order for the 
“paterialist idea” to dominate intellectual history, matter -- conceived as its opposite, its 
Other -- must remain “dead.”  However, without the organizing principle of seed, Goux 
suggests, matter is feared to propagate wildly and promiscuously into “an uncontrollable 
organic vitality,” where “nature, its accidents, its failures, work[s] in the pitch dark of 
shifting matter” to “organiz[e] itself.”46  Goux’s formulation, in its reconsideration of 
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Aristotleian theories of sexual generation, resounds with seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century natural philosophies that also considered matter as actively moving 
and living.  Thomson clearly has a similarly dynamic concept of nature in mind as he 
describes the vernal season.47 
  It is here, and among such “stuff,” that Hertford emerges into the scene.  Indeed, 
as this self-proliferating, feminized, “shifting matter” is the landscape of Spring, it is thus 
also an unpredictable Nature that Hertford, as the simultaneously attractive and menacing 
“soft assemblage,” ultimately represents: 
 
O HARTFORD, fitted, or to shine in Courts 
With unaffected Grace, or walk the Plain 
With Innocence and Meditation join’d 
In soft Assemblage, listen to my Song, 
Which thy own Season paints; when Nature all 
Is blooming and benevolent, like thee.48 
 
A closer look at this invocation reveals the deeper anxiety that the imagery of maternity 
and mixture in the opening lines has prefigured: an anxiety about the male poet’s role in 
the creation of his offspring.  In Spring, the word “soft” not only connotes mutability, but 
a keen and emboldened sexuality: much later in the poem, a lambent maiden will fervidly 
-- and regrettably -- trust “betraying Man” with her “soft Minutes.”49  Thomson’s 
characterization of Hertford as a “soft Assemblage” is telling: she is titillating because 
she is demure and yet unnatural, constructed -- both inhibited and expansive.  As a “soft 
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Assemblage,” she is able to mysteriously house both “Innocence and Meditation” within 
her body. The “soft Assemblage” recalls the same indefinable “shifting matter” -- an 
unrecognizable, foreign natural body -- that has characterized the self-propagating bosom 
of Nature.    
But Thomson also describes Hertford as “fitted,” an interesting term that signifies 
both Thomson’s deference to Hertford as the “fit” and suitable subject of his poem, while 
also laying claim to her body-as-landscape, which is “Fitted” -- organized and 
encapsulated -- within the poem’s linguistic register as his defining and original image.  
In trying to “fit” her indescribable “Assemblage” within the lines of his poem, Thomson 
further underscores her autonomy from him: this is not, in other words, a willing 
confluence between Muse and poet, but a more forcible attempt at the interception of her 
pliable Nature.  Still, Thomson’s effort to situate her in logical, controlled settings (in the 
court, or on the plain) are futile, and he must instead turn to the “all…blooming and 
benevolent” landscape to “paint[…]” her.  As with the “mazy-running Soul of Melody” 
elsewhere in Spring, this image is simultaneously also Thomson’s “Song,” and so again 
the poetry is loosened from the poet, as the “Song” is “painted” by her Season, 
replicating again the struggle for poetic control within the new context of Thomson’s 
adulation for his Muse. 
The phrase “soft assemblage” might also be a particularly apt characterization of 
Thomson’s distinctive form of poetry.  As Patricia Meyer Spacks recognizes in her recent 
study of the genre, early eighteenth-century poetry seeks to restore the peace and balance 
so vilely disrupted in the seventeenth century through a careful negotiation of passion 
(the suggestive term “matters of feeling”), expressed through complexity: deep 
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contradictions and dense descriptive detail.50  The poetry thus embodies, negotiates, and 
reconciles complexity through its formal compositions, its exhaustive linguistic registers, 
and its myriad contents.  Yet Thomson’s poetry, as recent work has shown, does not 
really attempt to reconcile its inherent ontological instabilities, but rather invites and 
probes complexity: meaning, form, and content are all slippery and slithery beasts, in 
Spring.51  Sandro Jung notes that readers of Thomson, from the eighteenth century to the 
present day, have “censured the formal and methodological heterogeneity of The 
Seasons,” in spite of a refusal to document what Jung views as a purposeful project of 
hybridity and mixture that characterizes this “blending of genres.”  Jung, not surprisingly, 
finds this project at its most striking height in Spring:  the best representative example of 
this “blending” tendency is Thomson’s work because it combines the hymnal and heroic 
tones of the ode with the dialectical/antithetical conventions of the epic and forms a 
“union” of these elements.52  
  Thomson’s representations of subjectivity are, then, tied to his formal 
experimentation.  There is a clear correspondence between Thomson’s fantasized 
submission to -- and immersion in -- the mutable, feminized “stuff” of Nature and his 
aesthetics: what critics like Shaun Irlam have deemed his poetic “enthusiasm,” the way in 
which the natural world, perceived as divine, simultaneously seems to overwhelm and 
inspire him.53  In both cases, Thomson equates physical, emotional, and indeed sexual 
submission to a concupiscible Nature with his most prolific and creative moments as a 
poet, and yet -- as I have shown here -- these are also moments fraught with anxiety about 
the boundaries between the creator and his creation.  Hertford presents Thomson with an 
impossible problem, one that must remain a contradiction: he must constantly struggle 
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with the demands of her patronage and of his unrequited love, and can never expect 
consummation or full gratification of his desires, nor full ownership of his poetry.   
Yet this is not the case with Amanda Young, the woman whom Thomson courted 
in the 1740s and who proves a much less formidable presence in Spring because she 
comes to represent the more companionate aspects of sexual courtship and natural love.  
In the next section, I consider Thomson’s incorporation of contemporary physico-
theological ideas into his poetry, and consider how the model of the Newtonian spectrum, 
in particular, offers an alternative model of unity and meaning within the abundant and 
eroticized plenitude of Nature.  This is a way, in other words, for Thomson to portray a 
relational self whose ability to be exceptional comes from a willing and mutual 
confluence with Nature’s abundance, and not in opposition to it. 
  
The Passions of Plenitude: Thomson, ‘Amanda,’ and the Erotics of Abundance 
At the time of Spring’s initial composition, the conception of the self as loosened, and 
thus embedded within a complex and dynamic natural system, was sanctioned by the 
contemporary physico-theological understanding of plenitude and its relationship to 
aesthetic pleasure, popularized by the writings of Joseph Addison in The Spectator.54 
Addison famously delights in the full absorption of the seeing “I”/eye in vast and 
sweeping prospects, where the eye can “lose itself amidst the variety of objects that offer 
themselves to its observation.”55  This gesture of self-effacement and absorption into the 
vast multitude of Nature is echoed in Addison’s writings on plenitude in Spectator 519, 
where the myth of the self-enclosed human body is revealed to be a myriad of other parts 
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and “peoples.”  Accounting for the “Infinity of Animals” that “stock” the “Material 
world,” Addison declares: 
 
Every part of Matter is peopled: Every green Leaf swarms with 
Inhabitants.  There is scarce a single Humour in the Body of a Man, or of 
any other Animal, in which our Glasses do not discover Myriads of living 
Creatures…we find in the most solid Bodies, as in Marble it self, 
innumerable Cells and Cavities that are crouded with such imperceptible 
Inhabitants, as are too little for the naked Eye to discover.56 
 
As Addison demonstrates here, the eighteenth-century understanding of plenitude is not 
anthropocentric, but in fact an almost grotesque integration of the human into the 
“crouded” divine world s/he inhabits.57  While Addison does laud “Man” as a 
“wonderful” creature “that deserves our particular Attention,” it is only because man so 
obviously and consciously embodies his own expansive liminality as the nexus utriusque 
mundi: he “who fills up the middle Space between the Animal and the Intellectual 
Nature, the visible and the invisible World.”58  
Given the permissive and expansive definition of what it means to be human in 
Thomson’s world, and the resonances between such a model and the “posthumanist” 
subjectivities outlined in my introduction, I argue in this section that sexuality -- 
represented through the courtship of Young -- becomes, in a very significant and 
meaningful sense, the product of an ontological “middle space.”  This is, in other words, 
a pleasure generated by a world so full that one cannot immediately distinguish between 
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self and other, and that encourages abundant and fruitful connections between beings and 
things.  As I will show in this section, Thomson incorporates a number of physico-
theological ideas about plenitude into his throbbing and eroticized vision of the natural 
world.  And while his characterization of the “I”/eye as simultaneously looking at and 
being in this “crouded” world demonstrates Thomson’s profound unease at the potential 
for a feminized Nature to supplant and disrupt his poetic vision and, by extension, his 
phallocentric sexual fantasy, ultimately it is the ways in which Thomson is able to work, 
write, and create through plenitude that render him an exceptional figure in the world of 
the poem.    
My reading begins in the spring of 1727, when Thomson is conceiving and first 
drafting Spring.  He is concurrently writing his eulogy to Newton, A Poem Sacred to the 
Memory of Sir Isaac Newton, and it is in this poem that Thomson first theorizes Newton’s 
spectrum of light as an analogy for the natural ebb and flow of the seasons, with the poet 
“collecting every ray” that “to the charm’d eye educed the gorgeous train / Of parent 
colours.”59  “First,” Thomson muses, “the flaming Red / Sprung vivid forth” -- the onset 
of spring a passionate, voluptuous color, which ultimately tempers to a “delicious 
yellow,” nestling into the “kind beams of an all-refreshing Green” in the lazy, luxuriant 
days of summer.  Autumn is characterized by “pure Blue,” the color of its 
“swell[ing]…skies” that eventually “deepen[…]” to “Indico,” as the “heavy-skirted 
evening” acts as the first indication of coming winter.  Finally, “the last gleamings of 
refracted light” signal the full weight of the frost; the violet “dye[s],” “faints” away at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from its sister purple, red.  The speaker’s “charm’d eye,” 
trailing each subtle transition, is enraptured as the prism “untwist[s]” each individually 
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painted strand.  Finally, the reabsorption of the individual colors into the infinite, white 
spectrum: the “myriads of mingling dyes” -- and thus, the indistinguishably subtle shades 
of every season -- dissolve into white sunlight, the “infinite source / Of beauty, ever 
blushing, ever new.”60  
 Of white sunlight, in his own papers on the spectrum Newton says it “is an 
aggregate of an infinite variety of homogeneal colors.”  The use of the word “aggregate” 
emphasizes what, for Newton, is a crucial point -- the “homogeneal colours” that make 
up the spectrum of white light (red, yellow, green, blue, purple, and violet) are “primitive 
or original” in that they are, themselves, unmixed.61  What begins as an individual, 
“original” part subsumes itself among the infinite other parts, and thus this particular kind 
of mixture only happens at the most inclusive collective level.  Newton’s influence, here, 
cannot be overstated: for Thomson, this will become a powerful model for a composite 
self, a self that is able to siphon and embody the expansive natural world, rather than be 
subsumed by it. In Spring, Thomson makes explicit reference to the “white mingling 
maze” of Newton’s spectrum but also incorporates it figuratively into his vision of the 
mixed, various world at the peak of its bloom: 
 
Oft let me wander o’er the dewy Fields, 
Where Freshness breathes, and dash the trembling Drops  
From the bent Bush, as thro’ the verdant Maze 
Of sweet-Briar Hedges I pursue my Walk… 
And see the Country, far-diffus’d around, 
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One boundless Blush, one white-empurpled Shower 
Of mingled blossoms…62  
 
Compressed into the sublimity of that “one white-empurpled shower / Of mingled 
blossoms” is a model for the collective of Nature in Thomson: a flexible and synergistic 
“one” that is manifest only its in mingled “many,” just as the distinct colors are inherent 
in -- but also separable from -- the mingled “white” of Newton’s “infinite source.”  For 
Newton, white light can only be derived from the infinite variation and interplay of pure, 
unmixed colors.63  Further, while the eye actually perceives “white,” this white is both 
“white” and infinitely imperceptible shades of red, yellow, green, blue and purple: both 
many and one simultaneously.  For Thomson, equally, Spring’s infinite variety comprises 
the whole and suggests its parts.  To perceive one element is thus to perceive it all as one 
connected universe and to perceive only one element, and this fluid epistemology is what 
motivates the vitalist project Reill sees emerging in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century.64  Addison’s “peopled” bodies resonate again here: bodies that are figuratively 
and perceptively whole, but found to be teeming with multitudes of other beings. 
 It is fitting, I think, that the verse I’ve cited above contains the first “I” of the 
poem -- the first embedded spectator -- because it is in this verse that Thomson’s 
enthusiasm for this kind of mixture reaches a feverish pitch.  Released from “the Town / 
Buried in Smoke, and Sleep,” the thrilled poet “pursue[s] [his] Walk” in the country, a 
rather quotidian activity and certainly conventionally pastoral.  Even prior to the 
conjunction “Or,” however, where we will see a remarkable shift in focus, there are clues 
that the “Walk” will transform into something more extraordinary.  The walk carves 
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through a “verdant Maze / of Sweet-briar Hedges,” an image of entanglement and 
irregularity; further, as the poet winds through the damp fields he experiences moisture as 
simultaneously an expansive, ubiquitous element (“wander[ing]” free “o’er the dewy 
Fields”) and as a minute, “trembling Drop […],” so delicate and sensitive that it is 
“dash[ed]” by his touch.  This image is subtly sexual: the image of “trembling” recalls a 
virginal, timid sensibility, particularly when read against the phallic image of the poet 
“dash[ing]” apart the dewdrop with his fingertip.  Thomson, here, wants to emphasize the 
“I”/eye as separate from the landscape, as seeming to reciprocally affect it, but this ability 
to shape and change its matter so easily and effortlessly seems to dissolve with the 
vulnerable dew.  The conjunctive split wheels the poet from a quiet “Walk” into a 
sweeping synaesthesia, first confounding his senses: he “taste[s] the Smell of Dairy.”65  
Then suddenly London (“AUGUSTA”) rises “Eminen[t]” in the landscape, collapsing the 
prior geographical distinction between the “Town” and the “Fields.”  London is 
transformed into “Plains,” and from here the poet’s “I”/eye is snatched even further back 
to a wider prospect from which he “see[s]” all of England, “the Country” as it 
“diffus[es]” into “One boundless Blush, one white-empurpled Shower / Of mingled 
Blossoms.”  The seeing eye, however, recalling Addison, is not separate from this 
immense prospect, but deeply enmeshed within it: it is “where the raptur’d Eye / Hurries 
from Joy to Joy.”  Thomson here plays on the double significance of ‘where,” which 
designates both the act of looking and is an indicator of place.  The  “I”/eye 
simultaneously looks at and is a part of this diffusive landscape.  As if to emphasize how 
extensive and expansive this leveling tendency is, Thomson closes the scene with an 
image of Autumn, “hid beneath / The fair Profusion”: Spring is so expansively gestative 
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that the nascent harvest is already, in some sense, present, and so spring and autumn 
coexist in both time and space.66 
 Thus, like the Newtonian spectrum, the landscape of Thomson’s Spring comprises 
an almost breathtaking array of minutia, but ultimately collapses into a vibrant 
uniformity.  The spectrum represents both conflation and confluence, and likewise -- at 
the height of its rapturous consummation -- the landscape incorporates and diffuses its 
discrete elements.  This is a moment in which nature seems to overwhelm the poet-
speaker, and yet Thomson’s language is less imagistic at strategic points, emphasizing 
order through the vertical accumulation of details rather than a more horizontal 
heterogeneity: the eye “Hurries from Joy to Joy,” for example, a phrase that gives the 
appearance of overwhelming variety but does so by a mediating repetition.  Thomson 
uses this technique again only a few lines later when he describes the “Myriads on 
Myriads” of “Insect-Armies,” and it recurs at numerous other points in the poem: 
moments like the one above, I would argue, when Nature seems to press a bit too closely, 
and the poem’s narrative of description threatens to be lost entirely.67  The grouping of 
“Joys,” for example, collapses innumerable individual elements into one unifying, if 
abstract, universal.  
   Thomson’s use of periphrasis suggests a similar impulse: it yokes several 
descriptors together to form a singular image of a particular subject.68  Indeed, 
particularizing phrases such as “the Cruel Raptures of the Savage Kind” (animal sex) and 
the “umbrageous Multitude of Leaves” (the forest) seemingly oppose themselves to the 
collapsing impulses of words like the “myriads” or “joy.”69  However, Keenleyside’s 
reading reminds us that periphrasis in Thomson often serves to “confound,” rather than to 
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sharpen, the taxonomic categories of Spring.70  Thus while periphrasis -- the technique by 
which Thomson meaningfully clusters his lines with excessive descriptors, what Samuel 
Johnson famously censured as Thomson’s “filling the ear more than the mind” -- 
diagnoses a loss of unity, as it troubles the presumed distinctions that might separate and 
divide individual categories by demonstrating the extent to which they are inevitably 
interrelated and perceived as aggregate.71 
What Thomson’s interpretation of the spectrum’s tension between the 
homogeneous and the heterogeneous enacts is a struggle for figurative and semiotic 
control: in other words, questioning if and how one can condense into the medium of 
poetry the seemingly indescribable infinity of plenitude. Thomson explicitly poses this 
problem at another point in the poem: 
 
  But who can paint  
Like Nature?  Can Imagination boast, 
Amid its gay Creation, Hues like hers? 
Or can it mix them with that matchless Skill, 
And lose them in each other, as appears 
In every Bud that blows?  If Fancy then 
Unequal fails beneath the pleasing Task; 
Ah, what shall Language do?  Ah, where find Words 
Ting’d with so many Colours…72  
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What Thomson proposes, here, is a two-layered problem in composing and representing 
plenitude: the initial difficulty in imagining, or conceptualizing, Nature and the related, 
additional problem of then rendering such a vision in the limited medium of poetic 
language.  Thomson registers this “fail[ure]” as a taxonomical or categorical limitation in 
both cases: the human intellect cannot “mix” as ingeniously or as subtly, nor can it sift as 
carefully the myriad, imperceptible shades of difference -- the “Ting[es],” as it were -- 
that natural phenomena possess.   
 “Yet,” Thomson consoles himself, “tho’ successless, will the Toil delight.”73  It is 
the perverse pleasures of the “Toil,” and markedly not its fruition, that “delight[s]” the 
poet -- the same creative mantra that will inform, among other things, the libertine 
Lovelace’s protracted sexual pursuit of Clarissa, when he reassures his comrade Belford 
that “preparation and expectation are in a manner everything,” while “the fruition, what 
is there in that?”74  While I will discuss the perversity inherent in Lovelace’s dogged 
pursuit of novelty at some length in the next chapter, let me now assert the resonance of 
the same claim for Thomson, whose almost obsessive revisions of the Seasons testify to 
the pleasures of the “Toil”: for Thomson, also, it is demonstrably “everything.”  Indeed, 
in what follows, I will argue that Thomson’s fruitless yet earnest pursuit of his real-life 
lover, Elizabeth Young -- the Amanda of Spring -- exemplifies the possibilities of infinite 
pleasures even in nominal impotence, and, by extension, helps Thomson regain a sense of 
self-purpose in his representation of that idealized courtship through the creation and 
ordering of unresponsive, wild natural plenitude.  
While at his patron George Lyttleton’s seat at Hagley, where he was actively 
revising Spring, Thomson wrote to Young: 
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I often sit, and with a dear exquisite Mixture of Pleasure and Pain, of all 
that Love can boast of excellent and tender, think of you…Whereever I 
am, and however employed, I can never cease to think of my loveliest 
Miss Young.  You are Part of my Being; you mix with all my Thoughts, 
even the most studious, and instead of disturbing, give them greater 
Harmony and Spirit.75 
 
Loving Young was more pain than pleasure: the courtship was one-sided, Thomson was 
repeatedly rejected, and Young ultimately married another man.  What Thomson 
describes here as the typically masochistic physical sensations of “Pleasure” mixed with 
“Pain” corresponds to the abstract mixture of his “Thoughts,” so that he imagines himself 
sharing a consciousness with Young that “give[s]” his own imagination “greater 
Harmony and Spirit.” While Thomson does not generally privilege one type of mixture 
(material or abstract, corporeal or epistemological) over another, in this letter he 
establishes a clear trajectory that reflects his pursuit of and desire for Young.  As Young 
first pervades his “Being” as sensation, and then moves to the more abstract realm of 
“mix[ing] with” his “Thoughts,” she transforms them -- and him -- in a way that is 
analogous to his own desire for her to read Spring as her love song: he sends her a copy 
in hopes that she will see herself in and through his poetry, and be thus convinced to 
share “this happy picture” with him.   
 Thomson’s competing desire for both unity and variety in love -- urged in a 
strange image that almost recalls the archaic, fungible “one-sex” body that Thomas 
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Laqueur argues loses prominence in the eighteenth-century -- emerges again in this 
depiction of Young.76  His declaration that she is “Part of [his] Being” -- both 
physiologically and emotionally -- is more than mere romantic convention.  Young is not 
simply an additional limb, or a heightened sense, but is absorbed into Thomson, both in 
body and in mind -- so much so, in fact, that Thomson fantasizes them as sharing one 
“Being.”  Further, this amorous mixing does not “disturb[…]” him but instead allows for 
“greater Harmony and Spirit.”  The play on “Spirit,” which denotes both an animating 
principle and a seminal life-force, further reinforces the mixture of thoughts as 
suggestively copulatory.  Like the spectrum, mixture produces anew from a synthesis of 
difference. And although such a reading might seem to suggest, rather sinisterly, that 
Thomson simply fantasizes about consuming Young fully and subjugating both her body 
and mind, it is important to note that he portrays himself as equally helpless in the face of 
this all-absorbing process: he can “never cease” his thoughts, and this “dear exquisite 
Mixture” haunts him “wherever” he is, “however employed.”  Thus, for Thomson, the 
image of mixture transforms his “Being” into something that is simultaneously both his 
(“my Being,” “my Thoughts”) and theirs.  Here Thomson lays the most particularized 
aspect of his self -- his poetic ability -- at Young’s feet, claiming that is only through his 
connection with and to her that he is able to distinguish himself as a poet. 
It is thus fitting that the verse I have cited above, in which Thomson represents 
the poet as pleasurably impotent in the act of poetic creation, prepares the reader to 
receive Amanda.  At first, Amanda and her lover are presented to the eroticized and 
throbbing world of the poem as two visionaries, with the poet-speaker, now confident and 
directive, focusing Amanda’s gaze.  First, when Amanda comes “with those downcast 
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Eyes, sedate and sweet / Those looks demure, that deeply pierce the Soul,” it is the 
speaker who turns her gaze outward into receptive Nature.77  For Amanda’s “looks 
demure” are initially disconcerting and defensive: she either looks down (thus, separating 
herself from the world) or looks too aggressively, “pierc[ing]” the “Soul.”  In both 
instances, these misguided looks sever her from a Nature poised to receive and titillate 
her.  And thus the speaker seeks to redirect her keen gaze, coaxing her to watch as the 
season suggestively reveals itself: 
 
See, where the winding Vale her lavish Stores, 
Irriguous, spreads.  See, how the Lilly drinks 
The latent Rill, scarce oozing thro’ the Grass, 
Of Growth luxuriant; or the humid Bank, 
In fair Profusion, decks.78   
 
The speaker reappropriates her gaze by turning it outward into the increasingly more 
seductive scene unfolding before them (“See…See”).79  And, indeed what the lovers see, 
together, is not only a provocative prospect, but in fact themselves reflected in the natural 
world -- precisely the narcissistic impulse diagnosed by Mulvey’s concept of the 
dialectical gaze.80  So “while the rosy-footed May / Steals blushing on,” the two lovers 
“wind[…]” through the “Vale.”81  As Amanda has just “grace[d]” her “braided Hair” 
with flowers, so the “fair Profusion” also “decks” the “humid Bank,” whose 
“Grass[es]…Grow[…] luxuriant.”82  And, as they “together…tread / The Morning-
Dews,” the “latent Rill” suggestively “ooz[es] thro’ the Grass,” provocatively 
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“spread[ing]” itself as the “Lily drinks” up the moisture.  As Amanda traces the gaze of 
the “I”/eye, she enmeshes herself further in the poem.   
Further into the passage, the evocative drinking and sucking behaviors not only 
continue, but expand, as the “fervent Bees / In swarming Millions…Cling to the Bud, 
and, with inserted Tube, / Suck its pure essence…”83  What Amanda and her lover 
properly “See” in Nature, then, is not only the reflection of their own erotic desire, but its 
enactment, its consummation.   And Thomson seeks to preserve that sense of communion 
by fleshing out scenes of Nature as collective, collaborative and mutual: the “Lilly” is a 
beneficiary, quenched by the “Rill” concealed among the “luxuriant” grass, while the 
“humid Bank” more ostentatiously flaunts its proximity to the life-giving and dynamic 
energies of the water. 
 As the prospect shifts to detail the “fair Profusion” of flora, the speaker and 
Amanda seem to disappear from the scene, subsumed by the universalizing “hurried Eye” 
that, as before, struggles to take account of the “endless Bloom” of Nature.84  (Indeed, 
this same line also recalls the “verdant Maze” and the “bowery Walk” of Thomson’s 
earlier prospect, suggesting his affinity for recycling the same imagery.85)   The “hurried 
Eye,” which has, “Distracted,” roamed the broad prospects of “Vistas”-- the “ethereal 
Mountain, and the distant Main” -- is called back to watch, entranced, as Nature’s 
striptease begins.86  Here I quote Thomson at some length: 
 
…why so far excursive?  when at Hand, 
Along these blushing Borders, bright with Dew, 
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And in yon mingled Wilderness of Flowers 
Fair-handed Spring unbosoms every Grace: 
Throws out the Snow-drop, and the Crocus first;  
The Daisy, Primrose, Violet darkly blue, 
And Polyanthus of unnumber’d Dyes;  
The yellow Wall-Flower, stain’d with iron Brown; 
And lavish Stock that Scents the Garden round. 
From the soft Wing of vernal Breezes shed, 
Anemonies; Auriculas, enrich’d 
With shining Meal o’er all their velvet Leaves; 
And full Renunculas, of glowing Red. 
Then comes the Tulip-Race, where Beauty plays 
Her idle Freaks: from Family diffus’d  
To Family, as flies the Father Dust,  
The varied Colours run; and, while they break 
On the charm’d Eye, th’ exulting Florist marks, 
With secret Pride the Wonders of his Hand.87  
 
Spring, manifest in its sexualized “blushing Borders, bright with Dew,” bares herself by 
“unbosom[ing] every Grace”: in short, performing a seduction by slowly releasing her 
“mingled Wilderness of Flowers.”   Yet in this depiction of Nature’s lascivious plenitude, 
Thomson embeds a struggle between what feminists like Donna Haraway recognize as a 
phallocentric impulse to organize and name the taxonomic categories of each flower, and 
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the disorder, negligence, and resistance to categorization the blossoms themselves 
exhibit.88  Thomson seems both troubled and thrilled by the ways in which Nature resists 
and fulfills these applied categories, whether scientific or figurative. 
The passage begins with the independent and self-enclosed “Snow-drop” and 
“Crocus,” both of which make a logical and unremarkable initial appearance.  The 
intimate coupling should remind the reader of Amanda and her poet-lover, who also enter 
into the scene as bonded individuals set apart from the “blooming” bosom of Nature.  
These flowers are subsumed by the slightly less systematic groupings of “Daisy, 
Primrose, Violet,” who share the stage with the “Polyanthus,” a flower actually cultivated 
to be a hybrid, and thus it begins to cast more unpredictable, yet stunning, “Dyes” forth 
into the mix.89  The polyanthus prefaces the increasingly more mixed flora, succeeded by 
the “Wall-Flower,” described as “stain’d” with “Brown,” and the “Auriculas,” who are 
equally mutable, “enrich’d” by the “shining Meal o’er all their velvet Leaves.”  The 
“mingled Wilderness” begins to slowly reveal itself, as mixture is increasingly privileged 
over purity, and yet Thomson chooses as the culmination of this promiscuous commixing 
the “Tulip-Race”: a cohesive category that is marked by its “Idle Freaks,” its ancestry and 
heritage so “diffus’d” among various “Families” as to make the origins of any given plant 
unrecognizable.  They “run” into one another with “varied Colours.”90  As the blooms 
frenetically multiply, the organized and categorical vision overwhelms the poet-speaker, 
who then collapses these flowers into the transcendent “Infinit[y]” of “Numbers, 
Delicacies, Smells,” succumbing to “the Breath of Nature and her endless Bloom.”91  
Amanda and the poet-speaker have effectively dissolved into the scene; at least, 
there is no clearly demarcated vantage-point from which the couple, and thus the reader, 
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“see.”  The “endless Bloom” of flora seem to occupy the poem’s every space, crowding 
the lines and filling the page apparently independent of the poet.  However, if I may be 
humbly permitted to snatch my reader’s eye back from such a vast prospect, I would call 
her attention to the almost indiscernible figure of the “exulting Florist” who looms 
throughout the passage: particularly, to his hand.  Indeed, the passage begins by 
describing this profuse bloom of flowers as “at Hand,” as immediately available to and 
coexistent with the speaker moving through the garden.  And, as we proceed through the 
passage, the language of the hand recurs throughout: Spring is described as “fair-
handed,” she “throws out” the flowers, and even the “vernal Breezes” are figured as “soft 
Wing[s].”92  All these hands, then, comprise the “Wonders of [the Florist’s] Hand.”  Read 
against the “charm’d Eye,” whose effect is to separate from -- “break” -- and thus further 
scatter the “varied Colours,” it is the “Hand” that tries to “mark,” that wants to collect, 
situate and make sense of all these myriad “Wonders.”  Further, Thomson’s syntax here 
is telling: “the Wonders of his Hand” explicitly describes his part in cultivating these 
flowers, but also locates the flowers as “of his Hand,” cramming all of this infinitude into 
the tiny lines of a human body part.  Thus the “Florist” does not produce what he is not 
always-already a part of; he is visible in every nook and cranny of the exploding garden, 
and, curiously, he remains remarkably invisible in the motley scene.  What seems to be, 
in this passage, a profusion of variety so remarkably dense and diverse is found to be 
reducible to a single human hand, but a hand that is paradoxically lost in the profusion it 
has bred.93 
It is just such an image that recalls, again, Addison’s notion of plenitude – even 
the individual “Humour” is found to be teeming with multitudes – and just such a 
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“Florist” that embodies the subtle, if tenuous, ownership Thomson struggles to take over 
his “Toils.”  Indeed, while the florist may ultimately find his task impossible, his “secret 
Pride” testifies to the pleasures of his work, in 
 
[t]he Negligence of Nature, wide, and wild; 
Where, undisguis’d by mimic Art, she spreads 
Unbounded Beauty to the roving Eye.94   
 
Amanda reappears again, suggestively as the “panting Muse,” after the “UNIVERSAL 
BEING” has “Command[ed] the vernal Sun” to “awake[n] / The Torpid Sap.”95  This 
moment is undeniably triumphant: when before the sap’s impotence and inadequacy was 
marked by its torpidity and its sluggishness, it is now suddenly so formidably virile as to 
“mount[…]” and “spread[…] / All this innumerous-colour’d Scene of things.”96  And 
Amanda’s “panting,” ostensibly the result of her swift ascension alongside the poet’s 
“Theme,” also implies a sexual satisfaction, suggestive after the orgiastic release of sap.  
Amanda is then effectively reabsorbed into the continuation of the “Theme;” the 
“Passion of the Groves” will, in fact, repeat the cycle of titillating variety resisting and 
then embracing the climax of enthusiastic unity, this time with sexy songbirds that 
replace the flirting flora.97  Amanda -- unlike the poet-speaker -- does not transcend the 
space and time of Spring, but is in fact ever more deeply enmeshed in it.  Similarly, the 
“Theme” does not transcend Spring’s genre and content, but is revealed to have been its 
source all along, just as the embryonic Autumn is always tucked away within the 
springtime landscape.  As I have shown, the fantasy Thomson projects here is of a 
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struggle between the mechanisms of mixture and of fusion that underlie the “negligent” 
natural world.  It is also, as we might come to expect, a fantasy of a self in aggregate: all 
of this profusion is revealed to be the work of one “Hand.”  Indeed, in this moment of 
fusion, the poet-speaker lays explicit claim to his theme, his verse, and his “panting 
Muse.”98  Through this fantasy of perpetual union, then, Thomson is able to differentiate 
himself: the Muse, in stark contrast to the controlled and distanced Hertfordian version, is 
now exhausted, clambering to keep up with his prolific imagery. 
 Accordingly, other representations of plenitude in the poem are found to identify 
a single, unifying origin from which the intensely variable natural world bursts forth. So 
the “rich soil” of the British isles is transformed into the “Exuberant,” “better Blessings” 
that “pour / O’er every land” and “the naked Nations cloath.”  Thomson situates the heart 
of a complex and sprawling system of international trade in the benevolence of Britain, 
“th’ exhaustless Granary of a World!”99  The language of plenty -- “rich,” “exuberant,” 
“exhaustless” -- animates and vitalizes the encapsulating soil.  And the “penetrative Sun” 
exerts his “Force deep-darting to the dark Retreat / Of Vegetation,” an implicitly sexual 
image that ignites and fertilizes the spring grasses and flora, “set[ting] the steaming 
Power / At large, to wander o’er the vernant Earth, / In various Hues.”100 Again, natural 
plenitude is given a phallic origin in the “penetrative” rays of the sun, and though the 
exhaustive energies of the natural world may be characterized by their diffusion and their 
amorphousness, they spring from an original, identifiable, and potent moment of focus 
and concentration. Yet other moments in the poem show less confidence and certainty in 
the mechanisms of Nature, and quite tellingly, these are moments that depict an intensely 
maternal and feminized Nature.  Thomson admires, for example, “Nature’s swift and 
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secret-working Hand” as it readies the garden for “the promis’d Fruit,” “yet a little 
Embryo, unperceiv’d, / Within its crimson Folds.”101  Even more perplexing are the 
moments in which detritus reveals itself as a self-consuming plenitude, and decay, waste, 
and death must also replicate and embody the teeming variety so deeply associated with 
life in Spring.102   
Accordingly, in such moments the poet insists on how he can become creatively 
and productively overwhelmed by the variety in the universe, locating himself in, rather 
than as external to, the perpetual flux of its elements: 
 
…catch thy self the Landskip, gliding swift 
Athwart Imagination’s vivid Eye: 
Or by the vocal Woods and Waters lull’d, 
And lost in lonely Musing, in a Dream, 
Confus’d, of careless Solitude, where mix 
Ten thousand wandering Images of Things, 
Soothe every Gust of Passion into Peace, 
All but the Swellings of a soften’d Heart, 
That waken, not disturb the tranquil Mind.103   
 
Though the “Landskip glid[es] swift” across the eye, one can “catch” it, and though the 
“Mind” is “Confus’d,” “lost,” and “lonely,” it is the “mix” of “Ten thousand wandering 
Images of Things” that “Soothe every Gust of Passion into Peace,” “Swell[ing]” the 
“Heart” and “waken[ing]” the “tranquil Mind.”  Though the overarching sensation -- that 
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of confusion and disorder -- remains the same in the captivated viewer, here it is recast as 
an integral and indeed constructive part of the creative process, a moment of inspiration 
and connection rather than one of isolation or of despair.   Indeed, Thomson’s  
“soften’d Heart,” while distinguishing itself from the landscape, participates in a common 
and communal project of rendering the mind “tranquil.”  Thomson’s reassertion of poetic 
production as vital and active, even in its seeming indolence, reaffirms the poet as the 
center of the “Landskip” that he captures, with all of its “negligent” elements cooperating 
in the single and exceptional effort to soothe and encourage him, thus acknowledging the 
poet as simultaneously their source and their product.  By distinguishing the poet from 
the landscape, Thomson thus opens the possibility of individual autonomy, but only at the 
moment in which he finds himself fully embedded within a natural plenitude. 
 It is evident that Thomson, to varying degrees throughout the poem, struggles 
with a sexed body-as-landscape that he finds both disturbing and alluring, both 
inspirational and oppressive.  Thomson is initially overwhelmed by the Muse of Spring 
and unable to overcome his sense of estrangement and distance from his own poetic 
creation.  To help assuage his anxieties about the source of his poetic production, 
Thomson then tries to locate himself within the eroticized landscape and aims to possess, 
organize, and represent it, but, tellingly, through an appropriately destabilizing model of 
creative confluence rather than a clear assertion of mastery.  To underscore the 
persistence of both modes of seduction in Thomson’s thinking, I look at two of the 
culminating scenes of Spring, both of which describe the effects of the vernal season on 
human lovers.  The first portrait describes an unrequited love made perverse by its 
exploitation of youthful ingenuousness: this is sexual love grounded in opposition, and 
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models -- in reverse -- Thomson’s earnest and innocent pursuit of Hertford.  The second 
portrait, however, imagines confluence -- the coming together of like and equal partners  
-- as the highest expression of the self, and is accordingly the poem’s final and lasting 
image.   
 
Conclusion: The Look of Love 
Two images of unrequited love -- male and female -- form the penultimate scene of 
Thomson’s Spring; I will focus here on the first.   It juxtaposes the ripening desire of a 
lambent young maiden against the perverse and self-serving passion of a rake.  The 
virgin, “Flush’d by the Spirit of the genial Year,” is described in highly-suggestive 
language: 
 
Her Lips blush deeper Sweets; she breathes of Youth; 
The shining Moisture swells into her Eyes, 
In brighter Flow; her wishing Bosom heaves, 
With palpitations wild; kind Tumults seize 
Her Veins, and all her yielding Soul is Love.104  
 
The maiden assumes the characteristics of a moist flower at the peak of its bloom, mixing 
the pinkish “live Carnation” of her complexion with a deeper and more robust blush, 
signaling the onset of her sexual receptivity, where “all her yielding Soul is Love.”  This 
desire is concentrated by her “keen Gaze” but her lover cannot meet her eye.  He “turns 
away / Full of the dear ecstatic Power, and Sick / With sighing Languishment,” himself 
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as erotic and sensitive as she.105  Indeed, despite the youth’s virility -- he is “Full…of 
Power” -- he is also “Sick / With sighing Languishment,” a feminized image that 
connotes his reluctant evasion of her bold and “keen” desire, and, further, underscores the 
perversity of his erotic response.  Accordingly, a warning to the “Fair” follows 
immediately: 
 
Be greatly cautious of your sliding Hearts: 
Dare not th’ infectious Sigh; the pleading Look, 
Down-cast, and low, in meek Submission drest, 
But full of Guile.  Let not the fervent Tongue, 
Prompt to deceive, with Adulation smooth, 
Gain on your purpos’d Will.106   
 
 The juxtaposition of a “keen gaze” against a “pleading Look, / Down-cast, and 
low,” the reader may recall, is again precisely how Amanda’s defensive and contradictory 
look is described upon her introduction into the poem, and, further, a misdirected or 
distracted gaze has also been, throughout the poem, associated with sexual passivity.  
Thus the emphasis on looking as evasive or as deflective, in this passage, indicates a 
deeply troubling sexual perversity, particularly given its association with the otherwise 
virile male lover.  Indeed, though the maiden and rake share many of the same outward 
characteristics, they are ultimately driven together by two separate and oppositional 
forces: genuine affection and sinister duplicity, respectively.  Thus, Thomson represents 
their anticipated commingling as appalling and unnatural.  The deceitfulness of the rake 
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underscores his separation and distance from the willing lover, even as her heart “slides” 
into his. 
 Thomson contrasts this intimate portrait with another, happier vision, of two 
lovers connubially joined “in one Fate” by “Their Hearts, their Fortunes, and their 
Beings,” which all “blend” together.107  To enjoy this kind of bliss, the lovers must first 
turn from the depraved demands of modern society: 
 
‘Tis not the coarser Tie of human Laws, 
Unnatural oft, and foreign to the Mind, 
That binds their Peace, but Harmony itself, 
Attuning all their Passions into Love…108  
 
Thomson rejects the “coarser Tie of human Laws” -- laws that demand restrictively-
defined contract and obligation, laws that “unnatural[ly]” join two inherently discrete 
beings -- in favor of physical and emotional “Harmony,” a mutual sentiment that 
“Attun[es]” all “Passions into Love.”  Earlier in the poem, individual “Passions” are 
known to “burst their Bounds,” gratuitously and promiscuously commixing in ways 
analogous to the social perversities Thomson rejects, proliferating selfishly instead of 
synthesizing productively: 
 
…a thousand mix’d Emotions more, 
From ever-changing Views of Good and Ill, 
Form’d infinitely various, vex the Mind 
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With endless Storm.109  
 
Such a persistent insistence on passions self-directed and thus separate from the 
productive “Attuning…into Love” enable disproportion and thus gross abuses in the 
name of love: Thomson references, in particular, an “ungenerous” man who, “alone 
intent / To bless himself, from sordid Parents buys / The loathing Virgin,” or the lover 
and her rake in the scene prior.110  For Thomson, the legal contract of marriage is 
insignificant without the promise of true, mutual feeling, or the “Sympathy of Soul” 
found in a perfect union with another being: “Thought meeting Thought, and Will 
preventing Will, / With boundless Confidence: for nought but Love / Can answer 
Love…”111  The evolution of Thomson’s accumulative technique (“Myriads upon 
Myriads”) is evident here: by underscoring sameness and connection, two equal selves 
meet each other with “boundless Confidence,” as “Love…answers Love.” 
 And as each lover comes together, they match each other ever more perfectly in 
sentiment, in intellect, and in physical desire.  Political differences are erased and 
replaced by mutuality of feeling, which perpetuates their eventual bliss.  Again, the 
moment of sexual consummation is one in which the lover is stripped of his individual 
identity and becomes part of a collective Self: Thomson ends Spring with such an image, 
as “the happiest of their kind!” will “Together…sink in social sleep / Together 
freed…”112  In an earlier version of Spring, the final lines show a couple who has been 
eying sexualized Nature freely and then bring this arousal into the bedroom, where it 
transforms from carnality to a shared spirituality, with “soul approach[ing] soul” in the 
marital bed.113  But the union of souls is only implicit in this version, with the word 
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“approach” suggesting that full consummation is, finally, impossible.  Not so in the 1746 
edition of Spring, post-Young:  
 
When after the long vernal Day of Life, 
Enamour’d more, as more Remembrance swells 
With many a Proof of recollected Love, 
Together down they sink in social Sleep; 
Together freed, their gentle Spirits fly 
To Scenes where Love and Bliss immortal reign.114  
 
What formerly was imagined as merely the capacity for consummation has been replaced 
by what we now recognize as a potent metaphor for total fusion: the shared gaze.  The 
pair, as of one mind and one mutual “Remembrance,” re-collect all the “Proof” of “Love” 
that Spring has offered -- the images “consenting SPRING / Sheds…on their Heads” -- 
and on the wings of that force launch themselves into Heaven, where “Scenes [of] Love 
and Bliss immortal reign.”115  This collective memory of “Love” is full with the scenes of 
“All various Nature pressing on the Heart,” the whole of a polymorphously erogenous 
universe infusing the sentimentalized lovers as they “join together” in their (death-)bed.  
These lovers have abandoned all social, legal, and gendered difference in a “Love” that 
eschews these “coarser Ties” in favor of sublime unintelligibility.  The lover returns 
“Love” for “Love,” “Thought” for “Thought,” and “Will” for “Will.”  In short, the lover  
-- enraptured, titillated, and comforted -- looks everywhere but sees only the comfort of 
self, a self that is blissfully and comfortingly in composite and in union.   
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 James Thomson once described this final image to Elizabeth Young in a letter.  
Dedicating his vision of perfect and mutual bliss to her, he hoped that one day such 
unimaginable happiness might be theirs.  It would never be.  Young rejected Thomson 
harshly and married another man.  The illustrious and romantic poet of the Seasons never 
found his love.  He died, heartbroken and alone, of a fever at age forty-eight. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Clarissa: Collective Relations and the Evasion of Sexual Autonomy 
 
 
My previous chapter argued that, for James Thomson, autonomy is possible but 
undesirable, as he finally envisions self-definition as the erotic result of a full and 
complete merging of two beings.  Thus, while the end of the poem rests in a more 
comforting and companionate model of affection, it is still one that resists opposition by 
incorporating the natural collective into its representation of human relationships.  The 
eroticized universe of Spring, perpetually expanding and contracting, oscillates between 
the localized musings of the poet-speaker and the effusive plenitude of a resplendent 
nature.  Both of these impulses come to infuse the poem’s culminating relationship, 
which perfects to an indistinguishable unity the communion between beings and things. 
As in Spring, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748-9) renders the particularized 
subjectivity of its eponymous heroine through two concurrent registers: one that offers 
intimate, localized expressions of feeling and the other that records externalized, 
eroticized relationships to “others”: in this case, family, friends, and suitors.  While in my 
reading I will largely privilege the second register -- arguing that Clarissa is, in fact, a 
character resistant to autonomy and thus determined by her relationships -- I also contend 
that this desire for relationships with others enables Clarissa to self-define, and to become 
the distinctive “exemplar of her sex.”  Her relational sense of self, I argue, resonates 
significantly less with the Puritanical transcendence and “unity” that has historically 
characterized Clarissa since, at least, Ian Watt.  Further, such a reading denies the 
characterization of her relationship with the libertine Lovelace as oppositional by 
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aligning her with his project of spontaneous and fleeting affinities, relations that confirm 
her exceptional sense of self.  The project of this chapter is not only to align, but also to 
invert the novel’s typical energies: I focus on how Lovelace, a polyamorous rake, finds 
himself defined by one monogamous intrigue, while Clarissa, the sexually virtuous 
woman, becomes increasingly defined by her steady stream of erotic intimacies. 
Indeed, while the poet-speaker of Spring still seeks to preserve some semblance 
of autonomy -- however anxiously and ambivalently -- Clarissa, in recognizing the perils 
of a specifically sexual autonomy, often seems to want to abolish this possibility 
altogether.  As she tells Lovelace (in a letter also offered as evidence to her mother that 
she has not encouraged him as her lover), “…I will not be either so undutiful, or so 
indiscreet, as to suffer my interests to be separated from the interests of my family, for 
any man on earth.”1  Any claim to self-motivated “interests” separate from the communal 
interest of her family would not only be undesirable because “undutiful,” but also 
“indiscreet” in its underlying desire for sexual autonomy and emotional freedom.  
Initially, Clarissa conflates all of her “interests” with those of her family, hoping that this 
will allow her to escape imposed or forced unions with men like Lovelace.  However, 
when she discovers that a “free” heart -- an uncommitted heart -- is necessarily also a 
heart that must be “governed by duty” and is thus subject to a forcible conjugal union 
with the odious Mr. Solmes, Clarissa must reassess the “interest” of her relations.2  Her 
family, Clarissa discovers, relate to her as inflexibly as a suitor or husband might, and are  
“all of one mind” that she should marry Solmes despite her protests.  Once again, she 
evades the dangers of sexual autonomy by asserting a new, conjugal relationship: 
suggesting herself committed to Lovelace, and thus ostensibly defined by this sexual 
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contract.  Her pretense to any relation with Lovelace, however, marks her ruin by 
initiating a series of brief encounters that ultimately lead to her abduction and rape.  
While central, however, they are not the only relationships Clarissa maintains throughout 
the novel.  She also defines herself -- at times, rather exclusively -- by her relationship 
with Anna Howe: a correspondence without the conditions imposed by her relations or 
lovers.  Her relationship with Anna positively affirms her exceptional situation and 
preserves a markedly consistent sense of self alongside the fluctuating, strategic personae 
she is forced to deploy in order to negotiate other, more precarious relations.  Yet 
Clarissa is, I will argue, is ultimately a novel about these other, less positive 
relationships: she is an exceptional woman who is made so through multiple sentimental 
affiliations: through her many attachments and her ability to move and affect others 
proximately. 
 Terms like “performance” and “persona,” are both indicative of the kind of 
relational subjectivity I diagnose in this text, and have historically characterized the 
villain Lovelace and his rakish strategems.3  In this chapter, I contend that Clarissa is also 
mutable, and thus not simply statically opposed to his libertine energies.  In recovering 
this aspect of Clarissa’s character, I tell a different story of the novel, one that finds 
unexpected correspondence between a more enterprising and dynamic Clarissa and the 
values of libertinism that Lovelace professes: values that stress fleeting, spontaneous 
affinities and contingent relations over more definite and rigid unions.  This association 
between Clarissa and Lovelace, I will show, even suggests a concordance between 
Richardson’s novel and the amatory fiction that he professes to depart from: particularly, 
a tendency for the heroine to define herself through sexual affinities and to resist being 
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fixed in one kind of relationship, whether familial or contractual. However, while 
Clarissa does ultimately turn from her consanguineal ties to (however inevitable) 
conjugal ones -- a move that critics like Ruth Perry associate with the “transformation of 
kinship” in the latter half of the eighteenth century -- it is crucial to note that she does so 
resistantly and ambivalently.  Indeed, that Perry’s study begins in 1748 -- and thus with 
the publication date of Clarissa -- is no accident.4  Clarissa is poised on the shifting 
threshold of novelistic “modernization,” and Richardson’s heroine clearly struggles with 
the question of how to define herself relationally in a historical moment when he 
political, social and sexual ties governing citizens are being continuously reshaped and 
reconsidered, as Perry’s study demonstrates.  Yet my chapter, which maintains Clarissa’s 
ambivalence in negotiating these opposing allegiances of family and courtship, resists the 
privileging of the emerging companionate model narrated by, among others, historians of 
sexuality.  It suggests that the eighteenth-century is grappling as much with old ties as 
forging new ones. 
 My reading of Clarissa as a protean figure, I have already suggested, is somewhat 
unusual because it eclipses the usual suspect: Lovelace, who Clarissa herself calls “the 
perfect Proteus,” as he is “so light, so vain, so various.”  Lovelace has been described by 
critics like William Warner as fire, as “an ever-changing element” that does not “have the 
fixed boundaries” of the cooler, more self-enclosed heroine.  He has indeed enjoyed a 
long reign as the novel’s most capricious and intriguing character, simultaneously 
dazzling and obnoxious.5  Yet I follow critics like Judith Wilt and Sandra Macpherson in 
seeing him as profoundly limited by his obsession with Clarissa, an observation that will 
resonate with my critique of male-dominated libertinism in Chapter Four’s discussion of 
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La Philosophie dans le boudoir.  While Lovelace, like Clarissa, is also made exceptional 
and able through his relations to others -- the institutions of libertinism and prostitution 
that support and enable his exploitation of women -- he is often represented as powerless 
when faced with Clarissa on his own.6  Further, and perhaps more significantly, 
Lovelace, who is driven by the lone desire to rape and to possess, recognizes that the 
protracted pursuit of Clarissa makes him, in fact, unwillingly constant, a rake’s death-
sentence: “so universal a lover” being “confined so long to one object.”7  The result of 
this seclusion is that Lovelace becomes “a more and more isolated figure” after the rape, 
when the “rigid canalization of correspondences” surrounding the flurry of her captivity 
and his many attempts at seduction are ultimately “broken down by a flood letters 
surrounding [her] with admiring and anxious attention,” as Watt has observed.8  In 
contrast, Clarissa is repeatedly defined by her “powers of moving” and the transformative 
force that allows her to affect others and to understand and define herself through a series 
of proximities and affinities, as I will show.9   What particularizes Clarissa in this novel is 
not, as has been argued, her strident and static individualism, but the way in which she is 
rendered exceptional by her relationships with others: whom she moves, or “touches,” 
and by what means.10  This kind of exemplarity is simply not possible in the more strictly 
oppositional model of sexual autonomy, where Clarissa would be only defined, 
objectively and thus restrictively, by who is able to touch or move her. 
 My chapter proposes a reconsideration of what makes Clarissa exemplary by 
looking beyond her presumed autonomy, as is usually claimed. Watt’s Rise of the Novel 
exemplifies the still-pervasive tendency to read Clarissa as the consummate individual, 
and thus as paradigmatic of the novel as the privileged form of a newly-emergent modern 
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subjectivity.  Watt aims to situate Clarissa within a trajectory that includes texts like 
Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), citing both as examples of a new bourgeois 
individualism characterized by familial independence, contractual (as opposed to 
“unwritten, traditional and collective”) relationships, and -- particularly in Crusoe’s case, 
but also in Clarissa’s -- a marked lack of sentimentalism.11 Watt says of Clarissa: 
 
 
…she is the heroic representative of all that is free and positive in the new 
individualism, and especially of the spiritual independence which was 
associated with Puritanism: as such she has to combat all the forces that 
were opposed to the realisation of the new concept—the aristocracy, the 
patriarchal family system, and even the economic individualism whose 
development was so closely connected with that of Puritanism.12  
 
Watt tries to fit Clarissa within a strictly oppositional paradigm: she becomes the modern 
individual staving off the cloying and powerful institutions that would sap her autonomy, 
and indeed, this model serves Watt well when relegated to moments when Clarissa must 
contend with broader networks of power like “the patriarchal family system.”  But I 
argue instead that Clarissa does not always define herself in opposition to her family, but 
often through and with them.  Watt’s individualist paradigm begins to show signs of 
strain when confronted by the more complex intimacies of the novel of sensibility, 
exemplified by both Pamela (1740) and Clarissa.  In these novels -- as Watt himself must 
concede -- “love” is transformed from a concrete mechanism of exchange between 
otherwise discrete individuals, as in Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722), for example, into an 
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unquestionably messier and considerably more crowded sexual/social dialectic.  Watt 
describes Pamela as “a struggle, not only between individuals, but between two opposed 
conceptions of sex and marriage held by two different social classes, and between two 
conceptions of the masculine and feminine roles which make their interplay in courtship 
even more complex and problematic than it had previously been.”13  While Watt is able 
to maintain his paradigm of individualism by representing this series of relations as 
diametric oppositions, even he must admit that such relations are made considerably 
more ambiguous and complex in novels like Clarissa.  Moving beyond a more 
oppositional reading of Clarissa, I contend that Clarissa’s emotional and sexual affinities 
both serve to confirm her individualism but do so without asserting her autonomy. 
   The epistolary register is vital in developing Clarissa’s sense of self as primarily 
relational.  Letter-writing allows Clarissa to maintain -- indeed, to demand -- intimate 
affective relationships without being physically proximate to brutish siblings or violent 
rakes.  An important premise of this chapter is the suggestive parallel Richardson’s 
fiction draws between the spontaneous, corporeal expressions that Clarissa invokes in her 
readers and her concurrent claims to the authenticity and, indeed, evidentiary value of the 
letter.  Critics have productively troubled this analogy by postulating that somatic 
expressions are, in an important sense, also intellectual and psychological ones.14  Julie 
Park, for example, has recently probed the connection between sensibility and fetishism 
to demonstrate the extent to which psychological responses are “configured in terms of 
body parts”: in the case of Clarissa, the sexed organs of heart and hymen.15  This overlap 
of feeling, sentient body and intellectual, textual body, often proves crucial in connecting 
Clarissa physically and emotionally to characters from whom she remains physically 
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separate.16  Letters also “witness,” or authenticate through a claim to presence, Clarissa’s 
emotional, psychological, and physical trials at the hands of her siblings and Lovelace.  
Clarissa thus relies upon the presence of the letter as a way to forge intense and inviolable 
connections between herself and others.  To use the terms of this dissertation, letters 
allow Clarissa to gain access to Lovelace and her family relationally, through the 
sentimental mediation of her crafted, written persona.   
 This chapter thus recasts the oppositional relationship of Clarissa against her 
communities (of family, of sexual libertines) and will instead consider her as within these 
communities, as circulating between her family and her captors, absorbing their 
characteristics and mechanisms, and as defining herself in relation to them.  Though 
undoubtedly compliant, I will argue, Clarissa is still actively resistant, a claim buttressed 
by recent feminist histories of the domestic novel.  For example, Helen Thompson has 
recognized the insufficiency of our concept of the “abstract individual” to account for a 
specifically eighteenth-century materialist body defined by its practice -- its methods of 
doing, its political aptitudes, and, crucially, its relations -- rather than its sex. 
Thompson’s model allows for a kind of gendered resistance that is not decisive, active, or 
bold, but that happens through traditional relationship paradigms: specifically, through 
feminine acts of complicity and of subjection.17  In her first letter to Anna Howe, Clarissa 
quotes Miss Biddulph’s ode to the “Ungen’rous sex”: “YOU talk of coquetry!—Your 
own false hearts / Compel our sex to act dissembling parts.”18  As Miss Biddulph laments 
and Clarissa concurs, the “dissembling parts” women are forced to “act” are necessitated 
under compulsion, and thus not chosen “freely,” yet Thompson’s framing of this problem 
usefully acknowledges the fuller political possibilities in such acts of impassioned, 
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sentimentalized compliance: these are acts that confirm, but also expose, weaken, and 
evade, the strongholds of libertinism and paterialism in the novel. What Clarissa 
ultimately demonstrates are the ways in which such purportedly cohesive institutions are, 
in reality, fractured.     
One of the ways she does this is through her writing and her adherence to 
“particularity” as expressive of empirical “Truth.”  Such an emphasis on the partiality and 
power of truth-claims, I argue, anticipates later posthumanist and feminist scholarship on 
the gendered nature of objectivity.  Donna Haraway contends that “[f]eminist objectivity” 
is only possible from a “limited location” and a “situated knowledge,” what she later calls 
“partial perspective.”  For Haraway -- and, I will claim, for Clarissa -- the many 
splintered truths supplied by a partial perspective testify to the “radical historical 
contingency for all knowledge claims,” and thus for the vacuity and arbitrariness of any 
one cohesive or synthesizing claim to Truth.19  For Clarissa, the part irreparably fractures 
even as it supports: it both confirms and cracks the whole, and it is always considered in 
relation to other parts.  As Terry Eagleton has observed of Richardson’s oeuvre more 
broadly, “[t]he whole of this dangerous labile writing is merely one enormous spare part, 
permanently capable of being recycled into something else” -- in other words, it is 
cohesive but polymorphous.  His novels are not uniform, but made up of contingent 
relations between one and many.20 
 In what follows, I will begin by looking at Clarissa’s defining moment -- the rape, 
a forced sexual relationship -- first in a discursive context exemplified by the readings of 
Warner, and then in the context of Clarissa’s own sense of autonomy and community.  I 
begin by documenting how the criticism persists in seeing Clarissa as both autonomous 
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and as oppositional to Lovelace.  This characterization of her has so shaped and defined 
our sense of Richardson’s contribution to the eighteenth century’s “modernizing 
moment,” but it is precisely this sense of isolated, resistant subjectivity that, I argue, the 
novel elides at every turn.  Revisiting the provocative textual analysis performed by 
William Warner in the late 1970s, I reassess some of its conclusions in light of more 
recent feminist work on the novel, arguing that the Clarissa Warner paints helps to 
illuminate -- perhaps unexpectedly -- the resemblances between Richardson’s “faultless” 
heroine and libertine sensibilities, embodied both in Lovelace and in the more lascivious 
women of amatory fiction. 
 
Critical Clarissas and the Limits of Lovelace 
Does Clarissa Harlowe shape her story, or does she suffer it? 
This question -- or variations on it -- has dominated the criticism on Richardson’s 
masterpiece for several decades; at least since 1979, when Warner first sent in his 
“minesweepers” and became “suspicious of everything” in a text that he felt threatened to 
seduce him at every turn.21  Read straightforwardly, Richardson’s infamous novel details 
the seduction, abduction, rape, and death of the eponymous heroine by a vile libertine.  
Clarissa’s letters are considered more or less faithful representations of the events leading 
up to and following her rape. The letters act as witnesses, each a fragmentary part of a 
cohesive and comprehensive whole: Clarissa’s whole self, accessible in her whole 
narrative.  They detail Clarissa’s helplessness, attest her faultless virtue, and at times even 
bear the physical marks of her violation: Lovelace’s famous phallic fingers, hijacking and 
puncturing her words, reminding us that the presumably unified and pure body, 
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represented by her many letters, has been penetrated.22  But, since its publication, some 
readers have seen Clarissa in a less favorable light, and these more suspicious readings 
have tended to emphasize her complicity in her own seduction.  According to Warner --
perhaps one of the more controversial examples of readings that privilege her discursivity 
and agency over her otherwise almost hermetic self-representations -- The History of a 
Young Lady is Clarissa’s “Story,” a loaded term suggestive of authorial control and, even, 
manipulation. In Warner’s account, Clarissa shapes her “History” into a “Story” by 
exploiting precisely the reader’s belief that each letter can, in fact, witness in an 
unmediated and authentic way.  Her triumph is the carefully and purposefully assembled 
collection of letters, testifying her virtue and culminating in her martyred death: a 
meaningful discursive absence.  She is, at every turn, the novel’s subtle but stringent 
form, directing and limiting Lovelace’s raw, dynamic energy.  She is protagonist, author, 
ruthless editor.  Written and read, she ultimately destroys the protean Lovelace by 
subsuming him, perversely along with herself, into her “Story’s” driving theme of moral 
“Truth.” 
The stakes of such a question are obviously high: if Clarissa actively authors, 
controls, and shapes her narrative, can she also be Richardson’s ingenuous “Angel,” the 
paragon of persecuted virtue?  Or, if she can be suspected of discursive play and 
duplicity, does this necessarily also compromise her moral and sexual integrity?  Though 
Richardson famously wrote her to be a spotless, even transcendent, heroine -- and 
generations of ardent readers found her so -- since penning the History, the author and his 
progeny, an “interpretative alliance” of “humanist” critics, have had to defend her against 
readers who find her rigid or smug, who see her death as over-the-top or pointless, or 
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who want her to marry, not reject, her perpetrator.23  This “alliance,” according to 
Warner, “is so powerful that it has obscured its own operation,” in essence effacing and 
naturalizing its own pervasive critical apparatus, and thus “ma[king] it difficult to think 
the possibility of a radically different way of knowing Clarissa.”24 Thus we read Clarissa 
alongside and through this interpretative agenda, easily and often without question.  Yet 
poised, as the novel is, between Pamela (1740), Richardson’s spectacularly popular -- 
and notoriously suspect -- tale of “Virtue Rewarded,” and Sir Charles Grandison (1753), 
his steady and bland moral opus, Clarissa begs consideration as a threshold in 
Richardson’s oeuvre, not simply as embodying a tenuously modernizing moment, as 
critics like Perry have suggested, but also as a moment in which the author is struggling 
against the limitations of his own pedagogical project.25  While Richardson is openly 
trying to correct the problems of feminine virtue made conspicuous in his earlier work, 
Clarissa is hardly an uncomplicated or straightforward account of feminine virtue.  
Virtually every critic who has ever written about Clarissa has engaged the 
question of her culpability, even if in passing.26  Terry Eagleton mounts a spirited defense 
of her as the unfortunate, unwitting locus of Richardson’s uneasy reconciliation of 
bourgeois and aristocratic ideological self-interest.  He sees that she must deploy 
“countervailing tactics…if she is to survive at all,” but laments that “she is thus drawn 
onto the terrain of a conflict in which she will always be a loser because the rules 
disadvantage her from the outset.”27  As recently as last year, Park has indicted 
Richardson and Lovelace as co-conspirators in the rape of Clarissa, as Richardson 
“depict[s] and collaborat[es] with Lovelace’s male subjectivity in order to help represent 
Clarissa’s subjectivity” in such a way as to focus and even enjoy Lovelace’s constant 
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pursuit of her “fetishized body part.”28  For Eagleton, Park, and indeed countless other 
critics, Clarissa seems the unfortunate and often relatively helpless victim of (albeit 
extraordinary) circumstance: any active role she might play in shaping or instigating the 
course of the narrative is often minimized or completely effaced.  For example, Park’s 
formulation, which reads Clarissa’s subjectivity as always-already filtered through the 
particularized context of masculine fetish, still promisingly suggests by its logic 
Lovelace’s dependence upon Clarissa’s pen for his perverse pleasures, and thus her 
(heavily problematized but still viable) phallic power.  Yet even Park’s eventual 
concession that Clarissa “may be seen” as “the most powerful” kind of woman -- “one 
who can take a man’s pen and write her own words as if they were his own” -- rings 
insincere in a text that opens by painting Clarissa as the consummate ingénue and that 
continues throughout to elide Clarissa’s contributions in favor of those made by 
Lovelace.29 
In such accounts, then, Lovelace is seen as the novel’s perpetual -- if awful and 
depraved -- agent, and Clarissa as perpetually subject: to his whims, to his stratagems, 
and to his lascivious portraits of her.  And perhaps no critic has stood more accused of 
valorizing Lovelace’s cruelty and of vituperating Clarissa’s virtue than Warner, whose 
book Reading Clarissa: The Struggles of Interpretation has been described by Eagleton 
as “an ominous exposé of the truly reactionary nature of much deconstructionist 
‘radicalism,’ once divorced from the social and political contexts it so characteristically 
finds hard to handle,” precisely because the text so unapologetically “sings the virtues of 
[Clarissa’s] rapist.”30  A deconstructionist reading of rape as only discursive insidiously 
undercuts the force of the physical act, as readers can and do understand the concrete 
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reality of rape for women, both in the eighteenth century and in the present day.31  
Warner’s defense is that he explicitly resists being seduced by the text and refuses to 
“play[…] a supportive role in an interpretative alliance directed by the text [he’s] 
intended to master.”32  In culling the image of the critic as “master,” and the text as a 
threatening, “direct[ing]” seductress, Warner fantasizes the act of criticism as a 
Lovelacian courtship; from such a posture, the discussion of rape becomes inexcusably 
tactless, at times even crass, as Terry Castle has observed.33 And Warner, who 
unfeelingly describes Clarissa’s rape as “the most cogent response” a rake can perform to 
Clarissa’s precious “fictional projection of her self,” indeed should seem inhospitable to 
readings of the heroine that cheer her as proto-feminist.34  In this section, however, I 
recover from Warner’s account a discursive and composite Clarissa: a protagonist whose 
more relational and contingent aspects mirror Lovelace’s own, and thus dismantle the 
opposition that Warner is so eager to (de)construct. 
  For Warner, Clarissa is in many ways a narrative double-agent: she is the 
shrewdly manipulative author and editor of her “Story,” but also its bewitchingly 
sentimental subject.  Thus, Clarissa’s most “effective feint” in her ideological and 
narrative battle to evade Lovelace is the “idea” she devises of a “whole story,” which 
ultimately “grows into the idea of the ‘whole book’” about Clarissa, by Clarissa.35  In 
other words, by claiming herself to be a neutral transcriber of events, merely an 
unmediated recorder of “the whole story,” Clarissa hides the puppet strings of her master-
narration, Pamela-like, and naturalizes her role as partial author.  Warner’s assertion that 
Clarissa stealthily “wraps herself in the mantle of her own integrity” leads him to a series 
of ruminations on her methods of artifice: 
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…has she remained uncompromised by these struggles?  or, is she hiding 
something unsavory beneath her garments?  Can she be single (a whole 
purified body which means one thing) while she constructs that meaning?  
Can she engage in manipulation, assembling and composing while she is 
one single thing?  The mimetic program she devises for her narrative is an 
attempt to hide her weaving fingers.  The construction of a self is carried 
on so as to conceal the fact of construction: she is an assemblage and 
repetition of all her world’s values….All this allows her art to take on the 
aspect of nature, allows its feverish activity of becoming to take on the 
character of being…36  
 
I find this moment in Warner’s text provocative, as its sexually-charged, oppositional 
language of process and of product, of movement and of stasis, reveals an insightful 
claim: that Clarissa’s nature is in its hidden aspect of “becoming,” not in its outward 
semblance of “being.”  The active, behind-the-scenes language of Clarissa’s 
“assembling,” “composing,” and “weaving,” suggests the surreptitious agency given by 
her methods of artifice, and further, her state of constant flux, while the contrast of 
blatant repetition, “single”-ness, and exemplarity betrays the error of seeing her as a 
fixed, “whole purified body which means one thing.”  What Warner deems the artificial 
Clarissa is a much more dynamic and polymorphous “being” than her “whole” and 
“single” “construction of a self,” which is quite easily deflated and almost laughably 
transparent.37 Warner’s Clarissa, here, is refreshingly active, tirelessly self-generating, 
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and a changeable, evasive presence in a text that constantly tries to fix her into its 
paragon. 
But Warner -- perhaps to his detriment -- is wedded to the metaphor of “struggle” 
and, by extension, of opposition, and thus needs to account for how Lovelace, the 
professed “master of Metamorphoses,” challenges and overcomes Clarissa’s own 
“elaborate pieces of artifice,” her “inventions designed for warfare.”38  However, where 
this leads Warner is quite exciting.  His conclusion is that Clarissa deploys all of these 
polymorphous, perverse strategies of invention and artifice to perpetrate a fraud of unity: 
to fasten “the reader or interpreter” (or the Lovelace) “in a kind of prison-house of reality, 
living under a fixed hierarchy of values, and tethered to a concomitant set of moral 
imperatives.”39   Warner’s Clarissa, here, is reminiscent of amatory heroines like Eliza 
Haywood’s Fantomina, who employ similar strategies of reinvention and performance to 
enforce moral obligations on duplicitous or insincere men.  Clarissa, in meeting 
Lovelace’s strategies with her own rather than becoming his static victim, harnesses a 
libertine approach to defuse libertine advances. 
What Warner then misses, in his criminalizing of Clarissa, is that she deploys her 
own series of duplicitous amatory strategies but to different ends than does Lovelace: in 
order to preserve her virtue.  The prior characterization of Clarissa as sly assemblage-in-
process is overshadowed by a new Clarissa-vis-Lovelace, who must supply the 
“regulating categories” that Lovelace will loosen through comedy, parody, and puppetry, 
“winning our laughter and giving us pleasure.”40  This characterization of Clarissa 
becomes increasingly unwieldy as Warner works through the metaphor of struggle.  
Clarissa, after her rape, now “tries to assume a Godlike authority and dominion over” her 
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friends and adversaries, “making herself into the center and subject that reigns over a 
multiplicity of objects.”  Indeed, Warner presses on, the black hole of Clarissa’s narrative 
power becomes all-consuming: “[o]nce they are placed within the confines of [her] book, 
all that Lovelace, James, Bella, and the rest can think or do simply predicates their 
subject, Clarissa.”41  In this respect, Warner’s reading is, in the end, surprisingly 
complicit with the fawning, titillated “interpretative alliance” he purports to resist.  Like 
those other readers, Warner installs Clarissa as a potent moral and discursive authority, 
the final word in a text where she is imprisoned, kidnapped, drugged, raped, jailed again 
and then killed by a “death that serves her,” he says, “in so many ways.”42   
While there is quite obviously much lacking in the approach of Warner’s study 
(how does it serve someone to be dead?), what his reading reveals is that Clarissa is 
rather remarkably libertine-like: she is simultaneously responsive (to Lovelace’s 
strategems) and yet resolutely determined to achieve her own ends.  This dialectical 
Clarissa is evident in both the text itself and in critical accounts like Warner’s, but is 
ultimately absent from their explicit political, pedagogical, and moral agenda, which 
seeks to posit only one version of Clarissa.  Richardson describes Clarissa as “an 
exemplar to her sex” in the Preface and clearly writes her with this end in mind, but 
laments that she and her motives are often misunderstood.43  Warner indicts her as 
manipulative and controlling but then juxtaposes a one-dimensional rigid and frigid 
Clarissa against the warm and mutable Lovelace, represented by fire: “an ever-changing 
element” that does not “have the fixed boundaries of an object,” an “unstable surface 
which makes what it meets unstable.”44  For Warner, it is most particularly the 
transmutable and communicable qualities of fire that so characterize Lovelace, “who,” he 
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argues rather charitably, “gives us the novel’s most convincing versions of human 
attachment,” as his “feeling[s]…seem […] more genuine for being largely concealed.”45  
Because this version of Lovelace is reciprocally affected -- he affects others, and then 
refracts his own affective response -- Warner seems to claim him as the most relational 
and contingent character in the text: 
 
…Lovelace’s life is a function of Clarissa as antagonist in struggle, and of 
Belford as recipient of his narratives.  Each gives him the possibility of 
playing, performing, and feeling alive.  That he is a function of the 
manifold of struggle and the interplay between self and other means that 
he is an uncertain and changing quantity, but also that he acknowledges, 
with every story and gesture, that he needs the other person and will feel 
the most acute sense of loss on their departure.46  
 
The same term “interplay,” however, is used only a few pages prior to characterize not 
only Lovelace, but, more specifically the relationship between Lovelace and Clarissa.  In 
this earlier formulation, Lovelace is given much more agency: he “empties the self,” and 
“makes it [into] a surface, a mask, a series of folds,” and, in so doing, actively 
“reduce[s]” Clarissa in much the same way, “to a surface…arrayed into a series of folds.”  
“[T]ogether,” Warner continues, Lovelace and Clarissa “constitute a manifold of 
struggle,” co-equally dynamic and complex, so that the “existence of each” is “a function 
of” this “interplay.”47  Here Warner briefly sketches a Clarissa who is not Lovelace’s 
archetypal adversary, nor the novel’s synthesizing telos, but in fact a radically contingent 
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and complex being -- albeit, problematically, she is made so by his “reduc[tion],” as he 
will later be a “function” of her “antagonis[m]” -- whose multiple “folds” are 
simultaneously surface and strata.  This Clarissa echoes the “assembling” and 
“composing,” in-process Clarissa already briefly encountered in Warner’s text, whose 
agency is barely perceptible but always there.  And, as the term “interplay” is associated 
just a few pages hence with Lovelace’s “possibility of playing, performing, and feeling 
alive,” it follows logically that Clarissa must also -- in Warner’s view, to a limited extent 
-- participate in this kind of play and performance as a “function” of the “manifold of 
struggle” and of the “interplay” between herself and Lovelace.  It is this dialectical 
Clarissa that I want to recover from the pages of Richardson’s text because it underscores 
her affinity with the libertine values espoused not only by Lovelace, but also by less 
“virtuous” amatory heroines. 
 Where Warner limits Clarissa in her efforts at self-representation and display -- 
claiming that these only reinforce her “singularly convincing image of herself as virtue”  
-- Lovelace himself supplies us with an instructive counterpoint.48  He writes to Belford: 
 
…this lady is a mistress of our passions: no one ever had to so much 
perfection the art of moving.  This all her family know, and have equally 
feared and revered her for it.  This I know too; and doubt not more and 
more to experience.  How charmingly must this divine creature warble 
forth (if a proper occasion be given) her melodious elegiacs!  Infinite 
beauties are there in a weeping eye.49  
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Here Lovelace -- the consummate libertine, thrilled by the aggregation of pleasures, the 
“more and more” of Clarissa’s wretched “experience” -- is awed by her “art of moving,” 
the “infinite beauties” collected in her one “weeping eye.”  Indeed, it is Lovelace, and not 
Clarissa, who seeks to control these “infinite beauties” by collapsing and perverting them 
into the same “experience”: his fantasized seduction.  And it is Clarissa, Lovelace 
acknowledges here, who is  “infinite[ly]” various in her strategies of self-representation, 
who pleasurably “warble[s] forth” her melancholy when given the “occasion.”  He, on 
the other hand, is locked into a pattern of compulsively occasioning her “melodious 
elegiacs.”  Her capacity for touching and moving others is expansive; this is why both 
Clarissa’s family and Lovelace “know,” and her family “fear[s]” and “revere[s],” her “art 
of moving.”  His is reductive: he can only touch and move her in this one way, 
suggesting the ways in which Clarissa’s polymorphous strategies defuse his limited, 
pointed advances.  She threatens to neutralize and sentimentalize his advances through 
her dazzling and myriad displays of feeling.  Indeed, Warner is correct in recognizing the 
awesome power of self-representation that Clarissa possesses, but he mistakenly sees that 
power as one-dimensional, and, thus, as merely oppositional to Lovelace’s considerably 
more exciting masquerade of representations.  Lovelace, in describing himself as a 
servant to the “mistress of [his] passions,” suggests that Clarissa’s “art of moving” is 
much more prolific and pressing than his repetitive libertine incitements, especially in 
their ability to awe him into constancy.50 
 This, it would seem, is the fatal error of Warner’s Clarissa and indeed, most other 
critical Clarissas: he substitutes his earlier characterization of a more mutable -- and thus, 
in Warner’s terms, more Lovelacian -- Clarissa for a later Clarissa who is pure antagonist, 
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only conceivable in opposition to her counterpart.  And it is this critical oversight that 
leads Warner into, arguably, his most controversial and troubling claim: 
 
…rape is the most cogent response to Clarissa’s fictional projection of her 
self as a whole unified body ‘full of light.’  [Lovelace] can subvert this 
fiction by introducing a small part of himself into Clarissa.  Thus the rape, 
like all Lovelace’s displacements, will seek to induce the slight difference 
that will make all the difference.51  
 
For a moment setting aside some of the disturbing language here (rape as a “slight 
difference,” as a “cogent response”), Warner argues that Lovelace can only conquer the 
powerful “fiction” of Clarissa as a “whole unified body” by introducing his “part” into 
that fiction, and so the physical introduction of his “part” into her body is reconceived as 
a discursive act: Lovelace “displaces,” a favorite term for both deconstructionist and 
Freudian critics, by writing his “part” into her “Story.”  Warner draws this as an instance 
of the part conquering the whole by, paradoxically, exposing its compositeness.  In other 
words, Lovelace’s counter to the totalizing “fiction” of Clarissa’s “whole unified body” is 
to expose it: to penetrate it and contaminate it with parts not of that body, parts that show 
its construction, its assemblage.  The rape, Warner urges, is how Lovelace is able to 
reveal Clarissa’s hidden, weaving fingers. 
 However, Warner’s claim is problematized by both Lovelace’s expressions of 
impotence upon the completion of the rape and by Clarissa’s forceful attempts to 
confront her rapist and to reconnect with her family following the act, both of which 
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suggest that the rape has, in fact, strengthened Clarissa’s desire for connection rather than 
“exposing” such connections as false or arbitrary.  Further, it is Lovelace, and not 
Clarissa, who is limited by the rape -- it fixes him to her while liberating her from the 
confusion of his advances.  Lovelace begins his fateful letter to Belford by saying, “AND 
now, Belford, I can go no further.”52  His “part” is now complete.  He has done all that is 
possible as a predator and has reached the limits of libertinism; all that remains is for him 
to do is to abandon Clarissa and to pursue another victim, which he finds himself unable 
to do because he has become sentimentally attached to her.  Clarissa, in contrast, 
abandons any possibility of a real sentimental connection, and indicts him by 
proliferating his shame, replicating the act in a series of scribbled notes, all of which 
strive to regain proximity to her loved ones by redeveloping sentimental connections.  
She is “free” -- and I, of course, use this term in a limited sense -- to pursue other, more 
emotionally-gratifying and self-actualizing connections. The scraps of paper Dorcas 
collects from Clarissa’s room immediately after the event show, piecemeal, her making 
sense of the assault through vocal performances, exploding like a hydra all over the text: 
she inhabits, by turns, the indignant voice of a sexual martyr, the desperate voice of a 
victim, the forcibly distant voice of allegory and parable, the thundering voice of a 
disgruntled patriarch, the smug voices of imperious siblings, etc. etc.  Lovelace himself is 
so moved by these “scraps” that he finds he cannot copy any more “eloquent nonsense” 
after the very first letter -- tellingly, the letter in which Clarissa laments the finality of the 
event to Anna Howe by saying “..I am no longer what I was in any one thing,” suggesting 
that every aspect of Clarissa has been shifted and displaced by Lovelace’s act of 
cruelty.53  Indeed, here, Clarissa directly refers to herself as a collective of “things” that 
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Lovelace has comprehensively displaced, challenging Warner’s claim that she was 
previously unified and is now fragmented by the act of rape. 
 Her letter to her father begins similarly by moving from a lament of isolation to a 
fervent prayer for connection.  She asks, “will nobody plead for your poor suffering 
girl?” -- but then moves to her telling him, “Yes, I will call you papa, and help yourself as 
you can—for you are my own dear papa, whether you will or not—And though I am an 
unworthy child—yet I am your child.”54  Thus she emphasizes their connection even as 
she acknowledges that Lovelace, in the fulfillment of her father’s curse, has given the 
family an actual basis upon which to shame and reject her.  Similarly, her letter to her 
sister Bella aims to stress a lost connection, assigning Bella a sense of emotional 
perception and acuity that surpasses Clarissa’s own: “You penetrated my proud heart 
with…jealousy,” “[y]ou knew me better than I knew myself.”  In so doing she 
reestablishes Bella as the knowing and more experienced older sister, reframing herself 
within the traditional family structure as the reckless and naïve younger child: “I was too 
secure in the knowledge I thought I had of my own heart…”55  In this moment, then, 
Clarissa is anxious to reclaim a sense of herself within the family structures she has 
abandoned, despite their rigidity.  She also supplicates with Miss Howe in a number of 
the letters, begging her: “if thou has friendship, help me / And speak the words of peace 
to my divided soul, / That wars within me… I’m tott’ring on the brink / Of peace; and 
thou art all the hold I’ve left!”56 Anna Howe thus remains, consistently, the sure and 
supportive mooring for Clarissa’s wavering sense of herself, yet one she only turns to 
after she has invoked less-certain and more volatile relationships with father, mother, and 
sister. 
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I understand this ability to turn an infinite variety of lenses on the event as the 
only way now available for Clarissa to respond to Lovelace’s insupportable behavior 
because it allows Clarissa to escape the reality of her rape by reframing herself within an 
alternate network of friends and family.  By fracturing the event into so many different 
perspectives, Clarissa can refract and resist the one totalizing lens of Lovelace’s desire 
and indict him for his compulsions at the same time by calling upon others to witness 
what he has done.  Formal peculiarities in this scene support my assertion: as Park has 
also recognized, the novel doubly registers Clarissa’s rape through a fragmentation of 
both Clarissa’s and, importantly Lovelace’s, correspondence.  While many critics have 
focused attention on Clarissa’s incoherent scraps of paper and how they help to record the 
trauma of her rape, few have seen Lovelace’s own guiltily scribbled acknowledgement as 
evidence of anything but his extreme indifference to the event.57  But, the novel tells us 
again and again, this is not an event that Lovelace can remain indifferent to, and so his 
meaningful brevity, here, must register something more than simply his cruelty.  Park 
suggests that it confirms his impotence by offering “the most telling proof of Clarissa’s 
corporeal inviolability;” I am not as confident that the physical rape is so insubstantial, 
but would agree that this rhetorical choice by Richardson does evince how empty and 
powerless the seeming triumph of Clarissa’s rape actually is, and  
-- in my own formulation -- how insignificant Lovelace’s discursive “part” becomes.58  It 
is merely one among many, drowned in the sea of papers from Clarissa that flood the text 
by asserting the relationships she can still draw upon even in her moment of trial, 
immediately following Lovelace’s statement.  For Lovelace, indeed, the game is up: he 
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has crippled himself by forcing a relation where Clarissa has repeatedly refused it, losing 
all of the pleasures he had previously enjoyed. 
The next section will, then, continue by looking at Clarissa’s parts and the ways in 
which she defines herself relationally to others.  I consider Clarissa’s narrative particulars 
as a way of maintaining immediacy, presence, and mobility within the impossibly 
stagnant patriarchal expectations of the text, arguing that such strategies echo those 
exhibited by heroines like Haywood’s Fantomina. 
 
Playing the Part: Clarissa’s Relations 
As a libertine, Lovelace knows and wants only what is immediate, pressing, and urgent: 
the object of his desire, ever elusive and ever varying.  Clarissa, by contrast, is usually 
read as transcending this scrutinizing and suffocating drive: she is believed to transform 
the particular moment into the universal and the eternal, becoming, as Angus Ross notes, 
increasingly “Christ-like” as the novel progresses.59  It is precisely this “transcendent” 
Clarissa that Richardson felt should be a model for his faithful readers, even as some 
found her blind adherence to virtue positively sadistic.60  Without casting aspersions on 
Clarissa’s attempts at martyrdom -- acts I find myself equal parts inspiring and 
exasperating -- I instead privilege, in what follows, the moments in the text where 
Clarissa seems to recognize and harness the more “Lovelacian” power of immediacy, or 
what Warner calls “the extraordinary quality of [the] particular moment.”61  Indeed, 
Clarissa’s ability to harness this “extraordinary quality” of “particular[s],” I will argue, is 
the most salient way in which she manages and negotiates erotic relations with others, 
and further, in so doing, aligns herself unexpectedly with the libertine project of 
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spontaneous and fleeting affinities.  By examining the ways in which Clarissa seeks to 
strengthen or intensify her sense of her virtue -- and further, to represent her virtue to 
others -- I demonstrate how she assembles a composite and indeed “exemplary” sense of 
self through her “particular” and local relations with others. 
An instructive comparison can be found in Eliza Haywood’s Fantomina; or Love 
in a Maze (1724), a text in which the heroine is also quite obviously limited and socially 
bound, and in which she suffers greatly at the hands of her lover, but crucially also, in 
which she enjoys and is allowed by critics a level measure of erotic play in her 
polymorphous masquerade.62  It is a particularly rich depiction of the female body as 
seemingly unified but in fact explosively various, as the heroine constantly reinvents 
herself, through disguise and artifice, to attract and keep her inconstant lover Beauplaisir.  
Helen Thompson, one of Haywood’s most incisive readers, recognizes that this is not a 
simple game of substitution: rather, “Haywood produces a series of whole bodies from 
what would seem the scant resources of one body.”  This emphatically material, physical 
replication happens, in the text, on a separate “epistemological register” from the 
intradiegetic narration of Beauplaisir’s letters, which supply a counterpoint to the 
“perpetual present of Beauplaisir’s desire.”63  The letters, then, confirm Beauplaisir in his 
strategems and also confirm, in their shared reader, the heroine as one body, when she 
receives two letters intended for two separate lovers. 
 In Fantomina, letters serve as a “register,” recording and indicting Beauplaisir by 
separating him from the “present” of his desire.  Not so, I contend, in Clarissa.  Indeed, 
the immediacy and presence Fantomina achieves through physical disguise and 
masquerade, I argue, is precisely what Clarissa attempts to convey in her writing: 
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resisting the violation of her physical body by substituting “a series of whole bodies,” 
letters that lay claim to authentic specimens of self and thus to provide an expansive 
aesthetic context for any one act.  With the epistolary providing the primary 
“epistemological register” in the novel, Clarissa invokes in a blatantly contradictory way 
the assumption that self-representations are singular and exemplary, and thus not serial.  
And nowhere is this attempt at rendering herself fully present more evident than in her 
resurrection in the novel’s final series of letters, in which she returns to the text as many 
Clarissas still performing the roles demanded by her friends and family.  She prostrates 
herself “into” the “awful presence” of her father “by these lines,” supplicating “on her 
knees” throughout her “repeated prayer” to him for forgiveness.  She “salutes” the 
“hands” of her mother, comforting her that “the principal end of [her] pious care” has 
been achieved.  She condescends to her brother James, chastising him for his “passion” 
and his “rigorous heart,” “deaf” to her suffering, telling him that “NOW is that time, and 
THIS the occasion” for her pardon.  She fantasizes Arabella weeping “unrestrained” over 
her grave.  She meditates, contemplatively, on the “ways of Providence” with her 
uncles.64 And she will wind herself through and among the letters of Lovelace as the text 
ends, serving as a counterpoint, a final moment of fracturing, as a prominent editorial 
note following her death apprises the reader.  Each letter presents the reader with a 
different Clarissa: one adapted to the particular relation that she has developed with the 
addressee.  Her father, for example, will be moved by a supplicating and compliant 
daughter; James, on the other hand, can only be rebuked if confronted.  By adapting 
herself strategically to each relation, and converting them through her particularized self-
representation, Clarissa unifies them in the more collective act of mourning her death and 
 93 
-- importantly -- of confirming her as exemplary.  The rapturous heights of their grief at 
the novel’s end only serves to testify to Clarissa’s singular virtue: a virtue she has 
convinced them of, paradoxically, through an artful and tailored series of stylized self-
representations. 
That Clarissa is aware of herself as consciously constructing self-representations 
in relation to others becomes rather immediately evident in the text.  In the first paragraph 
of her first letter to Anna Howe, she writes: 
 
How you oppress me, my dearest friend, with your politeness!  I cannot 
doubt your sincerity; but you should take care that you give me not reason 
from your kind partiality to call in question your judgment.  You do not 
distinguish that I take many admirable hints from you, and have the art to 
pass them upon you for my own.  For in all you do, in all you say, nay, in 
your very looks (so animated!) you give lessons, to one who loves you and 
observes you as I love and observe you, without knowing that you do.  So, 
pray, my dear, be more sparing of your praise for the future, lest after this 
confession we should suspect that you secretly intend to praise yourself, 
while you would be thought only to commend another.65  
 
This opening self-representation is strange in its combination of outward “politeness” and 
affection with self-interest.  Describing Anna’s affection as curiously “oppress[ive],” 
Clarissa seems to suggest that even consensual friendships can be governing and can 
affect behavior. Clarissa’s own self-stylings are then viewed as “art[ful]” in that they 
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absorb and imitate Anna’s own behaviors while passing them off as Clarissa’s own.  
From the outset, then, some of Clarissa’s most defining and “admirable” behaviors -- 
behaviors that Anna has described in the previous letter as “excelling [in] all your sex” 
(40) -- are found to be mutual, shared, or at the very least, explicitly borrowed.  And yet 
Richardson does something interesting here.  He does want to distinguish Clarissa in 
some way, and so he has Clarissa chide Anna for her vanity in finding those mirrored 
behaviors so absorbingly attractive, as they are behaviors that serve only to “praise 
[her]self” and thus cast her effusive adulations as perversely self-motivated.  In this 
gentle chastisement, Clarissa does actually set herself apart, both in her penetration in 
recognizing the self-serving aspects of Anna’s compliment and in her candor in 
expressing them to Anna, however delicately.  In this way, Anna’s relationship to 
Clarissa, while relational and indeed positive and supportive, serves to confirm her sense 
of self. 
 In contrast, Clarissa’s family sequesters her, transforming what is a nominally 
“positive” exemplarity in her relationship to Anna Howe into an isolating “autonomy.”  
Her Uncle John writes, “…I could not read your letter to myself, without being 
unmanned.  How can you be so unmoved yourself, yet be so able to move everybody 
else?”66  Here John describes her as constitutionally rigid, pitted against a family that she 
is able to dissolve at will, with John himself “unmanned” by her sentimental 
supplications.  In another letter, Bella describes her as an unnatural mixture of qualities, 
and thus as pejoratively exemplary: “In your proposals and letters to your brother, you 
have showed yourself so silly and so wise, so young and so old, so gentle and so 
obstinate, so meek and so violent, that never was there so mixed a character.”67  These 
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characterizations are contradictory -- John finds her “unmoved” and Bella finds her 
“mixed” and active -- but both serve to mark and isolate her as exceptional, emphasizing 
her opposition to the family that is cohesive and of one mind: as John tells her “You must 
not conquer father, mother, uncles, everybody.  Depend upon that.”68  
While throughout the novel Clarissa undeniably operates within impossibly 
stringent familial, social, and physical restraints, such constraints do not necessarily 
eradicate playfulness, or a sense of self-pleasure, and often even seem to incite or invite 
an eroticized and impassioned response from her.69  Clarissa in fact aligns herself with 
her sister Bella in a manner similar to -- but less explicit than -- that of her letter to Miss 
Howe. Though Clarissa promises to “do justice” to “[e]verything she said against me” in 
her description of the disagreement to Miss Howe, as well as to report her own 
“conduct,” in order for Anna to “judg[e]” properly with “approbation or disapprobation,” 
the letter offers a number of insights into how Clarissa absorbs and “reflects” back the 
behavior of others, even those behaviors she otherwise purports to loathe.70  Indeed, 
throughout the letter Clarissa’s report betrays the overlap and conflation of her own 
behaviors with those of the vile Bella, but always within the overarching context of 
Clarissa’s claim to truth and “justice.”  Though Clarissa’s letter has the intended effect of 
strengthening the reader’s sense of her virtue through its susceptibility to Bella’s 
purportedly more powerful jealousy, and thus intensifies virtue through its relation to 
vice, Clarissa does so through a fiction of opposition and of juxtaposition.  “Indifferent 
people,” Clarissa sneers, “judging of us two, from what you say” -- and, I would 
underscore, from what Clarissa reports -- “would either think me a very artful creature, or 
you, a very spiteful one.”71  Both Clarissa and Bella here give voice to the Haywoodian 
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observation that “virtue” or “vice” are socially constructed phenomena, which Diderot, 
and then ultimately Sade, will echo in France.  As Clarissa notes, what others will 
“judge” or see is based solely on external factors, on outward observations, and thus fully 
contingent and relational.  
Further, Bella is described frequently in the text as having an “outward eye,” a 
characterization which is clearly meant to suggest her superficiality, but which also more 
tellingly suggests her perspicuity in identifying artifice and strategy.72  Bella’s “outward 
eye” proves shrewd in her accusation that Clarissa is “one of the artfullest I ever knew,” 
substantiated by an account of her own limitations as seductress: 
 
And then followed by an accusation so low! so unsisterly! – That I next-
to-bewitched people, by my insinuating address: that nobody could be 
valued or respected but must stand like cyphers wherever I came.  How 
often, said she, have I and my brother been talking upon a subject, and had 
everybody’s attention till you came in, with your bewitching meek pride, 
and humble significance; and then we have either been stopped by 
references to Miss Clarissa’s opinion, forsooth; or been forced to stop 
ourselves, or must have talked on unattended to by everybody.73  
 
Bella complains that she and her brother become mere “cyphers” in Clarissa’s presence -- 
wallpaper to the dazzling displays of “meek pride and humble significance” that Clarissa 
puts on.  Clarissa’s “bewitching” and “insinuating” behaviors thus prove overwhelmingly 
attractive, “stopp[ing]” and “forc[ing]” her siblings’ lesser conversation.  Grammatical 
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stress laid on the words “meek” and “humble” clearly betray Bella’s bitterness, and help 
to underscore her accusations of duplicity and “artful[ness].”  But what Bella also accuses 
Clarissa of here is of strengthening herself relationally, by becoming a “cypher”: a word 
that suggests both an increase in relational value as well as Bella’s inherently lesser or 
zero value.74  Thus Bella’s real accusation here is that Clarissa would hardly be 
considered exceptional if not relative: this “accusation so low!” rings authentic, as 
Clarissa herself laments Bella’s lack of discernment in an earlier account of her sister’s 
courtship with Lovelace, precisely by considering smugly how it reflects upon her.  
The substance of her claims are verified by Clarissa’s own self-reflections in a 
subsequent letter to Anna Howe, where she writes:  
 
Your partial love will be ready to acquit me of capital and intentional 
faults—but oh, my dear!  my calamities have humbled me enough to make 
me turn my gaudy eye inward; to make me look into myself!—And what 
have I discovered there?—Why, my dear friend, more secret pride and 
vanity than I could have thought lain in my unexamined heart.75 
 
In characterizing her own eye as “gaudy,” Clarissa aligns herself with the “outward eye” 
of Bella, reinforcing her own perception and penetration as merely ornamental and 
misdirected, simultaneously reinforcing the artifice and shallowness in outward self-
representations.  Further, she shares Bella’s vantage point until turning this eye inward, 
when -- properly “humbled” -- Clarissa discovers that she shares a motivation for “secret 
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pride and vanity,” which reaffirms Bella’s claim (and indeed Clarissa’s own chastisement 
of Anna Howe) that meekness and humility are rarely ingenuous.  
 A closer look at the scene with Bella suggests, similarly, that Clarissa and Bella 
are more closely and intimately aligned in their behavior than Clarissa’s professions of 
helplessness would otherwise suggest.  As I mentioned above, Bella’s remarks formally 
adopt a tone of spitefulness when italicized, as when she is “surprised that the witty, the 
prudent, nay, the dutiful and pi-ous (so she sneeringly pronounced the word) Clarissa 
Harlowe, should be so strangely fond of a profligate man.” And yet Clarissa’s own 
response harnesses some of this same energy, flinging sarcasm for sarcasm: “The 
aggressor should not complain – And as to oppor-tune offers, would to heaven some-one 
had offered oppor-tune-ly to somebody.  It is not my fault, Bella, the oppor-tune 
gentleman don’t come!”76 Richardson’s juxtaposition of these stresses on the page affirm 
the conflation and overlap of the two girls’ voices, as the argument becomes increasingly 
heated; further, I would contend, this mimicry also demonstrates Clarissa’s ability to 
absorb and reflect back the behaviors of those around her.  Rather than staunchly 
opposing herself to Bella -- remaining passive and compliant, or presenting a unified 
front of “meekness”-- Clarissa reflects and intensifies Bella’s hostile energy, drawing 
upon it in her responses to her sister. 
 Accordingly, Bella accuses Clarissa of being a “reflecting creature” during an 
especially heated exchange: “Such a saucy meekness; such a best manner; and such 
venom in words!—Oh Clary! Clary!  Thou wert always a two-faced girl!”  Bella will 
later go on to describe Clarissa as a “cunning creature” and a “mixed character” with 
“contradictory qualities,” all of which suggest a dynamism and a vitality that hardly 
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portray a unified and vapid paragon of virtue.77  And Clarissa’s defense, in this moment 
of impassioned disparagement, is scarcely exculpatory: she sneers, “Nobody thought I 
had two faces when I gave up all into my papa’s management,” which Bella rightfully 
recognizes as “another of [her] fetches,” as the reader knows Clarissa and Anna Howe 
have repeatedly strategized about the political implications of managing the dairy-house, 
her grandfather’s estate, and have weighed the political advantages of giving it over to 
her father.78  Indeed, while Bella may only possess a limited, passive, and thus “outward” 
view, of Clarissa, what presents itself to her view -- even in the space of one short letter, 
narrated by Clarissa herself -- is how overlapping and indeed indistinguishable Bella’s 
voice is from Clarissa’s.   
 Thus, whether in an effort to defend herself or to suggest her virtue, to preserve 
her sense of self or to loosen it, to render herself exceptional or to humble herself, 
Clarissa’s behavior is always mutual and reflective of the others who surround her. 
Indeed, she laments rather openly to Anna that such behaviors seem easily to multiply 
themselves: that her “more capital artifices…branch out into lesser ones without 
number.” “Yet,” she concludes, “all have not only the face of truth, but are real truth; 
although not a principal motive.”79  It is my contention that “all” these behaviors “have 
the face of truth” because they are so omnipresent and inherent, so pervasive in the world 
of the novel that there is no rising above them, no becoming truly “exemplary” in 
isolation from others.  Further, pleasure is -- at least in part -- a motivation in these self-
conscious displays of artifice and of mimesis.  In recognizing Clarissa’s demonstrated 
pleasure in her various personae, I counter the assumption that, throughout the novel, she 
derives pleasure only from the ingenuous observance of law and virtuous obedience, 
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while Lovelace sits poised as the consummate transgressor and libertine.80  In her tireless 
evasion of boundaries through the performance of personae that imply her constant 
observance of them, and in the ways in which she defines herself by more fleeting 
relations instead of the fixity of marriage, I contend, Clarisse resembles the heroines of 
early eighteenth-century amatory fiction more than she does those of later domestic 
fiction, or as Ruth Perry refers to them, her literary “daughters,” and it is with this 
consideration in mind that I conclude my chapter.81 
 
Conclusion: Clarissa’s Tableaux 
A final example of Clarissa’s strategic self-representations illustrates how she is able to 
diffuse the intensity of Lovelace’s physical advances by insisting on their textuality, their 
symbolism, and their aesthetics.  Clarissa possesses an uncanny capacity to construct 
elaborate sentimental tableau, in which Lovelace, in so many ways the consummate 
Restoration rake, is all too willing to play a starring role.82 The tableau is a conflation of 
visual and textual representation and accordingly positions the reader as conscious of 
seeing, watching, hearing, and feeling: it is a moment when a reader might feel as though 
she has witnessed what the text has shown.  Tableau theory has tended to focus on 
theatrical or dramatic texts but the intensely visual and deeply emotive qualities of the 
letters in Clarissa similarly enable and, indeed, solicit such a multisensory experience on 
the part of the reader, and, in turn, in the world of the novel as testified to by Lovelace 
and others.  Indeed, by recasting Lovelace’s attempts at seduction within sentimental 
tableaux that offer more fixed narratives and thus control the outcome/meaning of the 
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scene, Clarissa is able to forge a different kind of relationship with him and thus to evade 
his attempts at isolating and sexually victimizing her.  
 Indeed, the conscious manipulation of the tableau gives Clarissa the ability to 
shape and to re-present what Lovelace sees when he looks at her, and further, to assume 
some control over her own representation in a world structured by libertine language and 
law.  Resistance, direct and open, will prove counter-productive, as Lovelace proclaims 
in a letter to Belford, quoting the poetry of Dryden: “It is resistance that inflames desire, / 
Sharpens the darts of love, and blows its fire.”  Compliance, on the other hand – what 
Clarissa purportedly cannot do – would paradoxically “disarm[…]” and cool desire: 
Lovelace continues the citation by noting that “Love is disarm’d that meets with too 
much ease; / He languishes, and does not care to please.”83  Dryden’s language is telling 
here: resistance “sharpens” and “inflames,” arouses and prepares to penetrate, while 
compliance “disarm[s]” the suitor and effeminizes him, rendering him “languish[ed]” and 
apathetic.  Clarissa, having already articulated this same incongruity in an earlier letter to 
Anna Howe, recognizes that she must negotiate this delicate balance in her own self-
styling.  She must continue to straddle the balance between a receptive lover and a 
virtuous victim if she is to survive Lovelace.  In other words, she must be loved enough 
to ensure her physical safety, but she must, equally, defuse his irascible and explosive 
advances with cooling compliance: both of which are moves that underscore her 
relationship with her captor. 
After she has been woken into a frenzy by Dorcas, who has sounded the alarm of 
fire, Clarissa finds herself half-dressed and in Lovelace’s arms.  Believing it to be one of 
his schemes, Clarissa first resists violently, “in broken accents, and exclamations the 
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most vehement.”  She raves menacingly, “looking all wildly round her as if for some 
instrument of mischief,” and indeed, for her more skeptical readers, this is a rare moment 
of thrilling resistance: we want her to just stab this guy and get away, already.84  But, 
crucially, as Lovelace has already suggested in his earlier meditation from Dryden, it is 
the moment when Clarissa is the most actively resistant that she is the most deeply 
ensnared.  And, indeed, Lovelace is in complete control of the scene, even of this hostile 
fit: he grabs the scissors easily from her and throws them in the fire, and then “permit[s] 
her to take the chair,” a chilling word that culls the authority and distance characteristic 
of the true libertine.  Her active resistance has inflamed him; he describes her in some of 
the novel’s most erotic language:  
 
But, oh the sweet discomposure!—Her bared shoulders and arms, so 
inimitably fair and lovely: her spread hands crossed over her charming 
neck; yet not half concealing its glossy beauties; the scant coat, as she rose 
from me, giving the whole of her admirable shape and fine-tuned limbs: 
her eyes running over, yet seeming to threaten future vengeance: and at 
last her lips uttering what every indignant look and glowing feature 
portended; exclaiming as if I had done the worst I could do, and vowing 
never to forgive me; wilt thou wonder that I could avoid resuming the 
incensed, the already too-much-provoked fair one?85  
 
At this moment, Clarissa is all “discomposure”: Lovelace easily isolates, and even 
fetishizes, each individual body part, and once again is aroused by the juxtaposition of 
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her resisting body and the promise of her compliance.  Her “bared shoulders” and her 
“half conceal[ed]” bosom offset her “venge[ful],” “indignant” and “glowing” expression, 
and Lovelace is first empowered by his interpretation of this “discomposure,” “clasp[ing] 
her once more to [his] bosom.”  But it is Clarissa who then takes control of the scene, 
regrouping the raw materials of her eroticized parts into another persona: 
 
…it was with the utmost difficulty that I was able to hold her: nor could I 
prevent her sliding through my arms, to fall upon her knees: which she did 
at my feet.  And there, in the anguish of her soul, her streaming eyes lifted 
up to my face with supplicating softness, hands folded, disheveled hair; 
for her night head-dress having fallen off in her struggling, her charming 
tresses fell down in naturally shining ringlets, as if officious to conceal the 
dazzling beauties of her neck and shoulders; her lovely bosom too heaving 
with sighs, and broken sobs, as if to aid her quivering lips in pleading for 
her – in this manner, but when her grief gave way to her speech, in words 
pronounced with all that emphatical propriety which distinguishes this 
admirable creature in her elocution from all the women I ever heard speak; 
did she implore my compassion, and my honor.86 
 
Clarissa’s eyes, formerly “running over,” are now “streaming…with supplicating 
softness;” her hands, which had “crossed over” her neck, are now penitently “folded;” her 
bosom now “aids” her “quivering lips” in an impassioned plea.  Rather than try to make 
Lovelace see her as a complete or unified person, Clarissa allows -- indeed, calls 
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Lovelace’s attention to -- the discreteness of each individual part, but contextualizes that 
part within the broader landscape of her powerlessness and victimization, the staging of a 
persona that overcomes and then defuses the heat of Lovelace’s desire.  By encouraging 
Lovelace’s desire for novelty, in emphasizing herself as fragmented, as body parts, she 
remains attractive enough to be loved; however, by varying the tableau from his virile 
opportunism to her helpless, and indeed powerless, compliance, both Lovelace and the 
reader see these body parts as already exploited, even though he has not yet penetrated 
her.  His fierce grip is loosened, and she literally “slid[es] through [his] arms.”   
Clarissa continues this relation; after she escapes Lovelace, she locks herself into 
her room, allowing her to -- in a very important sense -- frame herself for Lovelace.  As 
he prostrates himself at her door, Clarissa positions herself in front of the keyhole.  He 
peers through, eagerly, and sees “her on her knees, her face, though not towards me, 
lifted up, as well as hands, and these folded, deprecating I suppose that gloomy tyrant’s 
curse.”87   Lovelace is given an entirely new -- and entirely restricted -- vantage point on 
what is, essentially, an extension of her earlier supplicating posture.  His language here 
registers that he has absorbed, to the extent that he can, her position on the unfolding 
events, as he begrudgingly admits the weight of the curse that she carries.  By 
sentimentalizing herself and by reframing their relation as emotional rather than as 
sexual, Clarissa is empowered to fracture Lovelace’s totalizing, suffocating gaze: he who 
could see everywhere, who could see every part of Clarissa, can now only see what she 
wants him to.  Confused in his own strategies, he has been displaced from the center of 
the action and relegated to his own supplicating position outside her door.  Lovelace 
marvels at her mutability. He exclaims to Belford: “Now is my reformation secured; for I 
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never shall love any other woman!—Oh she is all variety!  She must be ever new to 
me!”88    
It is in her dynamic and multiple self-representations and her fluid and relational 
identity that Clarissa invokes Haywoodian heroines like Fantomina.  Fantomina, who 
constantly reinvents herself and re-presents herself in an effort to maintain her lover 
Beauplaisir, shares with Clarissa a profound understanding of the ways in which 
sentimental and erotic bodies can signify and communicate. Just as Fantomina is able to 
substitute many bodies in an attempt to fix Beauplaisir into constancy, so Clarissa 
demonstrates the ability here to replicate and preserve relations -- perhaps, Lovelace even 
suggests, in enduring ways through his ultimate “reformation” -- by rendering herself 
constantly “ever new.” 
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Chapter Three 
The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless: Eliza Haywood’s Promiscuous Machines 
 
Though they are usually assumed to be distant relatives, at best, the previous chapter 
concluded that amatory heroines like Haywood’s Fantomina might have more in common 
with Clarissa, the virtuous paragon of sentimentality, than is usually thought.  The present 
chapter aims to situate Haywood’s later didactic fiction, The History of Miss Betsy 
Thoughtless (1751) within this same literary-historical context: as a hybrid of amatory 
and domestic fiction rather than an edifying counter-narrative.  I will argue in this chapter 
that Haywood uncouples feminine morality from virtuous courtship and fixed 
companionship in Betsy Thoughtless, and instead links it with multiple erotic affiliations 
enabled here by “thoughtlessness,” a form of strategic indifference that, I contend, 
extends and reconfigures the emotional hollowness and critical distance characteristic of 
male libertinism.  To contextualize my claims about Betsy Thoughtless within the broader 
frame of this dissertation, I begin by expanding where the previous chapter left off: 
opening with a brief, detailed comparison of two scenes from Haywood’s Fantomina and 
Richardson’s Clarissa in order to show how the relational, libertine self acts as a crucial 
point of connection joining these two otherwise disparate genres.   
 After she has succumbed to the rake Beauplaisir’s first seduction, Haywood’s 
“celebrated Lady,” now known as Fantomina, vows to keep their “Intreague…a Secret” 
to prevent public knowledge of her “Disgrace,” and does so by refusing to reveal her true 
identity.  She recognizes the inherent power in preserving this fiction: “while 
[Beauplaisir] laughs at, and perhaps despises the fond, the yielding Fantomina, he will 
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revere and esteem the virtuous, the reserv’d Lady.”1  This explicit dualism that 
Fantomina preserves between authentic person and inauthentic persona, both housed in 
the same body, characterizes what Helen Thompson calls Haywood’s “conflat[ion] of the 
singular and the serial to assert…that to all men, all women are the same.”2  But the 
charms of even Fantomina soon become “tasteless and insipid,” forcing her to construct 
yet another self in order to maintain Beauplaisir’s attention.3  She becomes Celia, a pretty 
servant girl, and is promptly seduced:  
 
Coming the next Morning to bring his Chocolate, as he had order’d, he 
catch’d her by the pretty Leg, which the Shortness of her Petticoat did not 
in the least oppose; then pulling her gently to him, ask’d her, how long she 
had been at Service?—How many Sweethearts she had? If she had ever 
been in Love? and many other such Questions, befitting one of the Degree 
she appear’d to be: All which she answer’d with such seeming Innocence, 
as more enflam’d the amorous Heart of him who talk’d to her.  He 
compelled her to sit in his Lap; and gazing on her blushing Beauties, 
which if possible, receive’d Addition from her plain and rural Dress, he 
soon lost the Power of containing himself.4  
 
Here Haywood’s text subtly underscores the overlap between Beauplaisir’s effortless 
attraction and the efforts Fantomina has exerted to seduce him.  As her “pretty Leg” slips 
out of the skirt as if by fortunate accident, we know the “Shortness” to be an intentional 
costuming; as he gazes on “Beauties” intensified by “plain and rural Dress,” we know 
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this to be a disguise.  Ultimately, Celia’s victory is marked by the volatility of 
Beauplaisir’s sexual response:  
 
His wild Desires burst out in all his Words and Actions; he call’d her little 
Angel, Cherubim, swore he must enjoy her…devour’d her Lips, her 
Breasts with greedy Kisses, held to his burning Bosom her half-yielding, 
half-reluctant Body, nor suffer’d her to get loose, till he had ravaged all, 
and glutted each rapacious Sense with the sweet Beauties of the pretty 
Celia.5  
 
 Like Celia, who intentionally fluctuates between “half-yielding” and “half-
reluctant” in her purposeful attempts to engage Beauplaisir’s sexual attention, 
Richardson’s Clarissa embodies similar contradictions in her efforts to connect, 
emotionally, with Lovelace.  After struggling with Clarissa in the fire scene (which I have 
discussed in more detail in the conclusion to the previous chapter), a heated Lovelace 
grabs her and threatens, “Am I then a villain, madam?—Am I then a villain, say you?”  He 
then reports an account of the terrified Clarissa’s response: “Oh no!—and yet you are!—
And again I was her dear Lovelace!—Her hands again clasped over her charming 
bosom—Kill me! kill me!”  Clarissa’s behavior is not only contradictory here -- 
simultaneously disavowing and confirming Lovelace as “villain,” and asking “dear 
Lovelace” to show his love by “kill[ing] her” -- but Lovelace’s repeated use of the word 
“again” suggests that these behaviors replicate a larger pattern of strategic performance, 
and are perhaps even somewhat suspect in terms of their authenticity.  And yet still, these 
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contradictions have their intended affect: they awe Lovelace into submission, literally 
“suspend[ing]” him as he marvels at her ability to shift between seductive, sentimental, 
tragic and pitiful.  As he sits “suspended,” she, “with still folded hands, and fresh-
streaming eyes,” now calls him “her blessed Lovelace.”  Again, the contrast between 
Clarissa’s “still folded hands,” which redirect the reader’s attention again to her martyred 
posture, and her “fresh-streaming eyes,” which connect her former supplications to the 
present moment, in which she graciously “blesse[s]” and thanks Lovelace, remind us that 
she is negotiating at least two roles here: the pitiful, defensive victim and the pious, 
virtuous paragon, as well as -- as I have contended in the previous chapter -- a self-
consciously eroticized lover.  Lovelace, overwhelmed by the force of these 
contradictions, finds himself conquered: he muses to Belford, as he recounts this 
moment, “What heart but must have been penetrated?”6  Confirming his submission to 
Clarissa’s awesome self-representations, Lovelace, like Beauplaisir but to obviously 
different ends, bursts into a sentimental effusion, repeating “arduous prayers” for 
Clarissa’s pardon, and -- finding it denied him -- tries to gain the pardon again through 
force, although he will “sneakingly retire” after receiving it only half-heartedly.7    
This highly eroticized moment in the novel not only suggests the resonances 
between Clarissa and her amatory predecessors, but also anticipates the important, if 
equally overlooked, connections this dissertation will draw between the works of 
Richardson and Sade.  Literary-historical approaches to the eighteenth century novel 
have, it seems, largely ignored comparisons like this one, moments in which moralistic 
heroines like Clarissa and duplicitous characters like Fantomina behave in corresponding 
ways to gain strategic advantages over their lovers.  Further, while the aims of each 
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initially seem quite different, with Fantomina seeking a continued intrigue while Clarissa 
seeks to avoid ruin, inarguably both women manipulate their male lovers in order to 
enforce moral obligations: Fantomina, through licentious masquerade, demands 
constancy from her lover, while Clarissa struggles against her inevitable rape by invoking 
a series of sentimental and erotic self-representations.  These moments of overlap are 
suggestive for rethinking both the established and the alternative trajectories that inform 
our contemporary understanding of the novel’s rise, and further, help to establish the 
hybridity of texts like Betsy Thoughtless.  By combining moral and social edification with 
lascivious portraits of sexual intrigue, Betsy Thoughtless connects the pleasures of 
promiscuity with a more consistent and confident self-knowledge: both of these 
characteristics are foundational for Betsy’s relational sense of identity. 
To better understand the segregation of domestic sensibility from amatory fiction 
in accounts of the novel’s rise, I turn to Ros Ballaster’s Seductive Forms: Women’s 
Amatory Fiction from 1684 to 1740, widely considered to be the best treatment of the role 
played by amatory fiction in the evolution of the novel.  It opens by describing two texts 
that bookend the historical period under study: Aphra Behn’s Love-Letters Between a 
Nobleman and his Sister (1684) and Richardson’s Pamela (1740).  While Ballaster 
frames her study within a trajectory that enables Behn’s romanticized and dissolute 
account of courtly intrigue to transition into Pamela’s tale of virtuous resistance, she also 
recognizes that “[t]he distance between” these two texts is “both less and more wide than 
it at first appears.”  Notably, for Ballaster, this is because both heroines can be said to 
“control the scene of representation of their own amatory histories” through the newly-
repurposed epistolary register, and so Ballaster recognizes, as I do, the force and power 
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that the ability to represent selfhood affords literary heroines within the relational 
contexts of courtship, sex, and marriage.  However, Ballaster also maintains that Pamela 
only triumphs by virtue of her “innocence, her lack of self-consciousness, and integrity of 
mind,” while Sylvia achieves her goals, in contrast, by embracing “the duplicities of the 
letter” and by “her consequent ability to manipulate epistolary representation,” which, 
Ballaster contends, “enable[s] her to engineer her way out of the position of a discarded 
victim of seduction into that of female libertine.”8  Yet, as I have just shown, Clarissa 
also tries to “engineer her way out of the position of discarded victim,” and one way that 
she does so, my previous chapter argues, is by adopting strategies that align her precisely 
with libertine tropes of seduction and spontaneous affiliation.  And while the novel 
clearly sets limits on Clarissa’s capacity for pleasurable resistance, the fact that Clarissa 
actively and repeatedly harnesses a sense of feminine sexual agency clearly aligns her 
with the amatory heroines Ballaster implies that -- by association, at least -- she must 
have very little to do with.9 
 What the present chapter seeks to establish, then, is how the tensions between 
amatory self-representations and the moral requirements of domestic fiction collide in 
Haywood’s didactic fiction.  In Betsy Thoughtless, these tensions are embodied in the 
novel’s central plot: the eponymous heroine’s desire to maintain a “plurality of lovers” 
despite the strict social demands of companionate marriage.  I argue that Haywood’s 
novel stages an argument about the comparative disadvantages of companionate 
marriage, given the power and pleasure inherent in the feminine embrace of polyamorous 
affections.  Haywood subverts the expectations of didactic fiction by privileging both 
promiscuous affections and libertine indifference as ways for women to negotiate a world 
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plagued by earnest incompatibility: suitors and lovers are mismatched and manipulative, 
narrators and friends are deceptive and unreliable, men and women share 
indistinguishable physical and emotional qualities, and sexual double-standards arise at 
every turn.   
As Aleksondra Hultquist has noted, “domestic fiction, rather than rejecting 
amatory modes—especially scenes of seduction and stories of fallen women—
incorporates them to promote their comparatively conservative outcomes.”10  Hultquist 
traces an alternative “rise of the novel” account from Haywood’s Fantomina through 
Pamela to Betsy Thoughtless, arguing that Haywood “re-appropriates” the emotional and 
sexual “resourcefulness” that Richardson eschews, thus “challeng[ing] Richardson’s 
aesthetic and moral ideology of virtue.”11  I find Hultquist’s claim that Haywood 
“provides an alternative construction of female subjectivity based on sexual desire” 
compelling, but disagree that this “alternative” subjectivity is what separates Haywood’s 
work from Richardson’s.  Indeed, her argument that “experiences of seduction, rape, and 
sexual intrigue shape rather than degrade women’s experience” in Betsy Thoughtless, I 
would contend, could rather equally apply to my understanding of Clarissa as “shaped” 
by her relations with Lovelace.12  The present chapter thus aims to address the kinds of 
epistemological transformations that Betsy’s promiscuity permits as a means of 
demonstrating her continuity with domestic heroines like Clarissa, rather than as a 
divergence from such trends. 
I argue that, in this text, Haywood translates libertine indifference into feminine 
“thoughtlessness,” and in so doing, illustrates the surprising sexual acuity, intellectual 
wit, and social perspicacity that courtship enables women to have -- but only women who 
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refuse to attach to one object.13  So, the natural goal of courtship, which is supposed to be 
the gaining and preserving of singular affection, becomes for Betsy Thoughtless a series 
of transient diversions, with each new conquest strengthening her ability to render herself 
critically indifferent to male desire while simultaneously preserving and intensifying her 
own private, self-directed pleasures.  It is, Haywood argues, only when Betsy is forced 
into a marriage and denied sexual freedom that she falls victim to the limiting constraints 
of exclusive companionship, exacerbated by her incompatibility with the brutish and 
inconstant Mr. Munden.  Thus, for Betsy -- as for Clarissa and Fantomina, and ultimately 
also, for libertines like Saint-Ange and Eugénie -- erotic affiliations form a useful and 
pleasurable strategy for shaping male behavior to accord with female desire.14 
The centrality of critical “indifference” to libertine philosophy has been 
extensively established, and most suggestively explored, by Gilles Deleuze in his 
discussion of Sadeian orgy.15  But scholars have also recognized the role that dispassion 
plays in amatory fiction.  Particularly suggestive for my purposes is Joseph Drury’s claim 
that Haywood’s early fiction is concerned with “the intensity and complexity of female 
consciousness produced in the material experience of subjection,” particularly given how 
Haywood “harnesses the contemporary critique of material determinism, which argued 
that if human beings were machines they could not be moral.”16  Like Drury, I want to 
recast the arguments leveled against Haywood that suggest her representations of 
thoughtlessness and superficiality -- what William Warner describes as a “shell-like 
emptiness” -- render impossible any legitimate epistemological or emotional 
development in a heroine largely characterized by her involuntary impulses.17  Unlike 
Drury, however, I assert the resonance of these claims for Haywood’s later fiction.  Her 
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domestic fiction is explicitly engaged in didactic projects, but is also actively seeking to 
reconcile the dualisms that Drury proposes divide characters “exonerate[d] from moral 
blame” because they “act on impulse” and those “equipped with a deliberating 
consciousness that allows them not only to resist desire but also to reflect on the sincerity 
of other characters who claim they cannot do the same.”18  Betsy Thoughtless both revels 
in the pleasurable impulses of promiscuous behavior and sees these impulses as 
compatible with a new demand for moral reflection and self-governance.  Betsy thus 
develops a real and lasting self-knowledge through her multiplicity of erotic relations, 
rather than in their absence. Remaining indifferent to her suitors themselves but titillated 
by the possibilities and pleasures of their relations, Betsy is free to indulge her desire 
without the risk of becoming its object. 
 
The Possibilities of Dispassionate Promiscuity 
Betsy arrives in London a social novice and, under the guardianship of the mostly 
apathetic Mr. Goodman and the duplicitous Lady Mellasin, quickly develops and 
maintains an enviable “plurality of lovers,” with the notable Mr Trueworth one among 
them.  Despite frequent admonitions from friends and guardians -- many of whom are 
engaged in their own questionable intrigues -- to avoid the appearance of promiscuity, 
Betsy persists in her belief that “a young woman who ha[s] her fortune” should “be 
allowed to hear all the different proposals…offered to her on that score.”19  At least 
ostensibly, Betsy views promiscuity as a very efficient means to an inevitable end, and 
remains openly “averse” to the “marriage-state,” until, presumably, a mutually desirable 
arrangement presents itself.20  Yet Betsy clearly savors the powerful play of courtship and 
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thrives on juggling her various suitors’ passions, a “fault” that ultimately results in 
Trueworth’s abandonment of his suit in favor of the bland Miss Harriot.  Betsy, left to her 
devices, continues to encourage a wealth of suitors until she is convinced to marry Mr 
Munden; after enduring many miserable months of his abuses, she separates from him 
and is plunged into a state of painful self-scrutiny.  She returns dutifully to care for him 
on his death-bed, and discovers that Trueworth’s wife has also passed away in the 
interim.  Finally admitting her real feelings for Trueworth, she is reunited with him at the 
novel’s end.  In the final lines, the narrator muses, “Thus were the virtues of our heroine 
(those follies that had defaced them being fully corrected) at length rewarded with a 
happiness, retarded only till she had render’d herself wholly worthy of receiving it.”21  
Betsy Thoughtless thus combines the straightforward “reformed heroine plot” 
popularized by didactic fiction with the fracturing and variegating effect of episodic 
narrative.  Haywood’s novel, then, can be said to embody the tensions between 
companionate marriage and promiscuity in what John Richetti calls its “loosely-strung” 
form.22  It is a text composed mostly of brief episodes, divided into ninety-two relatively 
short chapters, and often flitting back and forth between several interrelated plots and 
storylines, with Betsy at the center.  The novel’s episodic form is also sustained, at least 
in part, by images of social multiplicity: the revolving door of eighteenth-century London 
society, the seductive and often insidious “continual round of publick diversions” that 
Betsy indulges in.  From the first moment in her guardian’s household, Betsy is initiated 
into Lady Mellasin’s luxurious and corrupting lifestyle of gaming, intrigue, and 
entertainment.  “It cannot” the narrator observes “…seem strange, that Miss Betsy, to 
whom all things were entirely new, should have her head turned with that promiscuous 
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enjoyment, and the very power of reflection lost amidst the giddy whirl…”23 But these 
formal digressions lessen substantially after Betsy settles into her marriage, and the novel 
sustains a more pointed focus on the new coupling.   Thus, Betsy’s characteristic 
impulsiveness, her marked lack of “reflection,” becomes explicitly linked with the 
“promiscuous enjoyments” she experiences in Lady Mellasin’s house, with the novel 
itself formalizing the tension between self-reflection and promiscuous enjoyment through 
its stitching-together of Betsy’s private meditations with the frenzied distractions of 
external “enjoyments.”   
 Given the significance of Betsy’s repentance at the novel’s end, Betsy Thoughtless 
has historically been read as a product of Haywood’s “conversion,” and was clearly 
valued  by contemporaries like Clara Reeve more for where it ended up than for how it 
arrived there.24  Although the novel does appear at the height of a mid-century vogue for 
didactic fiction, modern critics have tended to find this generic category unsatisfactory.25  
Though Betsy Thoughtless is inarguably a story of moral improvement, the similarities 
between Haywood’s novel and more traditionally didactic fiction are at best superficial, 
only visible in what Deborah Nestor calls the novel’s “surface narrative.”26  Haywood’s 
deeply playful and perverse portrayal of a philandering heroine punished with an abusive 
marriage makes the novel a significantly more complex portrait of women in the 
eighteenth-century domestic sphere.  Such an impression is only strengthened by the 
obvious inadequacy of what Paula Backscheider calls “The Story” of Haywood’s fiction: 
a critical narrative that has sought to divide her early amatory work from her later novels 
by considering the latter a more conservative product of her mid-life “conversion.”27  
Until very recently, Betsy Thoughtless has been considered as exemplary of this more 
 117 
reactionary fiction, but as critics like Backscheider and Hultquist have observed, the 
novel reincorporates earlier amatory themes within a domestic frame.  As I have 
suggested, Betsy Thoughtless is a novel on the threshold of the newly domestic fiction: 
love, sexuality, and intrigue collide with the more polite concerns of courtship and 
family. 
 A critical limitation of “the Story” is that it suggests that Haywood’s later fiction 
is the work of an essentially different, “reformed” author, and because it places such a 
strong emphasis on Haywood’s “conversion” as a literary turning point, works that 
proceed this moment are seen as entirely divergent -- in form, content, and moral -- from 
those that preceded it.  But, as I have suggested, the significance of promiscuity as not 
only a formal strategy, but also a political and epistemological one, implies a continuous 
and formative relationship between Betsy Thoughtless and early works like Fantomina 
(written thirty years earlier, in 1724).  Further, as in her earlier works, in Betsy 
Thoughtless Haywood does not offer an unproblematic account of promiscuity, but 
details the often too-high price of pleasure for women in a patriarchal society.  As in 
Fantomina, for example, where the biological limitations of a pregnancy thwart the 
heroine’s pleasures, characters like Flora Mellasin and Miss Forward provide cautionary 
examples of how actual sexual promiscuity -- as opposed to Betsy’s implied, non-
physical promiscuity -- throws into relief both the physical limitations and the social 
prohibitions governing female sexuality in eighteenth-century society.   
In The Female Spectator (published from 1744 to 1746), Haywood makes a 
broader case for promiscuous behavior as a way of developing self-knowledge while 
exerting control over relationships that might otherwise disempower a female author.  
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Importantly, she frames this argument from the perspective of a reformed coquette, 
whose own pleasures and sexual play clearly anticipate some of Betsy’s courtship 
practices, in ways similar to other early heroines of her fiction.  In Book I, the Female 
Spectator voices her ostensible penitence by replacing the “Hurry of Promiscuous 
Diversions” previously enjoyed with the presumably more edifying pursuit of writing.  
The Spectator vows that she “will draw no flattering Lines…nor attempt to shadow over 
any Defect with an artificial Gloss,” as she was once “the greatest Coquet of them all.”28  
Recalling the follies she once considered as pleasures, the Female Spectator now pursues 
gratification exclusively in the “Consolation” of educating the “Public” regarding the 
pitfalls of frivolity.  Importantly, while she explicitly laments her naïve worship of 
“Dress, Equipage, and Flattery,” she does not actually condemn the behavior, and further 
suggests that these “Promiscuous Diversions” are precisely what have enabled her to 
become a worldly and sophisticated writer.  Indeed, it is only from this cultivated 
perspective that the Spectator can insightfully examine the behavior of others.  This is, 
Haywood suggests, the paradox of the reformed coquette: because her knowledge stems 
from past immoral conduct, her current authority can only be summoned and legitimated 
through the admission of past indiscretion.29  Further, and more suggestively for the 
didactic Betsy Thoughtless, the Female Spectator represents promiscuity as a way to 
maintain interest and power in a fickle world: by promising to appeal to her imagined 
reader’s particular “Curiosity” as well as the broadest possible range of “Tastes” in 
telling her story, the Spectator makes it repeatedly clear that the onus is on her to attract 
and seduce as many readers as possible to ensure literary success.30  
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Indeed, Betsy similarly gauges the risks of placing too much importance on a 
single relationship when she has the considerably more strategic and pleasurable option 
of encouraging a wealth of suitors.  Even in considering Mr. Trueworth, her most 
promising suitor and the man she will freely choose at novel’s end, she muses: 
 
…she thought she could be pleased to have such a lover, but could not 
bring herself to be content that he ever should be a husband.  She had too 
much good sense not to know that it suited not with the condition of a wife 
to indulge herself in the gaieties she at present did, which though innocent, 
and, as she thought, becoming enough in the state she now was, might not 
be altogether pleasing to one, who, if he so thought proper, had the power 
of restraining them.31  
 
The “good sense” Betsy exhibits here underscores the distinction between her own 
pleasure and that of her imagined husband’s.  She rightfully recognizes that a marriage 
will mean sacrificing not only her freedom, but her “gaieties” and pleasures, as she will 
have to stake her future happiness on “one” who has the irrevocable “power of 
restrain[t],” even if he does not choose to exercise it.32  As the Female Spectator also 
suggests in her analogy of readerly attention, this is a dangerous and ill-advised gamble, 
given both the likely inconstancy of and the extraordinary power afforded to any one 
particular partner.  In contrast, Betsy clearly articulates political and social advantages to 
remaining single.  After Mr. Goodman chastises her for encouraging too many lovers, she 
tells him bluntly that she does not want a husband, and further “that it seemed strange to 
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her, that a young woman who had her fortune to make might not be allowed to hear all 
the different proposals offered to her on that score.”33  In calling attention to the 
“strangeness” of such expectations, rather than their blatant unfairness or inequality, 
Betsy echoes the novel’s larger argument about the disadvantages of singular affection, 
given how it disempowers women. 
 Haywood asks if it is categorically wrong for women to define themselves by 
their conquests, to “value themselves on the number and quality of lovers, as they do 
upon the number of richness of their cloaths.”  Even the otherwise disapproving narrator 
is forced to admit that accumulating a number of lovers “makes them [women] of 
consideration in the world,” even as it may strain ties with the odd genuine suitor, as 
promiscuous women “never…reflect[..] how dear it may sometimes cost those to whom 
they are indebted for indulging this vanity.”34  Betsy’s behavior is, in fact, a way for her 
to exercise an extraordinarily shrewd political awareness: Flora calls her a “perfect 
Machiavel in love affairs” and Mr. Goodman laments “it was a pity she was not a man, 
[as] she would have made a rare minister of state.”35  Betsy’s political savvy is thus 
directly tied to the alternative identity she carves out for herself – rather than becoming 
less sensitive to other men with every sincere conquest, as is the goal of companionate 
courtship, she cultivates a keener and more penetrating faculty that prepares her to attract 
and seduce the next man.  She also exhibits a strategic indifference to any one suitor and 
questions the assumption that male-governed courtship is inherently positive because it is 
the effortless norm.  By being notoriously difficult to win over -- after one suitor rescinds 
his suit, Betsy complains bitterly “Did he imagine his merits were so extraordinary, that 
there required no more to obtain, than barely to ask?” -- Betsy openly and repeatedly 
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questions whether companionate marriage is socially or intellectually advantageous.36  In 
contrast, Betsy’s sifting of various offers provides ample opportunity to exercise her keen 
social sensibilities while simultaneously indulging her pleasures: as the book progresses, 
she transforms from a largely naïve ingénue into someone who “never made a conquest 
without knowing that she did so.”37  
 Though Betsy is, as I have shown, described throughout the novel as 
“penetrating” and political, she is also always defined by her nominal “thoughtlessness,” 
and in what follows I aim to establish the centrality of this contradiction for Haywood’s 
portrait of domestic female identity, as well as for Haywood’s unique brand of amatory 
didacticism.  In particular, the novel’s opening portrait of Betsy focuses rather 
exclusively on her characteristic superficiality, tying this in with her impulsive 
sensibility. The narrator writes: 
 
…she was not of a humour to give herself much pains in examining, or 
weighing in the balance of judgment, the merit of the arguments she heard 
urged, whether for or against any point whatsoever.  She had a great deal 
of wit, but was too volatile for reflection, and as a ship, without sufficient 
ballast, is tossed about at the pleasure of every wind that blows, so was she 
hurried thro’ the ocean of life, just as each predominant passion directed. 
 
Having established Betsy’s oscillating temperament and innate lack of reflection, the 
narrator continues: 
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But I will not anticipate that gratification, which ought to be the reward of 
a long curiosity.  The reader, if he has patience to go thro’ the following 
pages, will see into the secret springs which set this fair machine in 
motion, and produced many actions which were ascribed, by the ill-
judging and malicious world, to causes very different from the real ones.38 
 
In the second paragraph, the narrator attributes the novel’s complications, rather 
exclusively, to other forces besides Betsy’s thoughtlessness: her “secret springs,” a 
phrase which could either indicate her inherent propensities or invisible external 
phenomena, and the criticism of an “ill-judging and malicious world” which repeatedly 
misinterprets and misconstrues Betsy’s behavior.  Thus, even as the narrator initially sets 
up Betsy’s “thoughtlessness” as an internal flaw, she immediately undercuts its severity 
by indicating how it is deeply affected and even exacerbated by external forces unrelated 
to Betsy.  By emphasizing the multiplicity of influences that form and shape selfhood, the 
narrator reinforces the relational nature of identity: no one develops in a vacuum.  There 
is something more, the narrator suggests, visible if we peer into Betsy’s “secret springs,” 
and that something more will, she promises, “gratify” our collective “curiosity.” 
 Further, though Betsy is not balanced by “ballast,” and is impulsive by nature, she 
is not insensible.  Indeed, while 
 
…she had never yet seen the man capable of inspiring her with the least 
emotions of tenderness, she was quite easy to that point, and wished 
nothing beyond what she enjoyed, the pleasure of being told she was very 
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handsome, and gallanted about by a great number of those, who go by the 
name of very pretty fellows.  Pleased with the praise, she regarded not the 
condition or merits of the praiser, and suffered herself to be treated, 
presented, and squired about to all public places, either by the rake, the 
man of honour, the wit, or the fool, the married, as well as the unmarried, 
without distinction, and just as either fell in her way.39  
 
While Betsy is “tost about” by each “predominant passion,” the narrator ascribes this not 
only to the “great number” of “pretty fellows” that Betsy engages, but also to her 
extremely discerning taste: no man has yet “inspired” her.  It is thus Betsy’s indifference 
to her suitor’s affections that allows her to “wish…nothing beyond what she enjoyed,” 
and to further encourage, without guilt or regret, the pleasing variety of those who 
compete for her affections.  Betsy’s ability to remain emotionally unattached is what 
enables her to remain in control of these multiple affiliations and to be “[p]leased with 
the praise” only, while eschewing “the condition or the merits of the praiser,” and thus to 
avoid engaging with any concerns symptomatic of lasting companionship.  By refusing to 
humanize her suitors and objectifying them by only valuing their qualitative, external 
characteristics, Betsy practices a form of libertine indifference elsewhere advocated by 
characters like Lovelace and Dolmancé, who equally objectify their conquests.   
 For the majority of the novel, this kind of behavior is explicitly condemned by 
Betsy’s friends, yet it is important to note that it is rather emphatically reinforced by her 
guardian in what we might consider Betsy’s formative moment and introduction into the 
world of courtship: her first real suitor, Mr. Saving.  Mr. Goodman, after discovering Mr. 
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Saving’s affections to be genuine, but rightfully concerned that the elder Saving will 
disapprove of the marriage, approaches Betsy to gauge her sense of the situation.  He 
fears that Betsy will love Mr. Saving and be heartbroken to discover that she is unlikely 
to be a suitable match; he is “extremely glad to find,” on the contrary, “how indifferent 
that young lover was to her,” confusingly praising her “indifference” while still 
demanding her compliance.   He then proceeds to tell Betsy that he has already dissuaded 
Saving, which the narrator hints might be perceived by her as a misstep, as “it is certain 
she took an infinite pleasure in the assiduities of his passion.”  “[I]t is therefore highly 
probable,” the narrator continues, “that [Betsy] imagined he meddled in this affair more 
than he had any occasion to have done.”40   Interestingly, rather than the more 
experienced Mr. Goodman stepping in to teach Betsy a lesson here, as is the explicit 
intention of the chapter, Betsy’s thoughtlessness leads to her prompt dismissal of his 
advice, only to learn the same lesson pages later from another experience with the suitor 
Gayland.  Thus, it is an “accident” with Gayland -- not Goodman’s lecture -- “which 
shewed her own to her in a light very different from what she had ever seen it,” stressing 
the greater value of Betsy’s firsthand experiences over the mentorship of her friends.41 
 In what follows, I explore the troubling assessment of Betsy’s libertine behavior 
from within the male-dominated institution of courtship that Haywood ultimately 
critiques.  Betsy’s behavior, while often markedly unexceptional in a world governed by 
duplicitous suitors and hypocritical “friends,” often signifies her resistance to the unfair 
norms and standards demanded of unmarried women. Betsy, who ultimately cannot 
escape the insidious double-standards she clearly despises, finds ways to capitalize on the 
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expectations of courtship in the eighteenth-century while delaying their ostensible aim: 
the cultivation and enjoyment of a singular, lasting affection. 
 
(Fe)Male Libertinism and the Double-Standards of Courtship 
 I am not the first to suggest that Betsy Thoughtless represents political problems within a 
proto-feminist framework.  Beth Fowkes Tobin, in her introduction to the Oxford 
Classics’ edition, argues that Betsy’s “thoughtlessness exposes the social institutions and 
economic conditions that shape women’s lives as repressive and hostile to expressions of 
female power.”42  Thus, while Betsy’s behavior in and of itself may often be suspect, its 
obtrusion in the social world of the novel “exposes” the impossible patriarchal standards 
demanded by institutions like the companionate marriage.  Here Betsy’s 
“thoughtlessness” is imposing, blatant, resistant: it disrupts and displaces.  Emily 
Hodgson Anderson takes a somewhat different view.  In her thoughtless “state,” 
Anderson argues, “Betsy cannot engage in any form of self-conscious performance, but 
instead mindlessly repeats the roles presented to her by society.”43  In Anderson’s 
formulation, “thoughtlessness” is reflexive but also redemptive: Betsy replicates expected 
“roles” rather than more active, “self-conscious performances” -- at least until she finally 
“adopt[s]” a strategy of controlled performance like Fantomina, which, Anderson argues, 
“enables the expression of female emotions” in meaningful and purposive ways.”44   
This, I would underscore, transforms her role into that usually occupied by a male 
libertine.  Helen Thompson provides a third and more nuanced way to conceive of 
Betsy’s “thoughtlessness.”  Her remarkable lack of “ballast” might enable her 
exploitation, but it also prevents any substantive transformation: Betsy is thus 
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emphatically “anti-exemplary” because she is so demonstrably unaffected by the social 
forces that dominate the novel.45  Thus “thoughtlessness” insulates Betsy in many ways, 
as I have claimed, but ultimately also isolates her and prevents her from enjoying positive 
or transformative relationships in the novel.   
While feminist critics, then, have sought to uncover fuller epistemological and 
political possibilities in how Betsy relates to social institutions within the novel, they 
often find the relationships lacking -- primarily, I argue, because they all in various ways 
understand transformation as only possible within lasting relationships, like the 
companionate marriage.  It is only, I contend, when moral development is uncoupled 
from the institution of marriage, and attached instead to the more transient and superficial 
pleasures Betsy enjoys, that we are able to recognize and identify the myriad ways in 
which Betsy develops throughout the novel.  Her “thoughtlessness” and indifference then 
serve to insulate Betsy emotionally from the kinds of attachments that would prematurely 
stunt her ability to develop a particularized self-knowledge.  Yet throughout, the novel 
continues to return to the companionate marriage as a “reward” for virtuous behavior, 
even as it problematizes its fundamental premise: the ideal of the “virtuous” female as a 
corrective to uncurbed male sexual freedom.  In what follows, I explore how this tension 
manifests itself in Haywood’s work, underscoring the ways in which Betsy’s libertine 
indifference enables her to resist the institution of marriage as a way of, paradoxically, 
better readying her for its fullest expression: her honest and unhesitating choice of Mr. 
Trueworth. 
In many ways, Betsy Thoughtless exemplifies the “trauma of gender” that feminist 
theorist Helene Moglen has diagnosed in the novel form.  According to Moglen, 
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It was in the novel, more than in any other expressive form, that the social 
and psychological meanings of gender difference were most extensively 
negotiated and exposed.  At one level, these innovative fictions 
demonstrated how the ideals of masculinity and femininity were translated 
into social roles, and they established norms for that translation.  At 
another level, they expressed resistance to the wrenching system of 
differentiation and revealed the psychic costs that it incurred.46 
 
In her refusal to adhere to “ideals of…femininity,” Betsy clearly “express[es] resistance 
to the wrenching system of differentiation” that allows men a remarkable range of 
freedoms and experiences while unfairly limiting her to one possible kind of life: that 
enabled by a monogamous marriage.  By embracing promiscuity, Betsy actively carves 
out an alternative identity for herself and displaces the male libertine by enjoying her own 
sexual and social freedoms.  Thus, even in her resistance to the social roles prescribed to 
her, in her “ambiguously gendered” and “sexually initiating” role, Betsy would still seem 
to maintain the dominant “sex-gender system” that would consider promiscuity a 
nominally masculine enterprise by embodying the same traits as those that characterize 
male libertines. 
 This tendency may have its roots in Haywood’s own sense of the female author as 
having to occupy a nominally masculine role.  The linking of female promiscuity with 
authorial prolixity was a charge leveled at Haywood by male authors like Jonathan Swift 
and Alexander Pope, who connected her copious literary output with a supposedly 
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voracious sexual appetite.  In The Dunciad (1728), “Dulness,” the odious muse of Pope’s 
satire on intellectual industry, judges a pissing contest in which publishers William 
Chetwood and Edmund Curll compete for the rights to Haywood’s bastardized literary 
offspring.  “Two babes of love” -- two of Haywood’s salacious amatory novels, named 
by Pope in an accompanying footnote, The New Utopia (1724) and The Count of 
Carimania (1726).  As Haywood “stands confessed” in the center, Dulness decrees “His 
be yon Juno of majestic size, / With cow-like udders, and with ox-like eyes.”47 Haywood, 
a perverse mixture of cow’s body and ox’s perspicacity, clutching her “babes,” 
obstinately persists as the specimen of authoress-whore, conflating literal with literary 
promiscuity by mothering texts outside the established patrimonial bloodline.48  Swift 
writes “Corinna,” a poem that collapses Haywood and at least one of her predecessors, 
Delarivier Manley, into the eponymous subject of a raunchy lampoon.49  Born blessed by 
Apollo, the “subtle jade” as an infant “seem[s] to laugh and squall in rhymes,” but as the 
love-child of Cupid and Satyr, becomes a prodigy of smut.  “At twelve,” Swift tells us, 
she matures to a “wit and a coquette” who subsequently “Marries for love, half whore, 
half wife; / Cuckolds, elopes, and runs in debt, / Turns authoress, and is Curll’s for life.” 
The poem culminates with a peep into her “commonplace-book,” replete with 
“gallan[try],” a “cornucopia” overflowing with “scandal” that is filled to such an excess, 
she can simply “pour[…] it out” to create her fiction.50  
  Haywood is targeted by Swift and Pope for her extraordinary popularity and her 
propensity for penning explicit literature; as Ballaster glosses, “[w]omen’s writing is here 
metaphorized as a form of unrepentant prostitution, in which the women’s body is turned 
for profit.”51  Though publishers like Curll are also indicted by association -- particularly, 
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in Pope -- it is the woman writer whose morals and motives are questioned and who must 
either reform, by conforming to male expectations, or risk becoming ostracized as a 
prostitute.  Indeed, as Katherine Sobba Green indicates, these accusations by male 
authors may have been the impetus for Haywood’s interest in didactic literature and 
purported conversion: she notes that Haywood “demonstrated a marked shift 
toward…morality…in her works (largely anonymous) published after the 1728 
Dunciad.”52 
 That Haywood was thus affected by, as well as deeply conscious of and critical of 
the double-standard governing female sexual behavior in eighteenth-century London is 
equally well-documented.  In a recent article, David Oakleaf has presented compelling 
evidence that Haywood drew Betsy Thoughtless’s character from a real-life prostitute, 
Betsy Careless, who worked Haywood’s Covent Garden neighborhood.  According to 
Oakleaf, she fascinated Haywood because she so exemplified the same paradox of female 
knowledge that underlies the plot of Betsy Thoughtless: as he frames it, “How can a 
young woman taste the commercial delights of the city without circulating as public 
property (a prostitute) rather than private (wife or potential wife)?”53  Betsy Thoughtless, 
I have contended, offers a solution to this paradox, arguing for a “plurality of lovers” -- 
an implied, but not actual, promiscuity -- as the only available strategy for a woman 
seeking to shape self-knowledge and to fully comprehend the political and social stakes 
of male/female relationships before they -- ultimately, as they must -- willingly and 
knowingly enter into a marriage.  Limiting oneself too early to only one partner in the 
least risks curtailing the range of experiences necessary for a healthy and substantial 
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growth, and, at worst, may result in socially-sanctioned abuse, neglect, or exploitation at 
the hands of an immoral husband.   
 The reader is thus often invited to compare the severity of Betsy’s freedoms with 
those enjoyed by prominent male figures and ostensible role models in her life, including 
her brother Andrew Thoughtless.  Haywood thus draws explicit connections between 
Betsy’s behavior and that of the novel’s rakes and libertines, who are often encouraged 
and rewarded for their behavior while Betsy is chastised and punished.  When asked by 
Mr. Goodman to assume guardianship of Betsy upon his arrival in London, Andrew 
replies: 
 
…as I am a single man, I shall have a crowd of gay young fellows 
continually coming to house, and I cannot answer that all of them would 
be able to behave with that strict decorum, which I should wish to see 
always observed toward a person so near to me…In fine…it is a thing 
wholly inconsistent with the freedom I propose to live in…54  
 
Here Haywood stringently juxtaposes the limited capacity Betsy enjoys for social 
pleasure against the normalized “proposed” freedoms her brother enjoys, underscoring 
how these behaviors are paradoxically “wholly inconsistent” despite being explicitly 
identical.  (Betsy also enjoys being followed around by “a crowd of gay young fellows,” 
who rarely “behave…with strict decorum.”)  Further, Andrew is willing to leave his sister 
in a precarious, and indeed demonstrably vulnerable, position at Mr Goodman’s in order 
to keep enjoying his “freedoms,” an argument Betsy understandably finds “so weak, and 
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withal so unkind, that she could not forbear bursting into tears.”55  But this is, in fact, not 
even the real story.  The reader discovers that Andrew’s real motivation stems from a 
desire to keep secret his mistress, with whom he has traveled from France.  Andrew’s 
duplicity highlights the doubly-offensive nature of the sexual double standard: not only is 
he permitted to enjoy such freedoms, but he is in fact permitted to enjoy them so 
unquestionably as to be able to use them as an acceptable front for even more morally 
reprehensible behavior. 
 Andrew’s blatant disloyalty, not to mention the demonstrable unfairness of this 
situation, make such an impression on the text that the narrator is scarcely able to cull her 
usual critique of Betsy’s behavior in the chapter following:  
 
It was the fate of Miss Betsy to attract a great number of admirers, but 
never to keep alive, for any length of time, the flame she had inspired 
them with. – Whether this was owing to the inconstancy of the addressers, 
or the ill conduct of the person addressed, cannot absolutely be 
determined, but it is highly probable that both these motives might 
sometimes concur to the losing her so many conquests.56  
 
After Andrew has so glaringly demonstrated the extent to which single male suitors can 
be inconstant, disloyal, and fickle -- without reprobation -- the narrator can no longer 
reasonably indict Betsy for her own refusal to find a committed partner.  The narrator, 
who is otherwise quick to cast aspersions on Betsy’s behavior, is more measured here: 
Betsy is not exclusively at fault. Indeed, while the narrator frequently describes Betsy as 
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a flirtatious and even silly girl who lacks the coolness of introspection and the dispassion 
of self-control -- and while her suitors are afforded considerably more sympathetic 
portraits, this does not align with how Betsy views herself, or her suitors.  The initial 
description of Betsy as “too volatile for reflection” does not resonate with Betsy’s 
remarkable consistency in her aversion to marriage and her demonstrable agency in 
negotiating with her suitors.  Betsy, in fact, characterizes her suitors in language identical 
to the description the narrator makes of her at the novel’s opening: 
 
As the barometer, said she to herself, is governed by the weather, so is the 
man in love governed by the woman he admires: he is a meer machine – 
acts nothing of himself,--has no will or power of his own, but is lifted up, 
or depressed, just as the charmer of his heart is in the humour.  I wish, 
continued she, I knew what day these poor creatures would come,--though 
‘tis no matter,--I have got it seems possession of their hearts, and their 
eyes will find graces in me, let me appear in what shape soever.57  
 
The similarities are striking: just as Betsy is described as a “ship…tost about” by the 
waves, so her suitors are “barometer[s]” registering and affected by natural forces.  As 
Betsy is a “fair machine,” mechanistic and transparent, so her suitors are “meer 
machine[s],” predictably responsive to Betsy’s demands and whims.  Indeed, this 
comparison even suggests that male suitors possess less agency in love, as Betsy’s 
fluctuations are largely internal, a function of alternating and conflicting “passions” while 
men “ha[ve] no will or power of [their] own.”  These depictions resonate with a standard 
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Haywoodian observation that the “graces” of women are not inherent, but socially-
ascribed, and thus arbitrary and often superficial, discoverable only in external shape -- as 
in Fantomina, where Haywood poses the pressing question of whether or not women (or 
men) can possess anything like intrinsic virtue, or if indeed all of social life is a form of 
masquerade.  Betsy’s recognition that men “will find graces in” her shows her again to be 
particularly perceptive about the emphasis on externality and superficiality in courtship.  
As a rake or libertine often pursues only external beauties and superficial pleasures under 
the guise of more emotional and meaningful attachments, Betsy similarly controls and 
distances herself from the raw emotions of her suitors. 
 In contrast to Betsy’s supposed lack of emotional and social faculties -- her 
“thoughtlessness” -- she is possessed of a “natural” vanity, a propensity that is, 
throughout the novel, intensified by the behavior of her family and friends in apprizing 
her of the most advantageous marriage.  For example, Betsy’s first suitor, whose 
bashfulness and reserve is “so different from what she had observed in any other of those 
who had pretended to lift themselves under the banner of her charms,” finally 
“convinc[es] her of the conquest she had made,” and it is in the triumph of his singular 
attention to her that her vanity, “so natural to a youthful mind,” is “awakened in her 
breast.”58  However, rather than convince her that she should marry him, this sensation 
“hurries” her into “indulg[ent] liberties” and a “love of pleasure” -- in short, inspiring her 
to more promiscuous behavior and to seek similar engagements with more suitors.59 This 
“natural” inclination towards indulging vanity by accumulating pleasures is thus 
intensified, and not truncated, by courtship practices that reduce lovers to “conquests” 
and, further, that demand duplicity and strategy in every negotiation. As Lady Trusty 
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laments, in London “there are but too frequent proofs, that an innate principle of virtue is 
not always a sufficient guard against the many snares laid for it, under the shew of 
innocent pleasures, by wicked and designing persons of both sexes.”  In short, Trusty 
muses, “the reputation may suffer, though virtue triumphs,” deploring that actual physical 
“virtue” matters considerably less than socially-determined “reputation.”60  Thus, as 
Trusty notes, feminine virtue is, in fact, a liability in London; her emphasis, further, on 
the “snares laid” by “persons of both sexes” underscores the necessity of being political 
or even duplicitous in order to avoid becoming a victim.  Though Trusty advocates 
isolation from society and the simplicity of country life as a way to “wean” Betsy “by 
degrees, from any ill habits she might have contracted in that Babel of mixed company 
she was accustomed to at Lady Mellasin’s,” the early corruption of Betsy by the 
coquettish Miss Forward testifies, as does the occasion of her near-rape at Oxford, the 
fact remains that the country is equally precarious, and perhaps more so because it does 
not offer the anonymity of the city.61 
 Indeed, when juxtaposed with the behavior of the social communities that 
surround her, Betsy’s “thoughtlessness” and vanity often seem less exceptionable.  The 
novel, in fact, juxtaposes Betsy’s pleasurable antics with serious cautionary tales 
regarding the pitfalls of sexual promiscuity.  Miss Forward, Lady Mellasin, and Miss 
Flora all serve as reminders that actual sexual freedom is curbed and punished by 
stringent moral laws circumscribing the behavior of women.  Miss Forward, whose early 
talent for playing “the coquette” and predilection for the game of “fast-and-loose” serves 
as a model for Betsy in her school years, finds herself pregnant and abandoned, becoming 
a prostitute upon her arrival in London.  Lady Mellasin, whose affair with a criminal 
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results in her robbing her husband, Mr. Goodman, is thrust from the house with her 
daughter and ruined socially and financially for her indiscretion.  Flora, whose multiple 
lovers repeatedly reject her as a viable marriage candidate, seduces Mr. Trueworth by 
playing an Incognita, but is abandoned by him when he decides to marry the virtuous 
Miss Harriot. 
 In contrast, Betsy -- whose repeated experiences with duplicitous and violent 
suitors have allowed her to develop a discerning ethics -- distinguishes her playful and 
purposive practice of encouraging multiple lovers from the serious loss of control that 
these other women exhibit.  For example, after catching Flora in a compromising position 
with the rakish Gayland, Betsy reflects: 
 
‘What…could induce her to sacrifice her honour?  Declarations of love 
were not new to her.  She heard every day the flatteries with which our sex 
are treated by the men, and needed not to have purchased the assiduities of 
any one of them at so dear a rate.  Good God!  are innocence and the pride 
of conscious virtue, things of so little estimation, as to be thrown away for 
the trifling pleasure of hearing a few tender protestations?  Perhaps all 
false and uttered by one whose heart despises the easy fondness he has 
triumphed over, and ridicules the very grant of what he has solicited.’ 62  
 
Here Betsy astutely recognizes that sexual “innocence” and “conscious virtue” -- both of 
which depend on physical and emotional freedom -- will cost “dear[ly]” of lost, both in 
terms of reputation and in terms of a possible victimization.  Betsy also emphasizes the 
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contradictions inherent in male affection: though “fondness” should be easily won, given 
the terms of companionate courtship, it will be “despised,” because it means that a 
woman has “grant[ed]” too freely what the lover has “solicited.”  In moments like this, 
Betsy’s desire to “hear the proposals of a hundred lovers, had as many offered 
themselves” not only seems the viable choice, but ultimately displaces and subverts the 
male libertines who do the same, and who do so with “ridicule” and “false[hood].”63 
 However, Betsy is also punished for her promiscuous behavior throughout the 
novel, mostly through social means: ostracization, gossip, and scandal, limitations that 
Haywood often seems to align -- in severity and in emotional impact -- with more 
morally deterministic sanctions like the loss of virginity.  The difference, Haywood notes, 
is that scandal and gossip are the hypocritical measures instituted by communities that are 
often equally immoral.  Men are often indicted for hypocrisy, as in the example of 
Andrew Thoughtless I have cited above.  In another case, after Betsy is nearly raped at 
Oxford, she is driven out of town by the scandalous rumors circulated about her, and by 
the abusive, “continual affronts,” and “fresh insults,” of the students – “who all having 
got the story, thought they had a fine opportunity of exercising their poetic talent; satires 
and lampoons flew about like hail…copies of them handed about through the whole 
town, to the great propagation of scandal, and the sneering faculty.”64  While the narrator 
finds the condition of Betsy and Flora “truly pitiable” in this instance, she is perhaps even 
more disturbed by the harsh treatment that women often receive from “those of their own 
sex.”   In the opening paragraph of the novel, when the narrator observes that “[t]he 
ladies…are apt to make too little allowances to each other…and seem better pleased with 
an occasion to condemn, than to excuse.”65  
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Indeed, Betsy cannot escape the moral scrutiny of the narrative itself, nor can she 
the hypocrisy of a narrator who laments the cruelties of the female sex while exhibiting 
the same sanctimonious behavior.  The novel’s intrusive, Fieldingesque narrator often 
assumes the voice of a scolding matron.  After receiving a letter from Lady Trusty in 
which she expresses grave concern over Betsy’s recent behavior in Oxford – where she is 
almost raped by an opportunistic “gentleman-commoner” – Betsy sits down to “cast[…] a 
retrospect on several past transactions she had been witness of, as well as those she had 
been concerned in herself,” the letter having “made a strong impression on her.”66  As she 
ruminates on her past experience, the narrator indirectly relays to the reader her private 
thoughts: 
 
…she began to wonder at, and condemn the vanity of being pleased with 
such shadowy nothings:--such fleeting, unsubstantial delights, 
accompanied with noise and hurry in the possession, and attended with 
weariness and vexation of spirit.---A multiplicity of admirers seemed to 
her now among this number,--her soul confessed, that to encourage the 
addresses of a fop, was both dangerous and silly, and to flatter with vain 
hopes the sincere passion of a man of honour, was equally ungenerous and 
cruel. 
 These considerations were very favorable to Mr. Trueworth,--she 
ran through every particular of that gentleman’s character and behavior, 
and could find nothing which could make her stand excused even to 
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herself, for continuing to treat him with the little seriousness she had 
hitherto done.67  
 
The reader who encounters only this passage would likely conclude that Betsy has 
definitely seen the error of her ways.  According to the narrator, she “condemns” her 
“vanity,” and deeply acknowledges, through her soul’s confession, that she should no 
longer encourage the suitors she cannot seriously entertain, nor “flatter” her suitors’ 
“sincere passion” because it is cruel.  The narrator concludes, presumptively, that such 
“considerations” on Betsy’s part are “very favourable” for Trueworth, as Betsy’s decision 
to abandon the “fleeting, unsubstantial delights” of playful courtship seems to necessitate 
considering Trueworth’s proposal with a level “seriousness.”  The narrator, in making 
this presumption, aligns herself with the documented wishes of Betsy’s friends, including 
Lady Trusty and her brother, whose recent letters have both advocated strongly for 
Trueworth. 
 However, the reader receives these thoughts twice-removed, filtered by a 
narrative voice that has not only been intrusive, but opinionated and explicitly and openly 
manipulative.68  A quick review of the paragraph hints at such biases.  For example, it 
seems unlikely that Betsy would be “weari[ed]” or “vex[ed]” by the courtship games she 
herself revels in -- indeed, often incites.69  The phrases “shadowy nothings” and “fleeting, 
unsubstantial delights” appear overly harsh and self-critical for Betsy to think about 
herself.  This instance of free indirect discourse reiterates the interest of a manipulative 
narrator who scrutinizes and evaluates her behavior unfavorably.  Further, the narrator 
invites the reader to join her in “examin[ing]…the effects” of such “late occurrences” on 
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“the mind.”  The reader is thus quite conscious that this is a moment of unguarded 
exposure, where Betsy’s thoughts are laid open for evaluation, and the invitation 
extended to “examine” them as one might a specimen.  However, because these thoughts 
are filtered, the conclusion that Betsy now “favour[s]” Trueworth is at best an 
interpretation of Betsy’s frame of mind, if not a blatant manipulation on the part of the 
narrator. 
 That this reading of Betsy’s thoughts is questionable, at best, is supported by the 
following paragraph, in which Betsy’s voice penetrates through the indirect discourse and 
offers the reader a direct, spoken account of her thoughts.  Immediately following the 
narrator’s conclusion that Betsy is prepared to take Trueworth’s proposals more 
“serious[ly],” Betsy speaks for herself: 
 
‘What then shall I do with him?’ said she to herself.  ‘Must I at once 
discard him,—desire him to desist his visits, and tell him I am determined 
never to be his!—or must I resolve to think of marrying him, and 
henceforward entertain him, as the man who is really ordained to one day 
be my husband!—I have at present rather an aversion, than an inclination 
to a weded state, yet if my mind should alter in this point, where shall I 
find a partner so qualified to make me happy in it?—but yet,’ continued 
she, ‘to become a matron at my years, is what I cannot brook the thought 
of….’70  
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Immediately the reader can see the discrepancies.  Betsy’s thoughts are, indeed, 
“favourable to Trueworth,” but not in the definite and fixed ways that the narrator has 
suggested.  While Betsy admits that he would be an excellent and affable “partner,” she 
still possesses an inherent “aversion” to the “weded state” that makes such a pairing 
currently unthinkable -- so much so, in fact, that she is even entertaining the thought of 
having him “desist his visits” and “tell[ing] him [she is] determined never to be his.”  
Though Betsy is now conscious of her feelings for Trueworth, her ruminations have only 
strengthened her resolve to remain unattached -- she refuses to marry someone purely 
because they are “ordained” by her friends, and will not “brook the thought” until her 
mind “alter[s] in this point.”  Thus, she does not reject her former behavior outright, nor 
does she condemn herself, as the narrator has suggested.  Rather, she searches for a way 
to continue to be promiscuous and to circumvent Trueworth’s expectations of monogamy 
without placing herself in increasingly precarious situations: in short, a partial 
acquiescence that will permit her continued freedoms.  In her subsequent reply to Lady 
Trusty -- yet another manifestation of Betsy’s direct voice, unfiltered by narration -- she 
pleads: “I will own to you yet further, madam, that I am not insensible of the merits of Mr 
Trueworth, nor of the advantages, which would attend my acceptance of his proposals, 
but I know not how it is, I cannot all at once bring myself into a liking of the marriage 
state.”71  The conclusiveness with which the narrator has formerly represented Betsy’s 
decision is faulty.  Betsy, while owning that she does not fully know her reasons, remains 
consistent and clear in her desire to remain unattached, and further, in her refusal to be 
rushed “all at once” to consider marriage.  Such a formal discrepancy reinforces the depth 
of Betsy’s struggle against the dominant narratives of courtship and marriage in the 
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novel.  Through these dissonances, the reader is able to experience and sympathize with 
Betsy’s defiance and her resistance to how others want to normalize and defuse her 
behavior.  It is these moments of discrepancy, I argue, that form the basis for the ways in 
which promiscuity acts as a kind of necessary moral alternative for Betsy in the novel, 
allowing her to claim some measure of autonomy, paradoxically, by maintaining a 
plurality of attachments instead of the one that her friends demand.   
 As we approach the novel’s end, Betsy endures many hardships: she loses the 
friendship of Trueworth, consents to marry Munden, and suffers Munden’s violent 
behavior, including his despicable murder of her beloved pet squirrel (a gift from 
Trueworth).  Haywood suggests that the accumulation of these experiences have allowed 
Betsy to weigh her past and present behavior with considerable insight -- and what Betsy 
ultimately laments is that she has been, on the whole, “inconsistent with [her]self.”  In 
this moment, frequently read as her true “reformation,” she rebukes herself for playing 
the part of a “coquet,” a “character” she “knew” to be “both silly and insignificant.”  Yet 
her reform is marked not by a lamentation of her girlish ignorance, as we might expect, 
but instead by a painful recognition of her self-knowledge: she repeatedly asserts that she 
“had sense,” that she was “no fool,” that she had clear “discern[ment],” but that she 
willingly behaved as a “strange creature.”72  Given her fervent desire to reform and her 
powerful self-realization, one would expect that the novel speedily moves towards 
resolution at this point -- but, crucially, it doesn’t.  Indeed, it is only after Betsy has 
finally “[seen] herself and the errors of her past conduct in their true light” that her 
newfound resolve is challenged by ever more painful trials: the discovery of her 
husband’s affair, their legal separation, his death, and the resurgence of feelings for 
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Trueworth, now presumed to be lost forever.  When she is finally reunited with 
Trueworth and willingly chooses to marry him in the final chapter, the narrator comments 
that her “virtues” are “at length rewarded with a happiness, retarded only till she had 
render’d herself worthy of receiving it.”73  The emphasis here is, importantly, on Betsy’s 
continued agency, now channeled into less lascivious pursuits: in order to marry 
Trueworth, she “render[s] herself worthy,” rather than allowing her virtue to be 
circumscribed by the expectations of others.  In other words, Betsy’s behavior at the end 
of the novel does not represent a break from her past actions, but rather their continuation 
-- indeed, perhaps, their fullest expression. 
 The novel’s moments of resistance and even, as the previous example illustrates, 
of “reformation,” serve to throw into relief Betsy’s struggle for autonomy and self-
definition in a world that denigrates female sexual power, while simultaneously flaunting 
her embrace of orgiastic, communal pleasures in the “hurry of promiscuous diversions” 
that is London society.  In a brief conclusion, I turn my attention from the figure of Betsy 
to the setting of London, which Haywood paints as a hedonistic and pleasure-oriented 
world.  Betsy’s willing embrace of all London has to offer, as well as her eager 
consumption of its libertine pleasures, models in brief the kind of sexual education that 
D.A.F. Sade will expand to excess in his roman libertin, the subject of Chapter Four. 
 
Conclusion: “The Babel of Mixed Company” 
 
Consciously invoking the Restoration theatre as a space of social spectacle, Betsy 
Thoughtless goes to the playhouse to be seen.  And she is: her act of accompanying the 
morally-suspect Miss Forward is its own spectacle, resulting in much reprobation from 
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her friends, earning particular disapproval from Mr. Trueworth.  As Betsy takes her seat, 
she begins to reflect on how “his admonition testified the most zealous and tender care 
for her reputation,” and she thinks “seriously” about his affection in a way that – as has 
been the case throughout the novel – is conducive to imagining him as a lifelong 
companion, even as she remains adverse to becoming his wife.74  But the launch of the 
play banishes these thoughts: “the brilliant audience, -- the musick, -- the moving scenes 
exhibited on the stage, and above all the gallantries, with which herself and Miss Forward 
were treated, by several gay young gentleman…soon dissipated all those reflections, 
which it was so much her interest to have cherished, and she once more relapsed into her 
former self” -- a self absorbed by external, communal pleasures.75  This scene comes just 
prior to a formative and climactic moment in the novel: Betsy’s embrace of these 
“gallantries” leads to her being escorted home by a rake, who then attempts to rape her 
and only desists when she collapses, seeing her to be “truly virtuous,” and thus not a 
suitable victim for his refined “appetites of nature.”76  The eager “libertine,” Haywood 
suggests, is not truly vicious but, in fact, “a man of pleasure,” of “honour,” and of “good 
sense.”77  These are, of course, all qualities that have been attached throughout the novel 
to Betsy herself.  Indeed, even as Betsy suffers an extreme mortification from this event, 
ultimately, the novel concedes, this is simply the risk incurred by indulging promiscuous 
pleasures: that perhaps you will simply collide against the proclivities of another, and 
have to negotiate the limits of these competing desires. 
 Throughout the novel, Haywood paints a portrait of communal pleasures, 
indulged freely through performance and spectacle, and juxtaposes them to considerably 
more precarious, self-interested relationships: the rake’s entitlement to rape a “non-
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virtuous” woman, or the suitor’s duplicitous strategies for ensnaring a woman into 
marriage.  Yet it is only through such communal pleasures -- “promiscuous Diversions”  
-- that women can indulge their natural love of variety and gallantry freely, and so it is 
unfortunate that they incur both public and private risks.  Novels like Richardson’s 
Clarissa also echo this problem, linking the retreat to privacy with increasingly 
precarious options for a woman engaged in the play and pleasures of courtship.78  The 
next chapter reads a text that transforms the privacy of the boudoir into a public and 
mutual space of pleasure:  a spectacle reminiscent of the decadence of Haywood’s 
playhouse, but liberated from the moral constraints of public scrutiny.  Like Betsy, the 
young ingénue will have her “head turned” with “a hurry of promiscuous diversions;” 
unlike Betsy, she will only become increasingly more socially and politically liberated as 
she indulges herself in these diversions, and will only meet with the approbation of her 
friends, not their disapproval.
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Chapter Four 
La Philosophie dans le boudoir: Communal Sexuality and Mutual Pleasure  
 
  
It is, no doubt, surprising to suggest that the elaborate, spectacular orgies of D.A.F., 
Marquis de Sade, may have had their origins in the claustrophobic, stark interiors of 
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, but this chapter takes this origin as a crucial premise.  
Critics like Lynn Festa and Thomas O. Beebee have rather exhaustively traced 
Richardson’s influence on the sentimental fiction of the Continent, from his faithful 
French translator Abbé Prévost to his German translator Johann David Michaelis, but it is 
ultimately Sade himself who offers the most convincing case for the influence of 
Richardson, and of Clarissa, on his work.1  He writes in “Idées sur les romans”: 
 
C’est Richardson, c’est Fielding qui nous ont appris que l’étude profonde 
du coeur de l’homme, véritable dédale de la nature, peut seul inspirer le 
romancier…si après douze ou quinze volumes, l’immortel Richardson eût 
verteusement fini par convertir Lovelace, et par lui faire paisiblement 
épouser Clarisse, eût-on versé à la lecture de ce Roman, prise dans le 
sense contraire, les larmes délicieuses qu’il obtient de tous les êtres 
sensibles?  c’est donc la nature qu’il faut saisir quand on travaille ce genre, 
c’est le coeur de l’homme, le plus singulier de ses ouvrages, et nullement 
la vertu, parce que la vertu, quelque belle, quelque nécessaire qu’elle soit, 
n’est pourtant qu’un des modes de ce coeur étonnant, dont la profonde 
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etude est nécessaire au romancier, et que le Roman, miroir fidèle de ce 
coeur, doit nécessairement en tracer tous les plis. 
 
[‘Tis Richardson, ‘tis Fielding, who have taught us that the profound study 
of man’s heart—Nature’s veritable labyrinth—alone can inspire the 
novelist…Imagine, for a moment: if the immortal Richardson, after twelve 
or fifteen volumes, had virtuously concluded by converting Lovelace, and 
by having him peacefully marry Clarissa, would the reader, when the 
novel was thus turned round, have shed the delightful tears it now wrings 
from every sensitive soul? 
‘Tis therefore Nature that must be seized when one labors in the 
field of fiction, ‘tis the heart of man, the most remarkable of her works, 
and in no wise virtue, because virtue, however becoming, however 
necessary it may be, is yet but one of the many facets of this amazing 
heart, whereof the profound study is so necessary to the novelist, and the 
novel, the faithful mirror of this heart, must perforce explore its every 
fold.]2  
 
What Sade credits “the immortal Richardson” with, here, is the pivotal turn from 
privileging virtue in his own writing -- what has, rather ironically, disqualified Sade from 
most studies of sentimental fiction -- while still, ultimately, claiming the “heart of man” 
to be the “profound study” of his novels.3  If we take Sade’s suggestion seriously that 
Richardson engages in a kind of natural sensibility that escapes the purposes of virtue -- 
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and neither Sade nor his critics have offered a convincing reason why we should not -- 
the influence of Richardson on Sade would seem rather exhaustive.  In this chapter, I will 
claim that mutual feeling of sentimental affiliations form a basis for Sade’s representation 
of selfhood in his libertine fictions, tendencies that have origins in Richardson’s own 
interest in the fluidity of the sensible self, as described in Chapter Two. 
In 1799, an illustrated edition of Sade’s novel La Nouvelle Justine ou les 
malheurs de la vertu appeared in Paris, accompanied by a series of engravings that 
visually rendered its orgies in all their theatrical complexity.4  One scene depicts a group 
of four simultaneous, identical orgies radiating outward from the center of the image 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1.      
Source: Gilles Néret, Erotica: 17th-18th Century From Rembrandt to Fragonard (Köln: 
Taschen Press, 2001). 
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In each orgy, three men are conjoined by an act of sodomy, with the third man 
penetrating a willing female who, facing in the opposite direction, casts her gaze back 
over the group.  The orgy is thus a contained system, with a clear beginning and end, both 
aesthetically and physically coherent.  There are elements of what some have deemed 
Sade’s “mathematics” or “grammar” of pleasure here: the image depicts multiple, 
identical orgies as repetitive, accumulating pleasures, and the ratio of males to females 
condenses and intensifies male desire expressed through collective phallic penetration.  
However, the ostensibly more passive females on either side of the image arrest and then 
redirect our focus, as they stand in striking contrast to the male group: both physical body 
and aesthetic gaze simultaneously alter and lend coherence to the sexual act.  The 
positioning of each woman’s legs, which wrap themselves around all three men, indicates 
her receptiveness to all three lovers at once and as one.  It is she who transforms the act 
from repetitive penetration to a more creative, imaginative, and experimental orgy: one 
woman receiving three men as one lover.  And, finally, it is her gaze, cast forward over 
the act in its entirety, which aesthetically unifies and dramatizes the orgy as a complete 
and contained narrative, by giving force and meaning to the accumulated attention of the 
three men who watch her.  
In his essay “Tout dire?: Sade and the Female Body,” John Phillips details an 
interesting and suggestive contradiction in the infamous pornographer’s novels.  He 
observes that, while “[n]owhere else in world literature…is the female body so 
consistently abhorred,” paradoxically, “[i]n spite of their aversion [to the female body]… 
Sade’s libertines are repeatedly drawn to peer at it and dissect it, to torture, tear, eat, and 
defecate upon it, to turn it inside out, so that they can know exactly what it is…,” 
 149 
intimating that -- as the above image illustrates -- male desire can be shaped and directed 
by a more expansive female sexual energy.5  In this chapter, I argue that, in its 
epistemological and aesthetic attention to the female body, libertine desire garners much 
of its force from the pursuit of a communal pleasure analogous to some of the eighteenth 
century’s most influential discourses of the passions: those of sympathy, moral sentiment, 
and sensibility.6  Like the prominent sentimental authors praised in his essay “Idées sur 
les romans,” Sade shares a belief that the physiological experiences of an individual are 
shaped by outward forces (as in Condillac’s account of the homme-statue) and also carry 
outward markers that can be read, interpreted, and indeed felt by others (as in Rousseau’s 
notion of pitié and Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy.)7  Giving attention to these 
moments of connection and collectivity thus has profound implications for understanding 
the significance of communal pleasure to La Philosophie dans le boudoir (1795), a text in 
which the powerfully transgressive possibilities of orgy are made explicit in both theory 
and practice.  In this chapter, I contend that Sade adopts the paradoxical politics of 
looking epitomized by the literature of sensibility and its pleasures of mutual feeling into 
a perverse but earnest narrative of progressive sexual community.8 
In La Philosophie, Sade restructures the typically sexed and polarized male 
gaze. Even as the libertine is driven by an insatiable desire to possess and control the 
female body, this body equally acts upon his gaze and draws the more rigid male body 
into the powerful tableaux of orgy, as Madame de Saint-Ange and Eugénie repeatedly 
illustrate.  Thus, the male libertine is drawn into textual spaces where the individual 
affective response is absorbed within the larger affective community, and where 
seduction occurs on an aesthetic level as well as on a narrative level.9  This movement 
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away from dimorphic couplings and towards a mutual and shared sense of pleasure 
complicates the rigid juxtaposition of a virile, cruel male hero against his passive female 
victim -- what has been characterized as a rather straightforward embrace of sexual 
complementarity in Sade’s texts -- and instead posits a more mixed and indeterminate 
locus of sexuality in Sade’s work.10  Rather than oppositional or hierarchical, I contend 
that sexual subjectivity is often surprisingly communal in Sade. 
For, if the female body is the subject of obsessive focus throughout Sade’s 
oeuvre, the orgy is its central and distinctive mechanism.  The female body behaves as 
the sentimental and emotional register of the text, accordingly sensitive, pliable, and 
affective -- particularly in La Philosophie, where the force and enthusiasm of Eugénie’s 
sexual response measures the successful inculcation of libertine principles.  In other 
words, while the orgy acts to cohere the group, it is the female body that invites, 
embodies and then signifies these moments of cohesion.  Thus, while I am not the first to 
recognize the existence of orgiastic communities in Sade’s text, I argue that these extend 
beyond the hermetic and self-enclosed fraternity of libertines described by Jane Gallop, 
or the exploitative counter-societies diagnosed by Marcel Hénaff.11  Further, I challenge 
the enduring association of the Sadeian hero with the “coldness and cruelty” persuasively 
articulated by Gilles Deleuze and others, who read the libertine as a perverse and extreme 
formulation of the enlightenment individual: rational, but not empathetic, empirical but 
not ethical, methodical but not measured.12  As this chapter will demonstrate, there is a 
competing narrative to Deleuze’s assertion that solipsism and distance are the only 
originating source of power for the libertine.  The Sadeian hero, I insist, cannot act alone: 
he is formed and empowered by the elaborate community of orgy that he both organizes 
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and populates.  Thus, through the orgy, Sade privileges an even more insatiable need for 
community and connection, and by extension, the exquisite pleasures only made possible 
in the accumulative and shared sensations of an aroused group.  Group sex is perhaps the 
only acceptable form of social cohesion in La Philosophie, as it replicates and strengthens 
the bonds of nature while simultaneously eschewing the emphatically societal 
preferences for monogamy, and -- Sade will argue, rather unconvincingly -- reproduction. 
La Philosophie explicitly rejects the charges of solipsism and apathy.  Its very 
form -- an aroused series of dialogues between three libertines and various others, 
coupled with the inclusion of a political pamphlet that promulgates an extreme and 
sadistic republicanism, “Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicains,” -- 
indicates a serious attempt on Sade’s part to bridge his radical politics with his communal 
aesthetic and to funnel both into a bourgeoning (im-)moral philosophy.13  In the dialogues 
of La Philosophie, Dolmancé must vie for textual space, sharing the boudoir with Saint-
Ange and Eugénie, who speak unabashedly, openly and -- perhaps more importantly -- 
directly to the reader, without the synthesizing filter of external narration.  Saint-Ange 
and Eugénie join with several other voices that populate the text and destabilize any 
claim Dolmancé might make to serving as the text’s ontological or even epistemological 
center.14  And while Dolmancé is often considered to dominate the boudoir by his 
initiating and ordering of the orgies, it is undoubtedly the two females who seek to 
visually enhance, to broaden, and to blur these initial predilections.  While Sade clearly 
affords the (often singularly phallic) sexual body an enormous amount of power and 
privilege in La Philosophie, I maintain that he is equally interested in how the natural 
mechanisms that betray our common humanity -- our simultaneously universal and 
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particular bodies, desires, perversities -- indicate the potential for a radical political 
equality, even if such a state can only fleetingly be achieved.15  The most powerful of the 
mechanisms is sexual desire: for Sade, an emphatically polymorphous energy that 
compels and energizes all people.  The communal sympathies that Sade evinces in La 
Philosophie thus inform his radical revisiting of sensibility and, in particular, its emphasis 
on the shared mechanism of a core communal feeling. 
There is, then, a perverse pleasure inherent in exhibiting and/or recognizing coded 
desire, and that pleasure is simultaneously self-oriented and social.  And what the French 
tradition brings -- particularly through the looming figure of Denis Diderot -- is the 
productive and explicit conflation of instructive moral sentiment with heightened erotic 
pleasure.  Indeed, as David Marshall notes, even the entry on sympathie in the 
Encyclopédie (written by Louis de Jaucourt) links sympathy with seduction, as  “fellow 
feeling always has the potential to pass from the transport of compassion to the transports 
of eroticism (or at least love).”16 While this parallel remains largely implicit in the novels 
of Richardson, for example, it is boldly stressed in titillating erotic texts like La 
Religieuse (c. 1780).  This chapter, then, traces Sade’s contribution precisely along this 
correspondence between the public language of feeling and what seems to be an extreme 
version of it: the polymorphous and impossibly pliable female body that signifies and 
communicates pleasure, and her role in enabling the explicitly erotic “fellow feeling” of 
simultaneous group climax, achievable only through orgy. 
 
Sadeian Sensibilities 
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 Despite Sade’s self-professed literary lineage in “Idées sur les romans,” he has 
largely remained absent from most serious discussions of the literature of feeling.17  This 
is possibly a generic oversight.  In Janet Todd’s Sensibility: An Introduction, she calls 
sentimental work that which “reveals a belief in the appealing and aesthetic quality of 
virtue, displayed in a naughty world through a vague and potent distress.” Though the 
sentimental novel is conceptually and formally similar to the novel of sensibility, it 
differs in that it does not “honour above all the capacity for refined feeling,” an “innate 
sensitiveness or susceptibility, revealing itself in a variety of spontaneous activities such 
as crying, swooning, and kneeling.”18  I note this distinction because critics of Sade have, 
I believe, mistakenly cited his vituperation of virtue as evidence that he rejects or, at best, 
parodies the tradition of sensibility.  It is the emphasis on “refined feeling,” and not 
virtue, that separates and defines the British tradition of sensibility, and -- as I am 
suggesting in my study of Sade, in concordance with critics like Anne Vila -- opens up a 
new dimension in the French tradition. In particular, Sade incorporates and embraces the 
model of “refined feeling” in the context of a specifically sexual pleasure that might be 
called “refined fucking”: fucking as the core of social community, and further, as the 
exhibition of both a refined taste and of an “innate sensitiveness or susceptibility” on the 
part of the libertine.  
 It is also worth recognizing that, while Sade certainly presents rather evident and 
immediate challenges to what generally constitutes sentimental fiction, a key element of 
these related genres applies to his writing.  Both the novel of sentiment and also that of 
sensibility, Todd claims, strive to affect the reader in “reality” -- outside of the fictional 
world -- rather like how pornography aims to arouse the reader and the Gothic to 
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terrorize her.19  Todd convincingly lays the groundwork for an implied parallel between 
the physiological arousal incited by a novel dedicated to sentiment and emotion -- the 
potential of moving a reader to tears, for example -- and the numerous other, more illicit 
ways in which readers might find themselves stirred.  Indeed, reading Henry 
MacKenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) is not wholly unlike reading Sade’s 120 Days of 
Sodom (1785): both are composed of brief, intensely-felt episodes that demand, rather 
insistently, a physiological response from the reader.  Further, with the addition of each 
consecutive episode, that arousal is intensified and exponentially increased in both texts. 
 In a work that explicitly links Sade with the British tradition of sensibility, R.F. 
Brissendon details the ideological and aesthetic parallels between his writing and the 
sadistic propensities of novels by Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen, and others.20  While 
Brissendon reveals authors like Austen to be “remarkably sadistic,” however, he ignores 
the inverse possibility: that Sade is remarkably sentimental.21  Sade rejects, according to 
Brissendon, the “sentimental image of man” precisely because of his refined 
ineffectuality, which “denie[s] not only the sexual elements in his nature, but also his 
inherent violence, aggressiveness, selfishness, and cruelty.”22  How one categorizes Sade 
generically -- as sentimental fiction, or not -- boils down to his seemingly incompatible 
notion of human “nature,” a nature that is inherently “violen[t],” “aggressive” and 
“cruel.”  Initially this does seem quite different from sentimental “nature.”  John Mullan, 
who historicizes a “language of feeling” in the eighteenth century, quite clearly 
juxtaposes the “sociability” of sentiment against “political discourses of the eighteenth 
century” that “habitually identified passion with narrow interest and socially destructive 
fantasy.”  Writing of British sensibility, Mullan references Thomas Hobbes and Bernard 
 155 
Mandeville, but such discourses also resonate in the writings of materialist philosophes 
with whom the solipsist Sade is frequently aligned, particularly La Mettrie and Baron 
d’Holbach.23  It is only when, Mullan tells us, moral theorists like David Hume and 
Adam Smith advocate a loosening of sentiment from inwardly-directed passion towards 
an outwardly-directed sympathy that personal emotions become the latticework for 
broader societal interests.24  And yet Sade, whom most readers doom as perpetually and 
irreconcilably self-interested, is not believed to theorize sociable or sympathetic passions 
in the period.  
Yet even self-absorption is, paradoxically, revealed to be a shared phenomenon in 
La Philosophie.  For example, in the first dialogue, where Saint-Ange instructs Eugénie, 
that “[u]ne jolie fille ne doit s’occuper que de foutre et jamais d’engenderer” [a pretty 
girl should concentrate only on fucking, and never on bearing children], this seems 
precisely the sort of boldfaced philosophical premise that indicts Sade as anti-communal 
and perversely self-serving in his ideology.25  Here the social pleasures afforded by 
family and society are brutally rebuffed in favor of sexual pleasure and, ultimately, 
perversity: this will become, in a few short lines, a lengthy justification for the intrinsic 
superiority of anal sex, preferable because it is more pleasurable and non-procreative.  
And, indeed, Saint-Ange appears to revel in this fact as she continues, “Nous glisserons 
sur tout ce qui tient au plat mécanisme de la population, pour nous attacher 
principalement et uniquement aux voluptés libertines dont l’esprit n’est nullement 
populateur” [We will skip everything connected with the lowbrow mechanism of 
reproduction, and we will chiefly and uniquely align ourselves with the libertine delights, 
whose spirit never cares about breeding…]  Yet it is precisely Saint-Ange’s pedagogical 
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posturing, here, that betrays her need for a broader community to shape and infuse such 
“delights.”  In describing her aim to “align” herself and her pupil Eugènie with the 
common “spirit” of “libertine” pleasures, she legitimizes this proclivity by using a shared 
and thus communal philosophical justification, and is quick to correct Eugénie’s 
perception that this is, in fact, an abhorrently individual predilection.  (Procreative sex is 
the “lowbrow” act, in Saint-Ange’s formulation.)  In contrast, Saint-Ange describes the 
pleasures of anal sex as coveted and elite, a preference demonstrated by a shared and 
established parameter of taste: she promises Eugénie that “rien ne peut plus rende les 
plaisirs que l’on goûte, et celui qu’on éprouve à l’introduction par-devant” [the pleasure 
enjoyed during the penetration of your ass is incontestably preferable to all the delights 
that can be gained by the penetration in front].  Dolmancé, she urges, “te convaincra, 
j’espère, à toute bonne, que, de tous les plaisirs de la jouissance, c’est le seul que tu 
doives préferer” [will hopefully convince you, my dear friend, that of all the pleasures of 
enjoyment, this pleasure is the only kind you should prefer].26 
 What Sade thus aims to demonstrate through the education of Eugénie is that 
sodomy is both a cultivated and an innate pleasure.  To illustrate this, he uses the 
competing philosophical registers of nature and culture: he juxtaposes Dolmancé’s claim 
for anal sex as a natural pleasure against Saint-Ange’s position that it is advantageous 
because it is learned.  Both positions, ultimately, conclude by claiming sodomy as the 
most desirable form of penetration.  Sodomy is natural, Dolmancé will claim some pages 
later -- in a dialogue that reads rather comically to a contemporary reader but that is 
intended seriously -- because the anus is clearly ergonomically designed for penetration 
by a penis.  It is cultivated, Saint-Ange surmises, because “nature” initially resists with 
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“douleur,” but “une fois vancue” [once vanquished], the sufferer is able to experience a 
full range of unique pleasures.27  For Sade, sodomy is represented as simultaneously a 
universal and an urbane or exclusive form of sexual pleasure: it is an innate sensation 
refined into an increasingly exquisite form through the shapings of a shared sexual 
culture and community.  Thus, while Eugénie is a model pupil, she is also marked by an 
innate propensity towards sexual pleasure and feeling.28  In this respect, the sensations 
described by Saint-Ange and Dolmancé, and embodied in Eugénie, analogize sodomy to 
the social mechanisms that refine inward emotions into outward sympathy and taste: both 
of which, moral theorists like Hume and Smith claim, are natural feelings that can and 
should be cultivated.29 
 For even the most incisive readers of Sade, sensibility presents a kind of paradox: 
as Anne Vila notes, for his (generally male) “libertine philosophes, sensibility operates as 
a boundless energetic instrument for cultivating the erotic intellect,” while, for his hapless 
(and generally female) “victims,” “it is an inexorably fatalistic force that dooms them to 
the worst kinds of moral and physical suffering.”30  Yet Madame de Saint-Ange, who is 
both secretly a “libertine philosophe” and publicly a compliant wife, offers a 
considerably more complex and nuanced account of erotic sensibility in La Philosophie.  
Saint-Ange is particularly forceful in representing genuine sexual pleasures as neither 
fully autonomous nor fully conditional, but as rather willing and mutual.  Communal sex, 
Saint-Ange suggests, actually prevents subjugation and victimization by eradicating the 
restrictive and arbitrary political identities that monogamy enforces, thus empowering the 
subject in unexpected ways.31  In advocating the “cultivation of the erotic intellect” as a 
strategy to obviate the otherwise inevitable “moral and physical suffering” necessitated 
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by the phallocentric model of sexual sovereignty, Saint-Ange recommends that Eugénie 
see her body, instead, as powerfully receptive and ingeniously pliable, circulating within 
a community of possible lovers.  She cautions Eugénie against the too-rigid embrace of 
virtue, a sentiment that is self-serving and egoistic, and she advocates instead a woman’s 
right to own the pleasures of her body and the “right way” to direct these pleasures: 
outward, into the broader social network, for the greater good.32  She reiterates:  
 
 Les plaisirs reçus par l’estime, Eugénie, ne sont que des plaisirs moraux, 
uniquement convenables à certaines têtes; ceux de la fouterie plaisent à 
tous…Fouts, Eugénie, fouts donc, mon cher ange; ton corps est à toi, à toi, 
seule; il n’y a que toi seule au monde qui aies le droit d’en jouir et d’en 
faire jouir qui bon te semble. 
 
[The pleasures of esteem, Eugénie, are nothing but spiritual delights, 
which are suitable purely for certain minds, while the pleasures of fucking 
please everyone… Fuck, Eugénie, fuck away, my dear angel!  Your body 
belongs to you, to you alone.  You are the only person in the world who 
has the right to enjoy your body and to let anyone you wish enjoy it.]33  
 
For Saint-Ange, the body politically “belongs to you, to you alone” -- and Sade has long 
been extolled by feminist critics for his consistency in this respect, arguing later that “il 
ne peut donc être jamais donné…de droit légitime à un sexe de s’emparer exclusivement 
de l’autre” [no sex is granted the legitimate right to seize the other sex exclusively] -- but 
 159 
the best way to enjoy the aesthetic or erotic body is “to let anyone you wish enjoy it.”34  It 
is through this sharing of the sexual body that one moves beyond the “spiritual delights” 
afforded by the vain “pleasures of esteem” into the “pleasures of fucking,” superior and 
preferable because they transcend the pleasures of the individual body, the “certain 
mind[…],” and, by extension, “please everyone.”  So, as Sade muses philosophically 
later in La Philosophie, “c’est pour le bonheur de tous, et non pour un bonheur égoïste et 
privilégié, que nous ont été données le femmes…” [it is for universal happiness and not 
for an egotistical and privileged happiness that we have been given women…]35 
 And yet it is evident that, despite her commitment to enabling and enjoying 
“universal happiness,” Saint-Ange is also fiercely dedicated to her belief in a woman’s 
right to control her own body and its unique pleasures.  She is ruthless on the subject of 
familial laws governing daughters, finding it abhorrent that, “dans un siècle où l’étendue 
et les droits de l’homme viennent d’être approfondis avec tant de soin” [in a century 
where the rights of man have been so carefully widened and deepened], “les pouvoirs de 
ces familles” [parental powers] are viewed as anything but “absolument chimériques” 
[absolutely chimerical].36 Saint-Ange advocates instead that daughters abandon their 
homes in their early teens and dedicate themselves to serving others sexually – not in 
marriage, but in the more democratic and charitable institution of whoring: 
 
La destinée de la femme est d’être comme la chienne, comme la louve: 
elle doit appartenir à tous ceux qui veulent d’elle.  C’est visiblement 
outrager la destination que la nature impose aux femmes, que de les 
enchaîner par le lien absurde d’un hymen solitaire….Fouts, en un mot, 
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fouts; c’est pour cela que tu es mise au monde; aucune borne à tes plaisirs 
que celle de tes forces ou de tes volontés; aucune exception de lieux, de 
temps et de personnes; toutes les heures, toutes les endroits, tous les 
hommes doivent servir à tes voluptès; la continence est une vertu 
impossible, don’t la nature, violée dans ses droits, nous punit aussitôt par 
mille malheurs. 
 
[A woman’s fate is to be like a she-wolf, a bitch: she must belong to 
everyone who wants her.  We are quite blatantly outraging the destiny that 
nature imposes on a woman if we absurdly fetter her to a solitary 
marriage…fuck!—in a word—fuck!  That’s why you were put on this 
earth!  There is no barrier to pleasure outside of your own strength and 
will; no exception beyond place time and person.  All hours, all areas, all 
men must serve your sensual delight; continence is an impossible virtue, 
which nature, violated in its rights, instantly punishes with a thousand 
miseries.]37 
 
While the logic is troubling here, as this is easily read as a moment in which Sade 
conveniently aligns female sexual power with subservience to, and complicity with, male 
desire, it is important to note that Saint-Ange imagines whoring as a mutually beneficial 
vocation.38  A whore gives and receives pleasure without limits -- a transcendental kind 
of pleasure otherwise restricted (in Sade’s oeuvre) rather exclusively for male libertines: 
“all hours, all areas, all men must serve you” is the promise made to a woman who makes 
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the conscious choice to sacrifice her self-enclosed and sexed body to pleasure.39  For, 
even as she “belong[s] to everyone who wants her,” she also exerts an extraordinary 
amount of power over “all men.”  And she aligns herself with her magnetic sexual nature 
through “fuck[ing]”: it is her “fate,” her “destiny,” and her vocation, powerful and even 
portentous in the world of the boudoir, as for Saint-Ange, and also for Dolmancé, real 
power lies not in the ability to compel one to submit, but to convince. 
Saint-Ange goes on to give an impassioned defense of the democratic and 
republican spirit of the whore: 
 
On appelle de cette manière, ma toute belle, ces victimes publiques de la 
débauche des hommes, toujours prêtes à se livrer à leur temperament ou á 
leur intérêt; heureuses et respectables creatures, que l’opinion flétrit, mais 
que la volupté couronne, et qui, bien plus necessaires à la société que les 
prudes, ont le courage de sacrificier, pour la servir, la consideration que 
cette société ose leur enlever injustement.  Vivent celles que ce titre 
honore à leurs yeux!  Voilà les femmes vraiment aimables, les seules 
véritablement philosophes! 
 
[The word ‘whore,’ my lovely, refers to those freely available victims of 
male debauchery, women who are always ready to submit, either for their 
temperament or for their profit.  They are happy and respectful creatures 
who are stigmatized by public opinion but crowned by pleasure.  More 
crucial to society than any prudes, they have the courage to serve it and to 
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sacrifice the good reputation that society dares to deprive them of unjustly.  
Hurray for the women who feel honored by that title!  They are truly 
lovable, the only real philosophers of the Enlightenment.]40 
 
Here Saint-Ange quite clearly conflates the use-value of the whore with her willingness 
to “sacrifice” the artificial constraints of social mores to the service of the greater good, 
as she possesses “the courage to serve” society, and, what’s more, is even able to derive 
an extreme pleasure from doing so.  Saint-Ange tells Eugénie that she is proud to be a 
whore because she acts in the service of society, unlike so-called virtuous women (who 
are ignited by “l’ambition,” “l’orgueil,” and “la froideur seule d’un temperament qui ne 
leur conseille rien” [ambition…pride…the coldness of a temperament that never counsels 
them]) and even God, an anti-communal figure “inutile” [useless] to the cooperative 
system that Sade envisions (“s’il est certain qu’à supposer que cet être inerte existât, ce 
serait assurément le plus ridicule de tous les êtres, puisqu’il n’aurait servi qu’un seul jour, 
et que depuis des millions de siècles il serait dans une inaction méprisable…” [if it is 
certain that -- assuming this inert creature exists -- it must definitely be the most 
ridiculous of all creatures, since it functioned for only one day, next tarrying in loathsome 
inaction for millions of centuries]).41  The whore, then, is a more communal figure than is 
the creator of the universe because she is constantly circulating, in motion, serving the 
needs of a demanding society while God remains “inert,” “tarrying in loathsome 
inaction.”  It is the uniquely collaborative spirit of the whore that renders women the 
“true philosophers of the Enlightenment,” as female sensibility is inherently republican: it 
is expansive, it is inclusive, it is in every way communal -- and finally, it is orgiastic. 
 163 
 
“Beyond the Very Limits of Possibility”: Expansive, Radical Female Desire 
It is moments like Saint-Ange’s description of the whore -- moments in which 
feminine power is boldly claimed -- that the philosophy espoused by Sade’s female 
libertines resonates with a particular moment in late twentieth-century feminism, where 
eroticism, the embrace of sexual pleasure, and the possibilities of communal sexuality are 
called upon to shape and define the very notion of “womanhood.”  Theorists like Audre 
Lorde celebrate the erotic as “the lifeforce of women; of that creative energy empowered, 
the knowledge and use of which we are now reclaiming in our language, or history, our 
dancing, our loving, our work, our lives.”42  In the 1970s, Jane Gallop said that reading 
Sade made her a “liberated woman,” though she would later question both the 
appropriateness of that label and why La Philosophie, in particular, “spoke so powerfully 
to [her].”43  Yet Gallop, too, sees a simultaneously productive and troubling complicity 
between the “sexual revolutions” of the late twentieth century and the “philosophical” 
premises of the “Enlightenment.”44  And Simone de Beauvoir – who famously asked if 
we “must burn” him – sees in Sade the profoundly communal possibilities of sexual 
pleasure.  She writes: “ce n’est ni comme auteur ni comme perverti sexuel que Sade 
s’impose à notre attention: c’est par la relation qu’il a créée entre ces deux aspects de lui-
même.  Les anomalies de Sade prennent leur valeur du moment où, au lieu de les subir 
comme une nature donnée, il élabore un immense système afin de les revendiquer…” [it 
is neither as author nor as sexual pervert that Sade compels our attention; it is by virtue of 
the relationship he created between these two aspects of himself.  Sade’s aberrations 
begin to acquire value when, instead of enduring them as his fixed nature, he elaborates 
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an immense system in order to justify them].45  Beauvoir insightfully recognizes, here, 
that Sade’s perversities acquire “value” not as the compulsive demonstrations of a 
solipsistic “fixed nature,” but as parts of an “immense,” dynamic “system” that helps 
“justify them.”  Indeed, de Beauvoir intimates, Sade’s sexual proclivities carry no force if 
they are only his peculiar aberrations; it is only by virtue of his “elaborat[ions],” his 
expansion outward into a dense philosophical “system,” that these energies take real 
force and shape.  
It is along the same lines that Gallop describes her work (in the 1980s) as a 
“feminist enterprise,” although she aims to situate it within an “antihumanist” criticism  
confluent with the poststructuralist, posthumanist perspective that has informed the work 
of this dissertation.  Gallop writes: “As Sade stresses the sexual underpinnings of the 
philosophical and the political, as Sade violates certain identities, so our reading, a Sadian 
antihumanism, becomes necessarily a feminist disturbance of the distinction between 
masculine/feminine and the correlative privilege of the male, ideal sphere.”46  Similarly, 
Kathy Acker locates in Sade’s texts a surprising complicity with the destabilizing 
subjectivity of postmodern feminist aesthetics, and, by extension, a dismantling of the 
male gaze in favor of a more splintered -- and according to Acker, nominally feminine --
view.  Acker traces this tendency in Sade’s writing to his incarcerated vantage point: the 
sensual and visual deprivation of his jail cell, she contends, aligns him -- however 
inimically -- with precisely the kind of perspective his female victims inhabit.47  The 
violence of his representations is incidental, according to Acker, because focusing too 
heavily on the hollow representations of sexual violence misses what Sade truly offers to 
a discerning reader (which Acker certainly was): the daunting, and yet dazzling, 
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annihilation of phallocentric visuality.  Acker quite emphatically rejects the claim of 
solipsism, arguing that the gaze, in Sade, is not simply “that sight whose visual 
correspondent is the mirror,” a mirror in which “one only sees oneself,” but that Sade, in 
fact, “shatter[s] mirror after mirror,” to show that “behind every mirror st[ands] another 
mirror,” and -- finally -- that “behind all mirrors, nothingness sits.”  His perpetual and 
compulsive splintering of the truncated gaze reveals the (postmodern) truth of human 
identity: Acker concludes, “Sade wrote in order to seduce us, by means of his labyrinth of 
mirrors, into nothingness.”48 
Acker is very consciously invoking and confronting a particular kind of feminist 
assumption about visuality and the aesthetic.  The metaphor of the gaze, which so 
preoccupied anti-pornography feminists, is -- according to Acker -- defused, splintered, 
and deflected in precisely the kind of pornography that these activists railed against.  If 
the masculine gaze only reflects itself in a “mirror,” this act of gazing is narcissistic and 
reflective, and thus not active or penetrative.  But Sade does not simply hold up a 
“mirror,” Acker argues, to the social world: what he provides instead is a formidable act 
of conflation, aligning the perspective of the female object with the powerful and 
authorized position of the male subject.  What Acker diagnoses as the interminable 
“labyrinth” of mirrors in Sade, or what Beauvoir characterizes as a “system,” I contend, 
helps to illustrate the movement towards the myriad and the communal rather than the 
solipsistic and the solitary in Sade’s work, and further, to assert this multiplicity as 
contingent to the female body and to female sexuality, in particular.  And so it is Saint-
Ange, and not Dolmancé, who in La Philosophie describes and circumscribes the space 
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of the boudoir: a space of infinite possibility and variety.  The ingénue asks, “why all 
these mirrors?” and Saint-Ange replies 
 
C’est pour que, répétant les attitudes en mille sens divers, elles multiplient 
à l’infini les memes jouissances aux yeux de ceux qui les goûtent sur cette 
ottomane.  Aucune des parties de l’un ou l’autre corps ne peut être caché 
par ce moyen: il faut que tout soit en vue; ce sont autant de groupes 
rassemblés autour de ceux que l’amour enchaîne, autant d’imitateurs de 
leurs plaisirs, autant de tableaux délicieux, dont leur lubricité s’enivre et 
qui servent bientôt à la completer elle-même. 
 
[By reflecting the positions in a thousand different images, the mirrors 
infinitely multiply the same delights in the eyes of the people enjoying 
them on this ottoman.  That way, no part of either body can be concealed: 
everything must be exposed.  And there are as many groups surrounding 
the people entangled in love, as many imitators of their pleasures, as many 
delightful tableaux whose lechery is intoxicating, and which can soon 
serve to crown our efforts.]49 
 
Expanding from the sentimental intimacy of two lovers “entangled” in sexual embrace, 
Saint-Ange exponentially increases this view so that the lovers can “infinitely multiply” 
these initial “delights.”  They are visually struck by the accumulative sensations of “the 
many imitators of their pleasures,” a community of lovers who are also, intriguingly, 
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themselves.  The “delightful tableaux,” and its “intoxicating” “lechery,” transforms into a 
vast erotic landscape populated by an orgy of lovers, while -- in reality -- it comprises 
only two.  This ability to expand and explode the self-contained intimacy of one insular 
couple into an infinitude of “many” pleasures -- pleasures that expose “everything” --
characterizes not only the polymorphous desires of the libertine Saint-Ange, but the 
nominally feminine space of the boudoir itself.50 
 In depicting the boudoir as suspended between two aesthetic extremes -- infinite 
variety and yet, synthesizing unity -- Saint-Ange garners the inherent tension of the 
eighteenth-century dramatic tableau.  The tableau, then, conflates visual with textual 
representation and positions the reader to witness what the text shows.  Thus inherent in 
the complex aesthetics governing beholder and tableau is the tension between seduction 
and resistance.  In his book L’esthétique du tableau dans le theâtre du XVIIIe siècle, 
Pierre Frantz describes the tableau as a “dialogic of sensation”: “Le tableau condense 
l’émotion et rayonne d’énergie simultanément… Le tableau participe d’une sorte de 
dialogique de la sensation” [The tableau simultaneously condenses emotion and releases 
energy… The tableau participates in a dialogic of sensation.]51  Jay Caplan describes this 
tension between flux and fixity using erotic language: “…the tableau…is a sort of 
fetishistic snapshot in which the transitoriness of the real world is magically transformed 
into an ideal fixity.”52  However, it is Tili Boon Cuillé’s characterization of the tableau as 
dynamic, an “emotional plenitude,” as opposed to an “ideal fixity,” that most resembles 
the unconstrained and unpredictable nature of the Sadeian tableau.53 Sade’s use of the 
tableau as a governing form for representing orgiastic pleasure allows him to filter the 
particularities of individual sexual response within the abstracted, transcendent “ideal 
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fixity” perpetuated by the moment of communal orgasm.  The tableau, then, casts the 
relationship between individual and communal pleasure within a powerful aesthetic 
frame. 
 The tension that Michael Fried identifies between absorption and distraction thus 
corresponds to this chapter’s interest in the relationship between individual and 
communal sexual desire.  Indeed, the formulation of “eliciting” and “resisting” drives 
helps us to recognize the centrality of seemingly distracted actors to the narrative 
coherence of the sexual tableau, even as it disrupts the narrative order.54 
 
Figure 2. 
Source: Gilles Néret, Erotica: 17th-18th Century From Rembrandt to Fragonard (Köln: 
Taschen Press, 2001) 
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In this engraving from La Nouvelle Justine, a half-dressed man sodomizes another, who 
sodomizes yet another figure strapped to a wheel.  The second actor is, physically, the 
orgy’s center: he penetrates the bound figure, he draws the standing women opposite into 
the collective act by fondling them, and finally, he kisses the bound woman hanging 
upside-down from the pulley.  He is the one figure in direct physical contact with every 
other actor in the orgy, and thus he acts as its cohering mechanism.  And yet, arguably, it 
is the women who -- despite occupying somewhat more marginal positions in the tableau 
-- aesthetically expand and proliferate the scene.   While the bound woman, for example, 
faces in the opposite direction from the more cohesive, central group, two elements of her 
body provide focal emphasis: her gaze redirects the viewer, again, to the act of sodomy, 
and her straight legs form a kind of point, giving the orgy a triangular shape and 
emphasizing the linear connection between the subjects on the floor.  Finally, the woman 
at the mirror watches the action unfold, and her vantage point serves to confirm the 
cohesiveness and insularity of the orgy.  As she looks in the mirror, seemingly self-
absorbed and distracted, she sees both herself as autonomous subject and the communal 
sex act in its entirety, with herself as its end point.  She thus houses the tension between 
the individual and the group that the tableau itself questions and interrogates.  
While the female body has perhaps been historically overlooked as a force 
defining and shaping the Sadeian aesthetic, the orgy -- usually made up of mostly female 
participants, or, at least, a higher ratio of female subjects to male -- is a governing and 
central image in Sade’s writing.  The orgy is one important instance in which the female 
body -- its mutability, its transferability, and its radical openness -- becomes a mechanism 
for exponentially increasing and intensifying pleasure, and the male director must submit 
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to be a participant, must offer pleasure to others even as he enjoys it himself.  My 
understanding of how the orgy operates in a text like La Philosophie thus pushes against 
the historically phallocentric conception of the orgy as advanced by George Bataille -- an 
“organized explosion” where “contagious actions” between men harmonize into a 
carnivalesque community of sexual violence -- in favor of the messier and less-
constraining definition of orgy as presented by feminist critic Lucienne Frappier-Mazur: 
“the presentation of a collective act focusing on excess – be it of sex, of food, or of 
language – and on confusion: mingling of bodies, hybrid foods (such as fish and fowl), 
blurring of the line between natural and artificial décor.”55 Frappier-Mazur’s depiction of 
orgy as “excess[ive]” and as “confus[ed]” emphasizes that the orgy is not necessarily the 
depiction of a condensed and intensified male pleasure, but in fact the comingling 
pleasures of both female and male participants, and -- so defined in the Sadeian universe  
-- nominally a feminine act. 
 Frappier-Mazur’s rather visceral understanding of the orgy as a tangible and 
sensual phenomenon underscores the ontological materialism that Sade finds both 
philosophically and aesthetically compelling. While Sade’s understanding of sexuality is 
deeply materialist, it is also progressively polymorphous.  In the opening scene, Sade 
introduces a crucial distinction between women and men in an imaginatively empowering 
revision of the dimorphic or complementarian model of sexual identity.  Saint-Ange 
describes herself as an “animal amphibie,” [an amphibious creature], saying, “j’aime tout, 
je m’amuse de tout, je veux réunir tous les genres” [I love everything, I enjoy everything, 
I want to try all kinds of pleasure].  By contrast, Dolmancé is described as  “singulier” 
[that singular man], a “sodomite par principe” [sodomite by principle], a man who “ne 
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céde même au nôtre [sexe] que sous la clause spéciale de lui livrer les attraits chéris dont 
il est accoutumé” [yields to our sex purely on condition that it will supply him with the 
treasured charms that he is accustomed to] -- in short, a gourmet’s preference for sodomy 
over vaginal sex.56  Dolmancé’s preference for anal sex and his privileging of the phallus 
will be challenged throughout the text, for even as Dolmancé structures a particularly 
seditious tableau to teach Eugénie about sodomy, it is Saint-Ange that coheres and 
centers the orgy, as she sodomizes her brother with a dildo while Dolmancé --- somewhat 
against his preferences -- sodomizes her. It is in this moment that Dolmancé calls the 
group a “chapelet formé” [a rosary], suggesting that even in this proliferation of sexual 
acts, a chain or collective pleasure emerges: the individual sexual pleasures are subsumed 
by the larger, collective act of sodomy that incorporates all five individual bodies into 
one mass body.   Dolmancé, far from behaving as the tyrant of the boudoir, begs when he 
is fully aroused, “ne pensons plus qu’à décharger maintenant” [Now we want to think 
only of coming!].  His gratification thus depends on maintaining and participating in this 
heightened collective act. As the arousal mounts, the Chevalier begins to ejaculate -- 
Dolmancé attempts to rein him in, begging “Un peu d’ensemble, mes amis…et nous 
partirons tous à la fois” [A little togetherness, my friends…and we can all come 
simultaneously], exhibiting his reliance upon the group.57  It is thus Saint-Ange who, 
cohering the group, makes the simultaneous climax possible: not Dolmancé, who is 
marginalized by his predilection.  Indeed, here Sade’s understanding of orgasm as 
simultaneously transcendent and deeply vitalist aligns nicely with his understanding of 
death as an inherently polymorphous state:  “ce que nous appelons la fin de l’animal qui a 
vie,” he writes, “ne sera plus ne fin réelle, mais une simple transmutation, don’t est la 
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base le mouvement perpetual, veritable essence de la matière et que tous les philosophies 
moderns admettent comme une des ses premières lois.  La mort, d’aprés ces principes 
irréfutables, n’est donc plus un changement de forme, qu’un passage imperceptible d’une 
existence à un autre…”[What we call the end of an animal’s life will no longer be an 
actual end, it will be a simple transmutation based on perpetual motion, which is the true 
essence of matter, and which all modern philosophers accept as one of the supreme laws 
of matter.  Hence, death, according to these irrefutable principles, is nothing but a change 
of form, an imperceptible passage from one existence to another…]58  
 Indeed, Dolmancé is often depicted in the text as profoundly limited by both his 
focused and highly-particular sexual proclivity -- sodomy, preferably homosexual -- and, 
by extension, the limits of his physical body, which is not capable of feeling or 
expressing pleasure in the same way as the more “amphibious” Saint-Ange.  When 
Eugénie begs Saint-Ange and Dolmancé to supply her with details of the “écarts 
incroyables” [incredible deviations] they have experienced as libertines, it is Saint-Ange 
-- and not Dolmancé -- whose excessive and detailed lecheries titillate her.  Dolmancé, by 
contrast, elides the question entirely, instead pressing her for a more immediate 
satisfaction: “Belle Eugénie, j’aimerais cent fois mieux vous voir éprouver tout ce que je 
voudrais fair, que de vous raconter ce que j’ai fait” [Beautiful Eugénie, I’d rather have 
you experience a hundred times over what I’d like to do to you than tell you what I’ve 
already done]. Here, Dolmancé equates pleasure with the repetitive and accumulative 
“experience” of sodomy.  For Eugénie, the wholly undefinable and pleasurably various 
libertinage Saint-Ange hints at is vastly preferable.  Even as Saint-Ange refuses to supply 
the full details, Eugénie presses her impatiently to “go further.”  When she responds, 
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coyly, “Cela se peut-il?” [Can one go any further?] Eugénie is sexually aroused, and cries 
out “Yes, yes, yes!,” picturing all the ways in which Saint-Ange might have experienced 
pleasure, with Eugénie supplying her own lascivious and sundry imagery, consoling 
herself that “nos sensations morales les plus délicieuses nous venaient de l’imagination” 
[the most delightful spiritual sensations derive from the imagination], which is infinitely 
various in its possibilities.59  
Desire is, then, preferably various and flexible, and it is with this notion in mind 
that Dolmancé can be read as profoundly limited, and thus not the inventive master of 
cruelty that he is usually considered: the “ultimate authority in the boudoir.”60  Indeed, 
even as he instructs Eugénie that “toutes sont dans la nature” [all desires can be found in 
nature], and thus “[a]ucune ne peut se qualifier ainsi [extraordinaire]” “none can be 
termed outlandish,” Dolmancé himself experiences pleasure only in the act of sodomy.  
Still, he recognizes that “[Nature] s’est plu, en créant les hommes, à différencier leurs 
goûts comme leur figures, et nous ne devons pas plus nous étonner de la diversité qu’elle 
a mise dans nos traits que de celle qu’elle a placée dans nos affections” [When nature 
created human beings, it delighted in differentiating their sexual leanings as much as their 
faces; and we should no more be astonished by the diversity of our features than by the 
diversity that nature has placed in our affections.]61  Yet his affections are always the 
same; even in a particularly inventive tableau, Dolmancé constructs only a limited and 
restricted role for himself.  After he gives “quelques courses dans le cul de cette enfant” 
[several thrusts in this child’s ass], Dolmancé instructs promisingly, “nous varierons le 
tableau” [we’ll vary the tableau].  But it is ultimately only Saint-Ange and Eugénie who, 
following in his direction, will assume rather complicated and intricate positions: 
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“Eugénie, au-dessus de vous, votre tête entre ses jambs, m’offrira son clitoris à sucer,” 
[Eugénie, on top of you with your head between her legs, will present me with her clitoris 
to lick], and she and Saint-Ange share a cooperative embrace, “elle pourra vous le 
rendre” [giv[ing]…tit for tat] and “baiserez l’une et l’autre” [kiss[ing] each other].  
Dolmancé’s role in the tableau, besides his (purely pedagogical) oral stimulation of 
Eugénie, is much more formulaic: “Je vous enculerai, madame” [I’ll…fuck you up the 
ass, Madame]; “Je me replacerai ensuite dans son anus” [Next I’ll plumb her anus again]; 
“Vous me présenterez votre cul…” [You’ll hand over your ass]; “Je sucerai le trou de 
votre cul” [I’ll suck your asshole…]62 While Eugénie and Saint-Ange circulate, move 
dynamically, and occupy elaborate roles in the tableau, Dolmancé is locked into 
compulsive repetition.  Accordingly, Saint-Ange playfully but bluntly implies 
Dolmancé’s sexual limitations at the close of the tableau: “Voilà les homes, ma chère, à 
peine nous regardent-ils quand leurs désirs sont satisfaits…” [That’s a man for you, my 
dear!  No sooner does he glance at you than his desires are satisfied!]63   
 But even as the male body is limited by its predilections, the inherent possibilities 
of the more pliable female body draws him out of these compulsive, repetitive 
proclivities.  For example, Dolmancé draws an aesthetic comparison between the “asses” 
of Eugénie and Saint-Ange, admiring them “l’un près de l’autre” [side by side].  But the 
two women do more than simply offer him the cumulative, repetitive pleasure of two 
asses: they “enchain[ent]” [entangle] themselves into a “spectacle enchanteur de tant de 
beautés” [magical spectacle of so much beauty] two bodies wrapped together in 
“enchant[ment]” for Dolmancé to “idolize.”64  Clearly there is something more that 
happens when these sexual objects combine and commingle before his very eyes.  Later, 
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Dolmancé takes immense pleasure in “unit[ing]” Saint-Ange with her brother, the 
Chevalier, in “heavenly incest,” in a pleasure that is intensified because it involves an 
illegal and immoral commingling between brother and sister and thus the sordid collapse 
of difference and differentiation.65  (In his political pamphlet, Sade will describes incest 
as highly republican because it “étend les liens des familles et rend par consequent plus 
actif l’amour des citoyens pour la patrie” [loosens family ties and therefore strengthens 
the citizen’s love for their country…].)66  He tells the couple “ce sont mes doigts qui 
doivent vous lier” [let my fingers tie you together], invoking an image of weaving and of 
connection, and ultimately it is Saint-Ange who finds herself in a sublime moment of 
collective pleasure.  She cries: 
 
Ah! mes amis, me voilà donc foutue des deux côtés….Sacredieu! quel 
divin plaisir!... Non, il n’en est pas de semblable au monde… Ah! foutre! 
que je plains la femme qui ne l’a pas goûté! … et toi, Eugénie, contemple-
moi; viens me regarder dan le vice; viens apprendre, à le goûter avec 
transport, à le savourer avec délives… Vois, mon amour, vois tout ce que 
je fais à la fois: scandale, seduction, mauvauis exemple, inceste, adultère, 
sodomie! 
 
[My friends!  I’m getting fucked coming and going!...Damn it!  What 
divine pleasure!...No, there’s nothing like it in the whole world!...Ah, 
fucking! How I pity the woman who hasn’t tasted it… And you, Eugénie!  
Gaze at me!  Watch me in my vices, learn by my example, savor my vices, 
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relish them, delight in them.  Look, my love!  See everything I perpetrate 
at once: scandal, seduction, bad role model, incest, adultery, sodomy!]67 
 
Though Dolmancé has earlier claimed his “right” to “direct the scene,” here Saint-
Ange radiates authority because she is the orgy’s veritable center -- as was the male actor 
in Figure 2, above -- “getting fucked coming and going.”  Saint-Ange seizes this moment 
to empower Eugénie through her gaze: to encourage her to see the way in which Saint-
Ange is able to embody “everything…at once,” all her “vices” simultaneously.  And 
though Dolmancé initially intended for the lesson of the tableaux to be singularly phallic 
-- the aim is ostensibly for Eugénie to witness sodomy -- as the orgy continues, the focus 
is redirected to Eugénie’s shifting pleasures and transformative sexual prowess.  
Dolmancé gasps, after Eugénie completes a particularly salacious tableau by penetrating 
him with a dildo, “Cette charmante fille m’a foutu comme un dieu” [This enchanting girl 
has fucked me like a god!]  Eugénie responds, “En vérité j’y ai ressenti du plaisir” [I 
really felt your pleasure] -- ever the text’s emotional register -- and Dolmancé concludes, 
“Tous les excés en donnent quand on est libertine, et ce qu’une femme a de mieux à faire, 
est de les multiplier au-delà même du possible” [If you’re a libertine, every excess 
triggers pleasure, and the best thing a woman can do is to multiply those excesses beyond 
the very limits of possibility].68  In other words, Eugénie has so powerfully and 
“enchantingly” fucked Dolmancé because she has become sensitive to his “pleasure,” 
feeling his arousal and complying with his proclivity.  Now she, like Saint-Ange, is ready 
to experience “every excess,” and, further, “to multiply those excesses beyond the very 
limits of possibility.”   
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 This image of Eugénie, fired with sexual lust, lording over the libertine, 
triumphantly gripping the dildo and reveling in how she “fe[els]” every sensation of 
Dolmancé’s pleasure as she “fuck[s] [him] like a god,” brilliantly demonstrates that the 
pleasures and powers of sensibility can also be, as Vila describes, “boundlessly 
energetic” for the female victim.  What this moment powerfully illustrates is that the 
narrative of sexual education throughout La Philosophie is not exclusively the story of a 
seasoned libertine corrupting a naïve ingénue.  It is also, quite surprisingly, the story of 
how the unbridled, unlimited, and indeed unexpected desires of the ingénue can expand 
and encircle the otherwise compulsive behaviors of the libertine.  Eugénie’s ravenous 
sexuality opens up new sexual possibilities for Dolmancè, possibilities that extend 
beyond the boudoir, and that “multiply…beyond the very limits” of the possible. 
 
Conclusion: The Feminine Community of Orgy 
Throughout La Philosophie, as I have shown, there are many such instances that claim 
female sexual power as masterful and superior to male desire, thus perhaps one of the 
strongest communities in the Sadeian text is, rather surprisingly, that which is formed 
between and among women.  Saint-Ange advises Eugénie to “se procurer une bonne amie 
qui, libre et dans le monde, puisse lui en faire secrètement goûter les plaisirs” [have a 
good friend, a woman, who, untrammeled and in society, can help [her] to secretly taste 
those worldly pleasures], and elsewhere in another of Sade’s novels, the rakish and vile 
Juliette comforts and protects her abused, virtuous sister.69  Such a mentor can equip her 
mentee with the resources to “jette alors de la poudre aux yeux de tout ce qui l’entoure” 
[throw dust in the eyes of all the people around her]: the mentor can show, in other 
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words, how to “submit” disingenuously to those who would prevent her sexual freedoms 
in order to preserve her reputation for the satisfaction of later intrigues.  Even a marriage 
or sexual arrangement that initially “displeases,” and “to which she submits purely out of 
self-interest,” has the ability to “launch[... her] in society,” if guided by the more 
experienced hands of another female libertine.  From such a woman, even the most 
innocent of girls can learn to “rejette[r] et méprise[r] opiniâtrement tout ce qui ne tend 
qu’à la renchaîner, tout ce qui ne vise point, en un mot, à la livrer au sein de impudicité 
[stubbornly reject and despise everything that tends only to clap her in irons again—in 
short, everything that doesn’t contribute to keeping her in the lap of lewdness…]70  Sade 
goes further still in his philosophical pamphlet: he advocates the establishment of 
pleasure-houses for women, where “où leurs caprices et les besoins de leur temperament, 
bien autrement ardent que le nôtre, puissant de meme se satisfaire avec tous les sexes” 
[they can satisfy themselves with all sexes, gratify their whims and the needs of their 
temperaments, which, indeed, are far more ardent than our own].71 
What Saint-Ange clearly advocates and promotes in her pedagogical model is 
close, communicative and cooperative relations among women, and her model nicely 
aligns itself with Sade’s earnest defense of radical republicanism and perpetual revolution 
in “Français, encore un effort.”  Indeed, in Sade’s elegant and often emphatic assertion of 
a woman’s right to govern her own body, to own and enjoy her sexual preferences and 
pleasures -- not to mention his support of other rights, including matrilineal claims to 
children as property --he outlines a vexed but consistent sexual politics.  Sade thus offers 
an unexpectedly inclusive aesthetic and political model of community through 
libertinism, a model that reaches its fullest and most powerful expression in the orgy.  For 
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the orgy demonstrates, in the extreme, the possibilities for cohesion even within the kind 
of splintered subjectivity afforded the Sadeian heroine, and -- rather crucially -- shows 
how only this form of self-conscious passivity, in its radical openness and flexibility, has 
the power to ignite the cumulative, explosive pleasures of group climax. 
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Conclusion 
The Relational Self and the ‘Postmodern’ Eighteenth Century 
 
 
 
The readings in this project have formed their own strange, and motley, community: it is 
unusual, to say the least, to begin a dissertation with Thomson and end with Sade.  In the 
next few pages I will try to offer some sense of how this came to pass.  In short, I will 
offer some ways of conceiving of this community of literary selves as a connected group, 
rather than as a series of isolated examples.  The ties that bind, for example, a Thomson 
to a Sade, demand not only a recasting of our typical literary-historical stories, but also a 
questioning of both the individual as a privileged category of analysis, and of the 
eighteenth century more generally as a “modernizing moment.”  
For James Thomson, nature is a network of fortuitous, unpredictable collisions, 
from which the attentive self is able to glean meaningful insight into his or her own 
feeling being.  While there are undoubtedly moments in which Thomson can be said to 
engage with a more unified and sublimely abstract concept of nature -- Nature with a 
capital “N,” so to speak -- this kind of nature overwhelms him, stupefies him, awes him: 
it occasions the poet-speaker’s disconnection from, and frustration with, a world that 
offers him no solace.  It is, rather, the moments in which Thomson engages closely with 
an exquisitely-wrought natural detail -- an approaching thunderstorm, the maddening lust 
of a bull, the elegant courtship of the birds -- that deepen his sense of being as relational 
and as profoundly connected to the natural world.  As I have argued in Chapter One, the 
personal relationships that Thomson wound in and through his poetry reciprocally affect 
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and are affected by the inherently relational models everywhere present in nature.  It is 
not, then, how the Florist organizes and controls the flowers that moves us, but in how 
the flowers respond to the Florist; not in how Spring comes to dominate the landscape, 
but in how the gasping season struggles free from winter while secretly enfolding the 
anticipated harvest; not in how the husbandmen till the land, but in how the soil, oxen, 
seed, and glebe all collaborate to encourage that first vernal shoot.  There is, in Thomson, 
an inherent respect for process, for transition, and for the uncertainty of the collective 
associations joining humans with non-humans.  We are everywhere, in Spring, conscious 
of how erratic and yet thrilling these moments of collision can be.  
These uncertain and yet orgiastic associations also mark the kinds of relationships 
that structure the libertine novels of D.A.F., Marquis de Sade, who also, rather crucially, 
bases his notion of the relational self in an unpredictable and uncertain nature -- albeit of 
a substantially less benevolent kind than does Thomson.  For Sade, the messy and highly 
unstable orgy is an intensely associative experience, one that subsumes the individual 
within its powerful, communal pleasures.  It is also transformative, edifying, both for the 
ingénue and for the libertine: Dolmancé and Saint-Ange, as I have shown, confirm 
themselves as exceptional libertines only by their successful negotiation of orgiastic 
desire and by how others -- specifically Eugènie -- adopt and propagate their principles.  
Saint-Ange, in particular, models this kind of expansive association more obviously: in 
how she physically centers the orgy, or in how she collects and accumulates pleasure 
from multiple lovers.  Both Saint-Ange and Eugènie expand the possibilities of libertine 
desire while actively in pursuit of their own self-interested pleasure, a model that not only 
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reflects the poetic aspirations of Thomson’s poet-speaker, but also resonates with the 
libertine pursuit of “promiscuous Diversions” in novels like Betsy Thoughtless. 
For Haywood, however -- unlike these more utopian visions of Thomson and 
Sade -- such unlimited pleasures are constantly in danger of becoming restricted, and this 
is also the case in Richardson’s Clarissa.  What manifests in these accounts of more 
domestic relations are the pleasures that can be incurred even when the subjects 
themselves are physically, socially, or even sexually restricted.  Domestic fiction 
manifests boundaries and requires its heroines to patently observe them; however, as I 
have shown here, such acts of resistance and even of compliance serve to confirm, rather 
than to challenge, a relational sense of subjectivity in Richardson and Haywood. What 
Clarissa and Betsy best demonstrate, then, is the ways in which relational selves both 
oppose and are complicit with broader networks of power, how they draw upon the 
hierarchical and patriarchal institutions that demand their compliance to form their own 
exemplary, resistant selves.  As I have suggested repeatedly in this dissertation, this 
dialectic not only demonstrates the unexpected complicity of the “spotless” Clarissa with 
her amatory counterparts, but also proves influential for Sade’s own vision of persecuted 
(and “rewarded”) virtue.  
All four of the relational selves I describe here in some way or another rely upon 
the eighteenth-century understanding of sensibility as formative for moral, sentimental, 
and social selfhood.  Indeed, sensibility is, at its core, a relational phenomenon. These 
texts characteristically dramatize an individual’s emotional, physiological, and social 
development alongside his or her broader networks of nature and family, suitors and 
lovers, friends and villains.1  The literature of sensibility rather exclusively concerns itself 
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with the mechanisms, problems, and limitations of sociability: texts center on issues of 
political and contractual responsibility, of fellow feeling, moral sentiment and sympathy.2  
But in addition to these intradiegetic concerns, eighteenth-century readers were 
themselves implicated in the extradiegetic communities of sentimental texts -- another 
important dimension of sensibility’s relations.3  Authors like Haywood, Richardson, and 
Sade demanded that readers join with protagonists in search of emotional refinement and 
experience, and -- while Thomson did not explicitly engage the reader in his poetry itself 
-- The Seasons were also looked upon as a popular tool of moral and sentimental 
edification.4  Though we cannot know how actual readers experienced these texts, we 
know that they were, at least, invited to develop a moral compass, cultivate sentimental 
ethics, or even sharpen repressed libertine sensibilities through the proper consumption of 
stories of feeling.5  Thus the imagined community joining reader and sentimental text 
aimed at a highly specialized function: to refine the reader’s moral ethos (or, in the case 
of Sade, anti-ethos).  By developing sympathetic and instructive experience suited to a 
broad range of readers, the literature of sensibility deploys the power of communal 
feeling as a way of developing the individual reader into an exceptionally feeling and 
sympathetic being, alongside and through the protagonist.  In every text that I study here, 
then, as well as in the literature of sensibility more broadly, communal experiences are 
what enable a highly particularized and developed sense of self, both within the text and  
-- it is suggested -- even beyond it.6 
The radically relational selves that I have described in this dissertation also 
anticipate, in exciting ways, the uncertain, fragmented subjectivities that have 
characterized the postmodern, posthumanist condition.  In Questioning History: The 
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Postmodern Turn to the Eighteenth Century, Greg Clingham argues that “[t]he eighteenth 
century…needs to be seen as a site for some of postmodernism’s crucial insights and 
ideals;” for Clingham, who is primarily interested in “the structure of historical 
consciousness,” those insights center on “the place of the fictive in the production of the 
real, the true, and the historical.”7  Insightfully, he argues that the inherent belief that the 
“postmodern” approach “assum[es] that current practice exceeds that of the 
Enlightenment in sophistication and historical grasp,” a premise that reveals, he 
maintains, how “[t]he ‘postmodern’ intervention thereby replicates an unhistorical 
‘othering’ of the past of the kind that it deplores in the Enlightenment itself” (14).  This 
compelling reading unmasks our niggling and yet unconfirmed suspicions that, to use 
other examples not fully explored in this project, Tristram Shandy’s consciously inchoate 
self-representations or Fantomina’s performative, unfixable identities are suggestive but 
indeed less sophisticated than more contemporary experimentations with the relational 
self.  And, indeed, Clingham’s essay inspires a reconsideration of postmodernism as a 
“phenomenon” rather than as a bounded historical period: for, if the so-called 
“postmodern” individual is a series of attributes, or an ontological state, rather than a 
historical entity, it is quite possible and promising to suggest that eighteenth-century 
writers conceived of these attributes, too. 
This dissertation has shown how a radically relational subjectivity is foundational 
to eighteenth-century representations of the literary self across borders, genres, and 
modes.  What the texts in my project all suggest, collectively, is that eighteenth-century 
literary selves were quite more complicated and porous than the oppositional models of 
sexual complementarity, or the liberal narratives of bourgeois individualism, would allow 
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us to believe.  Perhaps the most significant and lasting of these narratives is the rise of the 
novel, which has been rather inextricably linked to the rise of the individual.  This is, I 
would suggest, at least partially because the tensions between individual and collective 
have their analogy on the critical level as well, in the competing instincts to see the novel 
as a phenomenon unique and foundational to the British eighteenth century and in the 
desire to broaden and deepen our understanding of so-called “novelistic” discourse in the 
long eighteenth and beyond.  In other words, we have privileged the individual because 
we have argued that the novel is individual; we have dismissed a more communal sense 
of “novelty” or of literary innovation because we see it as detracting from the uniqueness 
of the novel.  My dissertation has sought to expand our understanding of eighteenth-
century subjectivity to include the alterities of georgic poetry and the polymorphous 
dynamism of the roman libertin.  While the texts in this dissertation all develop in wildly 
different contexts -- and I hope I have been attentive to those contexts throughout -- they 
share important and lasting perspectives on what it means to be a subject in an uncertain 
world: a subject who is not bounded, self-enclosed, or sealed off, but in fact radically 
open to all that the teeming and dynamic world has to offer.  While historically 
“premodern,” this subject’s simultaneous aspirations to “modernity” – despite her 
perpetual questioning and revisiting of what that “modernity” might look like – makes 
her perhaps more of a postmodern subject than we might otherwise have expected. 
Thinking of selfhood in relational terms is a commonplace in the Internet age: 
Facebook profiles, Twitter accounts, and the efflorescence of social media all attest to a 
twenty-first century understanding of subjectivity as a composite, networked 
phenomenon.  We define the individual now by her accumulation of friends, her 
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extensive networks, and her collections of things.  While I am not claiming that the 
eighteenth century possessed similar or even analogous technologies for self-display and 
social networking, I do argue that the literature I’ve studied here exhibits a clear 
awareness of the self as a complex, dynamic phenomenon that draws from his or her 
relations, the various communities of which s/he is part.  Libertines defined themselves 
and their pleasures by the number and quality of their conquests, as did promiscuous 
women, and -- as Clarissa Harlowe most convincingly demonstrates -- even exemplary 
individuals cannot conceive of themselves as separate from their “Friends.”  However, 
even as I find compelling and even seductive the correspondences between an eighteenth-
century culture of identity and more contemporary notions of the networked self, my 
project has also insisted on the strangeness of the early modern: the ways in which such 
composite selves, in fact, may be one of the eighteenth century’s most unique and lasting 
by-products.  Indeed, it is perhaps only in this moment -- an era where virtually every 
citizen shared the polarizing experience of being a political subject extracted from 
sovereignty and yet not fully integrated into a new public of private individuals, an era in 
which familial, social, and erotic relationships were simultaneously enduring and fragile  
-- that a Clarissa, a Spring, a Betsy Thoughtless, or a Philosophie dans le boudoir could 
be written. 
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Notes  
                                                 
Introduction 
Relational Selves 
 
1 The libertine, while often portrayed in literature as self-interested or self-motivated, is also defined by his 
multitude of conquests. See, for example, the justification made by the impotent speaker of Rochester’s 
poem “The Imperfect Enjoyment” (Selected Works, ed. Frank H. Ellis [London: Penguin Books, 2004], pp. 
15-7) that links his understanding of himself as a libertine to his multiple conquests of other beings: 
This dart of Love, whose piercing point oft tried, 
With virgin blood ten thousand maids has dyed, 
Which nature still directed with such art 
That it through every cunt reached every heart; 
Stiffly resolved, ‘twould carelessly invade 
Woman or boy, nor ought its fury stayed; 
Where’er it pierced, a cunt it found or made. (lns. 37-43) 
Here Rochester exemplifies Todd Parker’s description of the libertine as having both a natural and a 
political/social disposition towards excess: in the Restoration, “Libertines…were not the objects of social 
scorn for their sexual excesses precisely because those excesses signified a superior form of masculinity 
that transcended the limits of quotidian society” (Sexing the Text: The Rhetoric of Sexual Difference in 
British Literature, 1700-1750 [Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000], 8). 
 
2 See Parker’s introduction to Sexing the Text, but also Thomas Laqueur’s Making Sex: Body and Gender 
from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), which rehearses a similar 
argument, where he claims that “[s]ometime in the eighteenth century, sex as we know it was invented” 
(149).  Though he is careful to maintain that “no one account of sexual difference triumphed” (152), the 
argument is still that the eighteenth-century develops and sustains the socially-prescriptive model of sexual 
difference, as opposed to the more fungible one-sex model of centuries prior. 
 
3 While studies of Restoration-era libertinism in a British context abound, studies of “Enlightenment” 
libertinism have tended to develop out of attention paid to what Robert Darnton calls “the forbidden best-
sellers of pre-revolutionary France”: works by Crébillon fils, Duclos, Diderot, Prévost and Laclos, as well 
as – of course – Sade.  (See, for example, Saint-Amand’s The Libertine’s Progress: Seduction in the 
Eighteenth-Century French Novel, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage [Hanover: University Press of New 
England, 1994], or John Phillips’ contextual study of Sade, Sade: The Libertine Novels [London: Pluto 
Press, 2001], as well as Darnton’s book [New York: W.W. Norton, 1995]). A recent exception is Peter 
Cryle and Lisa O’Connell’s edited collection, Libertine Enlightenment: Sex, Liberty and Licence in the 
Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) which features articles on Laurence Sterne 
and Delarivier Manley, among others.  Indeed, it is the exciting claim of this collection to connect 
“libertinism,” defined as “the self-aware, philosophically-oriented practice of more or less sexualized 
freedom,” with “libertinage—the vernacular, dissident freedoms of everyday life” (2) across Europe. 
 
4 For more general debates over the nature of modernity beyond the texts by Foucault and Latour 
referenced in my introduction, see first Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr and trans. Edmund Jephcott (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2007); see also Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), and Gilles Deleuze and Feliz Guattari, Capitalism & 
Schizophrenia, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983, 1987).  More specific and recent 
nuances to eighteenth-century concepts of modernity include Felicity Nussbaum and Laura Brown (eds)., 
The New 18th Century: Theory, Politics, English Literature (New York and London: Methuen, 1987) and 
Clifford Siskin and William Warner’s edited collection This is Enlightenment (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010).  For broader theoretical discussions of posthumanism, see Donna Haraway, Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991); Bruno Latour, The 
Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: 
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Harvard University Press, 2004); and Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998).  The eighteenth-century has 
taken up the question of the nonhuman in earnest: for a sampling of such work, see Felicity Nussbaum, The 
Limits of the Human: Fictions of Anomaly, Race and Gender in the Long Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), Richard Nash, Wild Enlightenment: The Borders of Human Identity in 
the Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2003), and Mark Blackwell’s 
edited collection The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century 
England (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2007). 
 
5 The first two of these claims are overlapping, and are often considered together in works that address the 
origins of the English novel. For work that considers the rise of the novel as literary innovation beyond Ian 
Watt’s influential The Rise of the Novel (considered elsewhere in this introduction), see Lennard Davis’s 
Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), Michael 
McKeon’s agrument for a dialectical theory of the novel in The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), J. Paul Hunter’s hesitatingly nuanced discussion of the 
“novel’s novelty” in Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century Fiction (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), and Catherine Gallagher’s Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of 
Women Writers in the Marketplace, 1670-1820 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). These are, 
of course, only a smattering of representative examples; the “novelty” and origins of the novel have formed 
a substantial sub-genre of eighteenth-century literary criticism.  Watt also advocates for the “rise” of the 
reading public, but more lengthy discussions include William Warner’s Licensing Entertainment: The 
Elevation of Novel Reading in Britain, 1684-1750 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), in 
which he describes the rise of a “media culture” in Britain.  Considerations of this same novelistic trend in 
France include Roger Chartier’s The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), Dena Goodman’s The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History 
of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) and Robert Darnton’s The Forbidden 
Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 1996). For for my third claim 
– that the emergently-modern individual is believed to extricate herself from more communal bodies in this 
period – see Peter Gay’s account of the secular Enlightenment break in The Enlightenment: An 
Interpretation, especially Volume 1, The rise of modern paganism (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1966; 1995), Lawrence Stone’s The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1977), and Terry Eagleton’s The Rape of Clarissa: Writing, Sexuality, and Class 
Struggle in Richardson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). There have been some 
exciting challenges to these paradigms: for a discussion of political difference that considers relations as 
formative to female identity, see Helen Thompson’s Ingenuous Subjection: Compliance and Power in the 
Eighteenth-Century Domestic Novel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); for an 
example of the shifting affinities of class relations, see Kristina Straub’s Domestic Affairs: Intimacy, 
Eroticism and Violence Between Servants and Masters in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
 
6 See the introduction, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik – or How to Make Things Public,” in Making 
Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Boston: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 2005). 
 
7 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Knopf 
Doubleday, 1990), 93. 
 
8 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 26; my emphasis. 
 
9 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (London: Oxford, 
2005). 
 
10 Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 4. 
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11 ibid, 5 (my emphasis). 
 
12 ibid, 12. Armstrong has somewhat revised this claim in her later work How Novels Think: The Limits of 
Individualism, 1719-1900 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
 
13 William Warner, “Social Power and the Eighteenth-Century Novel: Foucault and Transparent Literary 
History,” in Eighteenth-Century Fiction, vol. 3, no. 3 (1991), 191. 
 
14 The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1956). 
 
15 ibid 177. 
 
16 Latour, Making Things Public, 34. 
 
17 Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 15. 
 
18 ibid 25. 
 
19 See Jonathan Kramnick, Actions and Objects from Hobbes to Richardson (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2010) and Julie Park, The Self and It: Novel Objects in Eighteenth-Century England (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2010). 
 
20 For example, Park writes “…the eighteenth-century self reached its most lively articulation through the 
material objects we traditional consider as trivial imitations or supplements of the human: dolls, machines, 
puppets, wigs, muffs, hats, pens, letters, bound books, and fictional narratives” (The Self and It, xiii). 
 
21 Kramnick, Actions and Objects 3. 
 
22 I use the term “relational self” to refer to a dynamic self at the intersections of his or her emotional, 
political, social, and sentimental networks, but I know this term has signified in other, more specific 
theoretical contexts.  For example, the “relational self” refers to the psychoanalytic approach to 
understanding the psyche -- one that asserts that “the psyche cannot be understood as a discrete, 
autonomous structure,” but rather as derived from “relational patterns and interactions,” particularly those 
governed by familial dynamics.  See Barbara Ann Schapiro, Literature and the Relational Self (New York: 
New York University Press, 1994), 2. 
 
23 See as examples of comparative approaches that aim for (very broad) contexts while remaining attentive 
to textual and contextual particulars, Franco Moretti’s Atlas of the European Novel, 1800-1900 (New York: 
Verso, 1998) and Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History (New York: Verso, 2005), 
Wai Chee Dimock’s Through Other Continents: American Literature American Literature across Deep 
Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), and Emily Apter’s The Translation Zone: A New 
Comparative Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
1 
Chapter One 
Spring: James Thomson’s Anxious Affinities 
 
1 For the very few works that address early eighteenth-century poetry’s relevance to the eighteenth-
century’s “modernizing moment,” see John Sitter’s Literary Loneliness in Mid-Eighteenth-Century 
England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), Margaret Doody’s The Daring Muse: Augustant Poetry 
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Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Anthony Low’s The Georgic Revolution 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), Blanford Parker’s Triumph of Augustan Poetics: English 
Literary Culture from Butler to Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and G. Gabrielle 
Starr’s Lyric Generations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
 
2 For one account of such a shift, see Lynn Hunt’s introduction to The Invention of Pornography: 
Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800 (New York: Zone Books, 1993). 
 
3 Particularly by Ralph Cohen, who in The Art of Discrimination: Thomson’s “The Seasons” and the 
Language of Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), establishes the enormity of the 
affective response registered in the readers of this period.  See, also his chapter on Spring, which he calls 
Thomson’s “love song” in The Unfolding of the Seasons (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 9-91.  
I am particularly attracted to Cohen’s emphasis on what others have called “process” criticism, “which 
concerns the making and revising of a work,” as opposed to “product” criticism, “which treats the work as 
a finished artifact” (Gary Morson, “Return to Process: The Unfolding of The Idiot,” New Literary History, 
Vol. 40 no. 4 [2009], 843). 
 
4 See John Aikin, An Essay on the Plan and Character of the Poem On The Seasons (1788); Sir Harris 
Nicholas, from the introduction to The Poetical Works of James Thomson (London, 1830), cited in Cohen, 
The Art of Discrimination 45-6.  Others testify to the intense experience of reading the seasons: “The reader 
of the Seasons,” Samuel Johnson mused, “wonders that he never saw before what Thomson shews him, and 
that he has never yet felt what Thomson impresses” (my emphasis; Lives of the English Poets, ed. George 
Birkbeck and Norman Hill [New York: Octagon Books, 1967], 272).  Frances Burney imagined just this 
type of readerly encounter in Camilla (1796), when she describes Melmond, a young scholar, becoming so 
enraptured by the “truly elegant and feeling description” of Spring as he reads it, that he “perceive[s] and 
regard[s] nothing but what he was about,” every so often punctuating his silent reading with “passionate 
ejaculations,” crying out that Thomson’s language is “too much! too much!” for him to physically bear.  
His performance draws a group of spectators who absorbingly witness him “writh[ing]” with the sensations 
and emotions generated, in swells, by the poetry (eds. Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom, [Oxford: 
Oxford Paperbacks, 2009] 99-100).  In a particularly suggestive example, the eccentric and flamboyant 
Percival Stockdale speculates in his Lectures on the Truly Eminent English Poets (1807) that such an 
affective response is encouraged by the reciprocal emotion in Thomson’s verse.  He writes: “The Heart; the 
Soul is poured forth, in every line.  You [the reader] see an anxiety; a tenderness; an interest for the cause 
which he pleads, which absorbs the whole man…”  For Stockdale, who claims that, in Thomson’s case, one 
can in fact “determine what the Author is, from his book,” Thomson is left exposed by his poetry, revealed 
to his reader in all his “anxiety” and “tenderness.”  But Stockdale more subtly recognizes that such 
intensely emotional verse also threatens to engulf the poet alongside the reader, to “absorb the whole man” 
into its passionate “cause.” 
 
5 Thomson wrote frequently and earnestly to Young; as Cohen notes in The Unfolding of the Seasons, these 
letters “reveal the consistency of [his] responses to unreciprocated love” (80), where “[h]is wish of virtuous 
love was based on a hope doomed to be unfulfilled, and unfulfilled at the moment of composition…[it] 
function[s] as a realm in which the pain of private experience was concealed behind the praise of a non-
existence but wished-for ideal” (87). 
 
6 For examples of such criticism on Thomson, see Heather Keenleyside’s “Personification for the People: 
On James Thomson’s The Seasons,” ELH Vol. 76, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 447-472; Sandro Jung, “Epic, 
Ode, or Something New: The Blending of Genres in Thomson’s Spring,” Papers on Language and 
Literature, Vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), 146-65, and Shaun Irlam, Elations: The Poetics of Enthusiasm in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
 
7 Peter Hanns Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2005), 7. 
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8 In “Personification for the People,” Keenleyside counteracts Ralph Cohen’s claims for periphrasis as a 
form of differentiation, which he understands as a way of organizing beings into a taxonomy that resembles 
the emerging natural historical classification system.  Keenleyside argues that, in Thomson, these 
categories are “confound[ed]” rather than “sharpen[ed]”: “’Human’ is not a stable term in Thomson’s 
system of periphrastic personifications.  If sheep and bees and flowers are personified in these phrases, so 
are human beings” (ELH [2009], 454). 
 
9 ibid 453. 
 
10 The first of these quotations is from Reill, Vitalizing Nature, 7; the second is a reference to Latour’s  
terminology in Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
 
11 The Seasons is an Augustan poem and “shar[es] with the major poetry of the period an awareness of the 
valued past, the corruption of this past in the present, the limited nature of human life, and the faith that a 
better life exists beyond ‘this dark State’” (The Unfolding of the Seasons,1).  Thus, the poem is “religious 
didactic…join[ing] eulogies, elegies, narratives, prospect views, historical catalogs, hymns, etc.” under its 
unified vision (ibid, 3). 
 
12 Goodman describes her project more specifically as a “literary prehistory to the insight…that some sort 
of affect or cognitive dissonance registers those unfixed elements of history that exude or exceed the 
Lockean idea” (Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism: Poetry and the Mediation of History, 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008]), 8.  Goodman proposes, as I do in this chapter, that 
georgic poetry often unexpectedly resonates with narratives of modernity: her focus is more specifically on 
the functions of georgic “media.” 
 
13 See Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Newton Demands the Muse: Newton’s Opticks and the eighteenth-century 
poets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946) and Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Varied God: A 
Critical Study of Thomson’s The Seasons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). For a more 
recent account of Thomson’s relationship to the natural landscape, see Tim Fulford, “’Nature’ Poetry,” The 
Cambridge Companion to Eighteenth-Century Poetry, ed. John Sitter (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).  For an interesting counterpoint, see Margaret Doody’s discussion of Thomson as “surreal” 
and “visionary,” as transcending Nature rather than as subordinating it, in The Daring Muse: Augustan 
Poetry Reconsidered – particularly the chapter on “Charivari and metamorphosis” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
 
14 For an account of Thomson’s sexual proclivities and the many suspicions of his friends on that score, see 
James Sambrook’s excellent biography, James Thomson (1700-1748): A Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991). 
 
15 See the introduction to James Thomson in David Fairer and Christine Gerrard, eds. Eighteenth-Century 
Poetry: An Anthology (2nd ed., London: Blackwell, 2004) in which Thomson is suggestively described as 
“harbour[ing] a private loneliness and guilt about some of his male friendships” (211). 
 
16 James Thomson, “On The Hoop,” The Poetical Works of James Thomson, Vol. II (London: William 
Pickering, 1830), 278-9. 
 
17 This “Song” appears as “Unless with my Amanda blest” in Millar’s edition of The Works of James 
Thomson, vol. 1 (London: Printed for A. Millar, 1752), 228. 
 
18 Spring, l. 505. Unless otherwise noted, I cite from the edition of Spring in Eighteenth-Century Poetry: An 
Annotated Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. David Fairer and Christine Gerrard (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2004), 212-238. 
 
19 ibid, ll. 518-9, 528.  
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20 ibid, ll. 572-3, 576-7.  
 
21 Thomson’s notion of the breast as both generative and receptive would seem more in line with archaic 
notions of sexual bodies instead of the newly emerging model of complementarity in the eighteenth 
century.  Thomas Laqueur describes the premodern one-sex model thus: “In the blood, semen, milk, and 
other fluids of the one-sex body, there is no female and no sharp boundary between the sexes.  Instead, a 
physiology of fungible fluids and corporeal flux represents in a different register the absence of specifically 
genital sex” (Laqueur, Making Sex, 35).  
 
22 For the few but lively discussions of the breast-as-landscape specific to eighteenth-century Britain, see 
Ruth Perry, “Colonizing the Breast: Sexuality and Maternity in Eighteenth-Century England,” Eighteenth-
Century Life, Vol. 2, no.2 (1991), 204-234, as well as Anne K. Mellor’s Romanticism and Gender (New 
York: Routledge, 1993), Marilyn Francus’s “The Monstrous Mother: Reproductive Anxiety in Swift and 
Pope,” ELH, Vol. 61 (1994), 829-851, and Julie Kipp’s Romanticism, Modernity and the Body Politic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
23 Kolodny, The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American Life and Letters 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 67 
 
24 ibid 9.  
 
25 Gillian Rose, Feminism & Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 88. 
 
26 ibid 89.  
 
27 In her seminal essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Mulvey declares that “The paradox of 
phallocentrism in all its manifestations is that it depends on the image of the castrated women [sic] to give 
order and meaning to its world…To summarize briefly: the function of woman in forming the patriarchal 
unconscious is twofold: she first symbolizes the castration threat by her real lack of a penis and secondly 
thereby raises her child into the symbolic.  Once this has been achieved, her meaning in the process is at an 
end.  It does not last into the world of law and language except as a memory, which oscillates between 
memory of maternal plenitude and memory of lack” (originally published in Screen in 1975, reprinted in 
Visual and Other Pleasures, 2nd ed. [Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009], 14-15).  In her introduction 
to the second edition of Visual and Other Pleasures published in 2009 Mulvey revises many of her 
conclusions about the voyeuristic aspects of cinema, in light of new technologies and developments in 
feminism over the past twenty years.  She moves away from the more straightforward “gaze” described in 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” to the more complex notions of “enigmas” and “curiosity,” which 
suggest a less dialectical and, even, more manifold mechanism at work in the processes of looking.  Still, 
Mulvey’s formulation is useful to me here -- particularly in Rose’s lovely summation of it -- because it 
helpfully describes the way in which the gaze is simultaneously a looking at Self and Other, precisely the 
kind of looking I go on to argue that Thomson does in the world of Spring. 
 
28 Sambrook discusses Thomson’s professional and personal relationship with Hertford at some length in 
the chapter on “Spring” in James Thomson, A Life.  
 
29 There are three essays exploring  this relationship, spanning approximately 50 years (from 1928-1976) by 
three principal authors.  Beginning with Helen Sard Hughes’s 1928 essay in Modern Philology, vol. 25 no. 
4, “Thomson and the Countess of Hertford,” followed by its sequel, “Thomson and Lady Hertford Again,” 
Modern Philology, Vol. 28 (1931), the topic is picked up again in earnest by Hilbert H. Campbell in the 
1970s, who inherits Hughes’ fascination and builds upon it with his title “Thomson and the Countess of 
Hertford Yet Again” (Modern Philology, Vol. 67, no. 4 [May 1970]).  In 1996, Alexander Lindsay also 
published a note in The Review of English Studies, “Thomson and the Countess of Hertford Yet Once 
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More,” that establishes Hertford as the subject of “To Seraphina,” a fragment in Lyttleton’s manuscript. 
Others, including Spacks (in The Varied God) and Ralph Cohen (in The Unfolding of the Seasons), and, of 
course, Sambrook, show an interest but do not explore the relationship in much depth. 
 
30 Cited in Hughes, “Thomson and the Countess of Hertford” 444. 
 
31 Hughes recounts a number of insights gleaned from her “examination of certain papers of the Percy 
family at Alnwick Castle.”  Hughes, for example, records a lovely anecdote in which Countess Hertford 
signed her copy of Thomson’s earliest version of “A Hymn on Solitude” with the name “F[rances]. 
Hartford,” Thomson’s pet-name for her in Spring (“Thomson and the Countess of Hertford,” 447). 
 
32 See Hughes 447. 
 
33 Cited in Hughes, ll. 44-9. The final lines, published in 1729 in Miscellaneous Poems, by Several 
Hands…Publish’d by Mr. Ralph, recall the earliest known version of the poem and read: 
Oh, let me pierce thy secret Cell! 
And in thy deep Recesses dwell;  
For ever with thy Raptures fir’d, 
For ever from the World retir’d; 
Nor by a mortal seen, save he 
A LYCIDAS, or LYCON be. (44-9) 
Hughes notes that “the B Version was subjected to certain minor changes—the rearrangement of certain 
lines, and two or three verbal changes, the most important of which was the replacing of “secret hill” of the 
B version by “secret cell” of the A version…” (449). 
 
34 Hughes may have suspected that Thomson was in love with his patron, but her efforts were focused on 
dismissing Samuel Johnson’s claim that Thomson fell out of favor with his patron and that Hertford did not 
support any of his other projects.  She imagines herself “rescu[ing] a literary lady from the unmerited 
disparagement of Dr. Johnson,” a “pleasant privilege even after many years” (“Thomson and the Countess 
of Hertford,” 439).  She only goes so far as to say that the two had a “friendly intercourse….which… 
Thomson enjoyed for many years” (“Thomson and Lady Hertford Again,” 468).  Of course, her findings 
are much more suggestive, but she seems unwilling -- or unable -- to explore their erotic significance. 
 
35 Sambrook calls her this in Thomson: A Life, 62-3. 
 
36 ll. 3, 11, 13-6. Reprinted in its entirety in H.H. Campbell, “Thomson and the Countess of Hertford Yet 
Again,” Modern Philology 67 (1970), 367-9; also quoted in Sambrook, Thomson: A Life 62. 
 
37 The poem initially had a different ending.  See Campbell, “Thomson and the Countess of Hertford Yet 
Again,” 367-8. 
 
38 Cited in ibid, 367-8, ll. 21-4. 
 
39 Spring ll. 1-4.  
 
40 Reill, Vitalizing Nature, 5. 
 
41 Cohen, Unfolding 13. 
 
42 Cohen, Unfolding 13, where he describes this process as a collaborative enterprise: ”Spring is a world 
governed by the principle of communal good achieved through the tempered mixture of individual wills.  
Thomson’s notion of the will is so comprehensive as to extend to brute, vegetative, and even elemental 
creation.  In this bountiful universe, mixture enables the providential and the plentiful, as when Nature 
‘mixes’ seed with land to generate the ‘food of Man:’ 
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With such a liberal hand has Nature flung 
…Seeds abroad, blown them about in Winds, 
Innumerous mix’d them with the nursing Mold, 
The moistening Current, and prolifick Rain.” (ll. 230-3) 
 
43 Spring ll. 185, 188. 
 
44 ibid, 568-71. 
 
45 Curiously, in this moment Thomson also emphasizes the capacity of nature to sentimentalize and refine 
an otherwise brutish human, “who dip[s] his Tongue in Gore,” by teaching him “alone to weep”: 
 “But Man, whom Nature form’d of milder Clay, 
  With every kind Emotion in his Heart, 
  And taught alone to weep; while from her Lap 
  She pours ten thousand Delicacies, Herbs, 
  And Fruits, as numerous as the Drops of Rain 
  Or Beams that gave them Birth: shall he, fair Form! 
  Who wears sweet Smiles, and looks erect on Heaven, 
  E’er stoop to mingle with the prowling Herd, 
  And dip his Tongue in Gore?” (ll. 349-357) 
 
46 Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 227. 
 
47 Thoughout this chapter, Reill’s Vitalizing Nature has been my touchstone for Thomson’s understanding 
of living, natural matter; for a more extensive history, see also John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution: 
Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Thomson’s 
specific influences came from his education at the progressive and liberal Divinity School in Edinburgh 
under William Hamilton, a latitudinarian who associated with the Newtonians in England, particularly 
Robert Stewart.  Hamilton was also involved in Whig politics – particularly, in his role as Principal of the 
Church of Scotland in the 1730s – but he was also rather controversially supportive of landed property 
rights.  Upon coming to London as a young poet, Thomson would also fall in with a collaborative, 
Whiggish coterie of poets and authors: the Hillerian Circle, whose members included Eliza Haywood, 
Richard Savage, and of course, Aaron Hill himself.   Hill was, like Thomson, interested in Newtonian 
sciecne and in the collaborative mechanics of the natural world.  For more on these influences, see 
Nicholson, Newton Demands the Muse; Sambrook, Thomson: A Life (particularly pp. 20-29); and Christine 
Gerrard’s study of the Hillerian Circle, Aaron Hill: The Muses’ Projector, 1685-1750 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
 
48 Spring, ll. 5-10. 
 
49 ibid l. 982.  
 
50 Spacks, Reading Eighteenth-Century Poetry (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); for her discussion of 
Thomson, see especially 2, 20, 36, 44-5. 
 
51 See, again, Keenleyside’s “Personification for the People,” ELH (2009) for a provocative discussion of 
Thomson’s formal experimentation. 
 
52 Jung, “Epic, Ode, or Something New: The Blending of Genres in Thomson’s Spring,” Papers on 
Language and Literature (2007), 153. 
 
53 See Irlam, Elations, especially 113-141. 
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54 Irlam has characterized the turn towards the “Vast” in Addison’s Pleasures of the Imagination as “a 
diversion of sentiment from an unmediated, supernatural infinity to an infinite, potentially divinized Nature 
and to the enormous emotive resources that landscape and space furnish to eighteenth-century poetry,” in 
Elations, 83. 
 
55 my emphasis; Addison, The Spectator 412, June 21, 1712. 
 
56 Addison, The Spectator 519, October 25, 1712.  
 
57 Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud 228. 
 
58 Addison, The Spectator 519, Saturday October 25, 1712. 
 
59 Thomson, A Poem Sacred to Issac Newton, in The Complete Works, ll. 100-2.  For more on the 
Newtonian influences of Spring, see Sambrook, Thomson: A Life (especially pp. 57-73); Nicholson, 
Newton Demands the Muse; for the relationship of Thomson’s politics and aesthetics to both Newtonianism 
and Shaftesburian benevolism, see Phillip Connell, “Newtonian Physico-Theology and the Varieties of 
Whiggism in James Thomson’s The Seasons,” Huntington Library Quarterly Vol. 72, no. 1 (2009), 1-28. 
 
60 Thomson, A Poem Sacred, ll. 102-11; 96, 98; 116-8. 
 
61 Henry Oldenburg, “A Letter of Mr Isaac Newton…containing His New Theory about Light and Colors,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London, Feb. 19 1671/72, Vol. 80, 3075-3087. 
 
62 my emphasis; Thomson, Spring ll. 103-6, 109-11. 
 
63 Responding in the same letter to the charge that a fellow scientist had, in fat, produced “white light” from 
compound (and thus, already mixed) colors, Newton flatly stated: “The rays of light do not act on one 
another in passing through the same Medium” (Oldenburg, “A Letter of Mr Isaac Newton,” 3078). 
 
64 According to Reill, “The basic epistemological problem was to understand the meaning of these signs [of 
nature] and to perceive the interaction of the individual yet linked active forces, powers, and energies 
without collapsing one into the other.  To resolve this problem Enlightenment vitalists called for a form of 
understanding that combined individualized elements of nature’s variety into a harmonic conjunction that 
recognized both nature’s unity and diversity” (Vitalizing Nature 8). 
 
65 Although Thomson is using synaesthesia in a straightforward way here, I cannot help but note the 
suggestiveness of its definition: it is also when “the sensation in one body part produced by a stimulus 
applied to another body part” (Oxford English Dictionary) 
 
66 Here, I am indebted to Cohen’s insight, who notes that “the product is already inhered in the process,” 
where the eye sees in the image of procreation and generation layers of the seasons, of the natural world.  
Winter also appears and lingers at the beginning of Spring (Unfolding 15). 
 
67 Thomson, Spring l. 121. 
 
68 As a technique, periphrasis provides the reader with a highly specific and particularized image.  For 
critics like Cohen, this specificity is indicative of “fragmentary experience that, in different perspectives, 
provides aspects of an unattainable whole” (Cohen, Unfolding 77). 
 
69 Thomson, Spring ll. 823, 179. 
 
70 Keenleyside writes: “’Human’ is not a stable term in Thomson’s system of periphrastic personifications.  
If sheep and bees and flowers are personified in these phrases, so are human beings.”  Keenleyside goes on 
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to argue that Thomson uses general terms like “people” in the way that Claude Levi-Strauss understands 
the term “species” – as a “medial classifer” – where “species drives a perpetual movement between 
universalization and particularization, in which the particular is not opposed but consequent to the 
individual” (“Personification for the People” 454). 
 
71 Samuel Johnson, Lives of the English Poets: Life of Thomson.  Johnson also says of Thomson: “He 
thinks in a particular train, and he thinks always as a man of genius; he looks round on Nature and on Life 
with the eye which Nature bestows only on a poet, the eye that distinguishes in every thing presented to its 
view whatever there is in which imagination can delight to be detained, and with a mind that at once 
comprehends the vast, and attends to the minute.  The reader of The Seasons wonders that he never saw 
before what Thomson shows him, and that he never yet has felt what Thomson impresses” (298-99). 
 
72 Thomson, Spring ll. 468-76. 
 
73 ibid, l. 480.  
 
74 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa; Or the History of A Young Lady.  Ed. Angus Ross (London: Penguin 
Books, 1985), 163. 
 
75 Sambrook Thomson: A Life 223; see also James Thomson: Letters and Documents, ed. Alan Dugald 
McKillop (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958), 165-6. 
 
76 See Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990. 
 
77 Thomson, Spring ll. 483-4.  
 
78 ibid, ll. 494-8.  
 
79 I am always reminded, in any moment where Thomson charges us to “See,” of Johnson’s observation 
that as readers “we wonder why we have never seen before what Thomson shows us.” Lives of the Poets: 
Life of Thomson, 299. 
 
80 See Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” in Visual and Other Pleasures, 14-30. 
 
81 Thomson, Spring l. 489-90.  
 
82 ibid, l. 492.  
 
83 ibid, ll. 511-2.  This image recurs later in the same scene as Thomson describes in delight the “various 
vegetative Tribes / Wrapt in a filmy Net,” as they suggestively drink from one another, “suck[ing]” and 
“swell[ing]” together, now an indistinguishable “twining Mass of Tubes” (ll. 556-66).  The speaker and his 
“panting Muse,” satiated together by this imagery of consummated vegetable love, “ascend” together from 
“the vegetable World” with a new “Theme” revealed: “the Passion of the Groves,” Thomson’s theorization 
of sexual love as fulfilling a higher communal purpose (ll. 572-5, 81). 
 
84 ibid, ll. 518, 555.  
 
85 ibid, l. 519.  
 
86 ibid, ll. 517, 525.  
 
87 ibid, ll. 526-44. 
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88 See Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, no. 3 (Autumn, 1988), 575-599, in which she describes the 
refusal to accept empirical categories as a form of feminist resistance.  Keenleyside observes this as well in 
her rebuttal to Cohen: she sees periphrasis as a way of organizing beings into a taxonomy that resembles 
the emerging natural historical classification system, but serves to “confound” rather than to sharpen its 
categories.  She writes, “’Human’ is not a stable term in Thomson’s system of periphrastic personifiations.  
If sheep and bees and flowers are personified in these phrases, so are human beings.”  Keenleyside shows 
how Thomson uses “people” in the same way that Claude Levi-Strauss understands “species” – as a 
“medial classifier” where the term “drives a perpetual movement between universalization and 
particularization, in which the particular is not opposed but consequent to the individual” (“Personification 
for the People” 454). 
 
89 “Polyanthus,” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Accessed October 28, 2008. 
 
90 Doody offers a provocative reading of this scene in The Daring Muse, p. 161. 
 
91 Thomson, Spring ll. 545-5.  
 
92  Given that Thomson has a fondness for anthropomorphizing his songbirds – whom he refers to as “the 
plumy People” in line 165) – it is easy to imagine a bird “wing” as analogous to the human “hand.” 
 
93 The phrase “Wonders of his Hand” certainly lend themselves to a reading of the florist as a divine 
presence, perhaps even as an extension of the “UNIVERSAL SOUL” that appears only a few lines later.  
But Thomson is careful to maintain that this is material work carried out by a specifically human – and 
thus, this-worldly – hand. However, in the passage where he praises the “UNIVERSAL SOUL” as the 
“SOURCE OF BEINGS,” it is described in a manner reminiscent of the gardener, “who, with a Master-
hand, / Hast the great Whole into Perfection touch’d” (ll. 556, 559-60). 
 
94 ibid, ll. 505-7.  
 
95 ibid, ll. 567-8, 574.  
 
96 ibid, ll. 570-1.  
 
97 Building from yet another image of shared vision – the confluence of his “varied Verse” with the “mazy-
running Soul” of the birds’ perpetual “Melody” – the poem thus proceeds by making a lengthy description 
of the colorful, diverse world of what are elsewhere referred to as the “plumy People” (l. 165): this, in 
language and structure strikingly similar to that of the multiplicitous plant world the reader has just left.  
Though it is some of the richest language in the poem and well worth the luxury of a read, I do not cite 
extensively from it here. 
 
98 The passage in its entirety:  
As rising from the vegetable World, 
My Theme ascends, with equal Wing ascend, 
My panting Muse; and hark, how loud the Woods 
Invite you forth in all your gayest Trim. 
Lend me your Song, ye Nightingales!  oh pour 
The mazy-running Soul of Melody 
Into my varied Verse!...  (ll. 572-7) 
 
99 ibid ll. 74-7.  
 
100 ibid, ll. 78-83.  
 211 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
101 ibid, ll. 97, 99-101.  
 
102 See lns. 114-142, as an example of this kind of imagery. 
 
103 ibid, ll. 456-64.  
 
104 ibid, ll. 959, 962-6. 
 
105 ibid, ll. 967-9.  
 
106 ibid, ll. 970-5.  
 
107 ibid, l. 1114-5.  
 
108 ibid, l. 1116-9.  
 
109 ibid, 296-300.  
 
110 ibid, ll. 1126-8.  Just prior to the poem’s final scene of mutual bliss, Thomson introduces two scenes of 
failed coupling to illustrate how the perversion of sexual passion does not serve what he considers the 
sacred “Purpose” of love.  See especially lines 959-75 and lines 1010-112. 
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Chapter Two 
Clarissa: Collective Relations and the Problem of Sexual Autonomy 
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the relationship between Clarissa and Lovelace as inherently oppositional, with Lovelace as dynamic and 
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(“Lovelace Ltd.,” ELH, vol. 65, no. 1 [1998], 99-121), 102. 
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even the most mundane details (Clarissa 40), and which Clarissa describes as writing “minutely,” and 
exceedingly pleasurable, a “delight…equal to that which [she] take[s] in conversing with [Anna] – by 
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